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POINT FIRE

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION



JULY 28, 1995

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

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.I58
P65
1995

Point Fire Investigation Team

September 7, 1995

Mr. Lester K. Rosenkrance
Director, Fire and Aviation
National Interagency Fire Center
3833 S. Development
Boise, ID 83705

Dear Mr. Rosenkrance:

The team formed on July 31, 1995, to investigate the fatal accident on the Point Fire has completed its work. This letter signifies the formal transmittal of the report to you.

Team members sought to identify the factual data relating to the accident and objectively develop findings, causal factors, and recommendations. We believe that the recommendations section of the report is the most important part of our work. Some of the recommendations are specific to the Point Fire; others may have regional or national application. We hope that through the team's work, the dangerous job of fighting wildland fires is made safer.

We would like to express our appreciation to the team members for their efforts in writing and assembling this report. We would also like to thank the Kuna Rural Fire Protection District and BLM firefighters, managers, and others who cooperated with us as we sought to obtain information that was vital to the production of this report. We recognize the difficulty of the task and the trying circumstances, yet their assistance was outstanding.

A final, printed version of this report should be available in two to three weeks.

Finally, we appreciate the assistance of many employees of NIFC, who provided valuable direction and support as this report was prepared. We appreciate the chance to have worked as members of this team, and hope you find that the report fulfills our charter.

Sincerely,

Dan Friend

Dan Friend, Co-leader
Chief, Eagle Fire Protection District

Michael T. Green, Co-leader
BLM Burns District Manager

DEDICATION

This report is dedicated to volunteer firefighters everywhere, who put their lives on the line whenever the call comes.

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1995

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

Accident: Wildland Fire Burn-Over, Multiple Fatalities

Location: Boise District, Bureau of Land Management
Kuna, Idaho

Date: July 28, 1995

Investigation Co-Leader: Mike Green,
Bureau of Land Management

Investigation Co-Leader: Dan Friend,
Eagle Fire Protection District

Members:

Hugh Thompson, Forest Supervisor, Dixie National Forest, Cedar City, Utah

Mark Rabdau, Assistant Chief, Eagle Fire Protection District

Don Smurthwaite, BLM Information Officer, Boise, Idaho

Stan Palmer, BLM Safety and Health Manager, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, Idaho

Mike Morcom, BLM Station Manager, Vale, Oregon

Ron Hvizdak, Fire Management Officer, Rexford Ranger District, Eureka, Montana

Jim Hocking, Writer/ Editor, Missoula, Montana

Liaison with BLM:
Jan Peterson, BLM Safety/Occupational Health, Boise, Idaho

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POINT FIRE OVERVIEW

DATE OF INCIDENT: JULY 28, 1995
TIME OF INCIDENT: 1829 MDT
INCIDENT NAME: POINT FIRE
LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF LOCATION: T1N R1W SECTION 35 SE1/4 NW1/4

Late in the afternoon of July 28, 1995, thunderstorms began to move into southwestern Idaho from northern Nevada. The thunderstorms produced little or no moisture, and the lightning associated with them sparked dozens of wildfires.

At 1829, the Danskin Lookout reported a wildfire northeast of Initial Point, about 16 miles southwest of Boise, Idaho. The wildfire was also reported by several citizens and the Ada County Dispatch Center. At 1831, the Bureau of Land Management's Boise District Dispatch sent the "Wild West" Unit to the wildfire. The Wild West Unit consists of two "type 4X" wildland engines (Engine 67 and Salmon District Engine 425) and a "type 6X" slip-on. The crew boss, Dave Kerby, drove to the wildfire in a Suburban.

More resources soon were dispatched. BLM's "Unit C" included three "type 4X" engines (Engine 09, Engine 83 and Boise National Forest Engine E-61) and a Suburban driven by unit leader Blas Telleria. Additionally, one "type 2" water tender and a transport with a bulldozer were sent.

The Wild West Unit was first to arrive on the scene at about 1900. Crew boss Kerby assumed the role of Incident Commander (IC).

The Point Fire was actively burning in sagebrush and cheatgrass with moderate rates of spread and 3 to 5 foot flame lengths along the flanks. Because of higher-than-normal spring moisture, cheatgrass growth was especially dense, estimated in excess of 3,000 pounds per acre. Mature sagebrush from 3 to 4 feet high also added to the fuel load. The fire size when the Wild West Unit arrived was estimated at 60 to 65 acres. Winds were generally from the west at 4 to 6 miles per hour.

IC Kerby was contacted by Boise BLM Dispatch and asked if the Kuna Rural Fire District (Kuna RFD) was on the scene. Kerby said that he had not seen any rural fire department equipment or personnel. Kerby was then contacted by Kuna Fire Chief Rich Cromwell (Kuna 650) and asked if assistance was needed. The BLM IC replied that he could use a brush truck and a water tender. At 1907, Kuna 650 radioed Ada County Dispatch and requested three vehicles to respond. Kuna Engine 620, a 1,500 gallon brush truck, Kuna Engine 622, a 1,750 gallon brush truck, and a 2,500 gallon water tender (625) responded. The Kuna vehicles departed from their fire stations at 1911 for the wildfire.

The Wild West Unit arrived at the southeast corner of the wildfire on Swan Falls Road, a two-lane paved road running north-south. Its initial strategy was to keep the fire from crossing Swan Falls Road to the east, and to minimize the loss of resources and property in the Snake River Birds of Prey National Conservation Area. (See Map #1.) The IC tactically positioned the type 6X slip-on along Swan Falls Road. The assignment was to burn out along the road to keep the fire from crossing it. Engines 67 and 425 followed the IC to an area near the fire's point of origin at the southwest corner.

The engine crews were instructed to anchor and split up and directly attack the flanks, using water pumped through their hoses, called "live reels." Engine 425 worked the southern flank east toward Swan Falls Road, while Engine 67 worked the northern flank eastward, also toward Swan Falls Road. Shortly after the flanking operation began, the BLM dozer arrived and was assigned to work the southern flank, constructing a line behind Engine 425 to the east.

A helicopter departed the Boise airport at 1857 enroute to the Point Fire. The helicopter picked up the IC for a reconnaisance flight. During the flight, BLM Unit C arrived on the scene along Swan Falls Road. Two of the Unit C engines, 61 and 83, were assigned to directly attack the northern flank, west from Swan Falls Road. Engine 09 was sent to directly attack the southern flank west from Swan Falls Road. Telleria, the Unit C leader, assisted the type 6X Wild West slip-on with securing Swan Falls Road.

Kuna RFD Engines 620, 622 and 625 arrived just behind Unit C at about 1930. The brush trucks were assigned to work behind Engines 61 and 83. Doyle McPherson, the Kuna captain (6803), came to the scene on Engine 620 and was dropped off on Swan Falls Road at Tender 625 to act as Kuna Command, as directed by Chief Cromwell.

Shortly thereafter, Engine 61 and Engine 83 began flanking the north line, working west from Swan Falls Road. Kuna Engines 620 and 622 drove around them in tandem and 620 began working a flare-up on the fire line, using nozzles attached to the front bumper while driving next to the fire's edge. Engine 622 trailed Engine 620, conserving water. (See Map #2.)

At 2010, IC Kerby stated that engines on both flanks had met and the spread of the fire had been stopped. He estimated the size of the fire at 120 acres. The dozer continued working the southern edge toward Swan Falls Road.

Red Flag Warning

At 2022, BLM Boise Dispatch reported a "red flag warning" for dry lightning and locally strong winds had been issued by the National Weather Service. Red flag warnings are given to alert fire personnel to potentially dangerous conditions. At the Point Fire, wind gusts of up to 50 miles per hour were predicted from a thunderstorm, or "cell," that was moving northward at about 30 miles per hour. Telleria radioed Kerby and requested that he reinforce the fire's northern perimeter. Upon receiving the red flag warning, IC Kerby alerted Engines 61, 67 and 83 along the northern perimeter to anticipate gusty winds.

Kuna RFD Engines 620 and 622 continued to mop-up along the perimeter working west along the northern flank, then south around the west end and turning east. They passed the BLM dozer, Engines 425 and 09, ending up at a fence on the southeast corner of the fire line. There, Kuna RFD Engine 622's crew met with Brian Barney, driving the Wild West slip-on. Kuna RFD Engine 622 received directions over Barney's radio to turn around and work back around the perimeter, and to soak the perimeter with water. Kuna RFD Engines 622 and 620 (in that order), turned around and worked their way west along the southern perimeter. The Kuna engines worked in tandem to the southwest corner, then turned north and worked along the western perimeter, where Kuna RFD

Engine 622 ran out of water. Kuna RFD Engine 620 then went around Engine 622, using its remaining water. While following along behind Kuna RFD Engine 620, Engine 622 contacted the BLM IC for instructions. IC Kerby informed Kuna RFD Engine 622 to refill with water and standby due to predicted high winds. At that time Kuna RFD Engine 622 pulled off the line and drove east through the burned area toward Swan Falls Road.

Kuna RFD Engine 622, just prior to reaching Swan Falls Road, was contacted by Kuna RFD Engine 620 on the radio (BLM tactical channel 16). Engine 620's crew said that the vehicle was overheating. Kuna RFD 622 instructed the crew to remove the screen from the radiator. Kuna RFD Engine 620 acknowledged, "Remove the screen." After a time, Kuna RFD 622 pulled onto Swan Falls Road, turned south, and met with Tender 625, located south of the southeast corner of the fire, where refill operations started. Kuna RFD Engine 620 was not with Engine 622.

Sometime after Kuna RFD Engine 622 went to refill, Kuna RFD Engine 620 passed Engine 61 and Engine 67 on the west end of the fire line. Soon after, and for unknown reasons, Kuna RFD Engine 620 turned north on a two-track road at its intersection along the fire's northern perimeter. (See Map 3, point A.) Kuna RFD Engine 620 traveled along the two-track road for 1,945 feet (point C), where it turned off the two tracks and drove east and then north-northeast cross country another 1,786 feet through heavy sagebrush. At this point, the vehicle became disabled (point E). The vehicle was 713 feet west of Swan Falls Road and 1,750 feet north of the northern fire perimeter.

At about 2046, the fire escaped from the northern perimeter at several locations, fanned by strong, southerly winds from the thunderstorm. Telleria and Bob Stroud, a BLM fire investigator, were in a Suburban and immediately drove north on Swan Falls Road, about 2,000 feet from the original northern perimeter to assess fire behavior. To their surprise and horror, they witnessed a stationary Kuna engine in the path of the oncoming flame front. Telleria repeatedly attempted to radio the Kuna Engine and Kuna Command on the BLM tactical channel, but received no response. Telleria then radioed Engine 83's foreman, Lance Lane, a trained medical responder, and advised him that his skills may be needed. Telleria also radioed Boise BLM Dispatch and requested an ambulance and police assistance. (See Map #4.) At that time, Telleria was unsure if Kuna RFD Engine 620 was occupied.

At 2049, Kuna RFD Engine 620 contacted Kuna Command on the Ada County South frequency and reported, "We're on the north line, Doyle, we got fire coming hard and this thing has died." The speaker was Bill Buttram, a 31-year old volunteer fireman with Kuna RFD. The second fireman in the vehicle was 18-year old Josh Oliver of the Kuna RFD. A minute later, Engine 620 contacted Kuna Command again on the same channel. "It's not going to let us out of here!"

Kuna 650 asked Engine 620, "What kind of problem do you have?" Buttram's reply was, "We're surrounded by fire!" Kuna 650 asked him to repeat. "The truck's been overtaken by fire!"

That was the last transmission from Kuna RFD Engine 620.

The fire was moving rapidly and burning intensely. Flame lengths were at least 20 feet long, and the rate of spread was estimated to be about 560 feet per minute. It took about 4 minutes from the point of escape for the fire to overrun the truck. (See Map #5.)


INITIAL ATTACK BY "WILD WEST" CREW
ON POINT FIRE, KUNA, IDAHO
DAVE KERBY- IC AT APPROXIMATELY
1900 HOURS 7-28-95
MAP 1
TO KUNA
Nicholson Rd.
SWAN
FALLS
RD.
Section 26
Section 35
Original fire
line prior to
Initial Attack
Wild West
Slip-on
E-67
Kerby
E-425
Wind
Direction


UNIT "C" ON LOCATION AT POINT FIRE
KUNA, IDAHO - TO ASSIST "WILD WEST".
KUNA UNITS ARRIVE WITH UNIT "C"
AT APPROXIMATELY 1930 HOURS 7-28-95
MAP 2
TO KUNA
Nicholson Rd.
SWAN FALLS RD.
Kerby's Suburban
(Kerby in 81 Echo Alpha flying fire)
K625 & McPherson
Stroud
Telleria
E-83
E-61
K622
K620
Section 26
Section 35
E-67
Original fire line during initial attack
Wild West Slip-on
E-09
Wind Direction
Cat Line
Dozer
E-425

In the early stages of the fire, the two Kuna RFD engines and two BLM engines worked the north flank of the fire.

Winds were mild with flame lengths in the 3 to 5 foot range. A little more than an hour after crews arrived, the fire spread had been stopped.

Winds gusting to over 40 miles an hour caused the Point Fire to blow up, leading to the entrapment of the two firefighters.

SITE DESCRIPTION OF FATAL BURN-OVER
OF BRUSH ENGINE
KUNA, IDAHO 7-28-95

MAP 3




VEHICLE/CREW LOCATIONS KNOWN AT
TIME OF BLOW-UP ON POINT FIRE, KUNA,
IDAHO AT APPROXIMATELY 2049 HOURS
7-28-95
MAP 4
TO KUNA
Nicholson Rd.
Ranger
Miracle
SWAN
FALLS
RD.
K620
Wind Direction
Flame Front
of Blow-Up at 3
minutes
Telleria/
Stroud
Hunter/
Sandner
Dozer
Section 26
Section 35
Original fire line
prior to Blow Up
E-61
E-83
E-425
E-09
E-67
Kerby
BLM
Tender
Wild West
Slip-on
McPherson
K625
K622
Cat Line


VEHICLE/CREW LOCATIONS KNOWN AT TIME OF BLOW-UP ON POINT FIRE, KUNA, IDAHO AT APPROXIMATELY 2052 HOURS 7-28-95
MAP 5
TO KUNA
W West
Slip-on
Ranger
Miracle
Nicholson Rd.
SWAN FALLS RD.
K622
Telleria
E-425
K620
Hunter
K625
Flame front of Blow-Up at 6 minutes
Wind Direction
Dozer
E-61
Original perimeter of fire line
Section 26
Section 35
E-83
Kerby
E-67
E-09
BLM Tender
Cat Line

Rescue Attempts

Rescue efforts were hampered by the duration and intensity of the fire, caused by the heavy sagebrush fuel.

After the flame front passed, several rescue attempts were made by members of Kuna RFD and BLM crews. The residual heat from the sagebrush made the first few attempts to reach the engine impossible. At 2121, Kuna RFD Engine 622 was able to approach the vehicle. Engine 620 was still on fire. Kuna RFD Engine 622 extinguished the flames and gained access to the vehicle. Kuna Command was notified that two fatalities had occurred.

Most fatalities that occur on wildfires are not the result of a single mistake or circumstance. Rather, they occur as a chain of unfortunate occurrences. Such is the case in the deaths of Bill Buttram and Josh Oliver. Taken individually, the three primary events that led to the accident were all probably survivable, and perhaps, not even remarkable. But when the decision to leave the burned area and drive into heavy, unburned fuels was grouped with Kuna RFD Engine 620 stalling and the advent of 40 to 50 mile-an-hour winds from the thunderstorm, it proved to be a fatal combination of events.



Point Fire scene. Fire started in lower portion. Swan Falls Road (asphalt) to right of initial fire area.



Site where Engine 620 was overrun by fire.

INVESTIGATION PROCESS

The investigation of the Point Fire fatalities was initiated by the Bureau of Land Management through its National Fire and Aviation office in Boise, Idaho.

The team's charter was:

1. Identify factual data associated with the circumstances relating to the accident.

2. Accurately and objectively record the findings.

3. Analyze the findings to identify the significant factors involved and their relationships.

4. As appropriate, recommend actions that should be implemented immediately to prevent similar future occurrences.

5. Establish liaison with, and involve appropriately, local, county, state and federal officials who have a jurisdictional responsibility relative to this accident.

6. Develop and submit an investigation report as soon as possible, but no later than 45 days from the accident.

The team convened Monday, July 31, at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise for initial briefings and instructions regarding the investigation process.

In the following days the team interviewed witnesses, examined the incident site, discussed the incident with members of the Kuna Rural Fire District, BLM Boise District employees and others who had information pertinent to the investigation. The team also collected information such as weather data and burning conditions at the site of the fire.

Assignments were made to team members. The remainder of the week involved collection of data, documentation of events, and interviews with many of the persons associated with the accident.

Kuna RFD had the vehicle removed from the accident scene late on July 28th. Two mechanics volunteered to examine the truck for external evidence of drive train failure. No evidence was found. Clothing recovered from the vehicle was sent to the U.S. Forest Service's Missoula Technical Development Center (MTDC) for determination of fire protection effectiveness.

The team closed out the initial phase of the investigation in Boise on August 6, 1995. The team reconvened on August 15-18 to review the draft report, and most team members met again August 24-25 to further refine the report.

The final report was presented to Lester K. Rosenkrance, Director, Office of Fire and Aviation, on September 7, 1995.

FINDINGS

A. FIRE BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

1. The primary fuel type was cheatgrass and sagebrush. It most closely correlates to Fuel Model 2.

2. Live fuel moisture levels (water content of foliage expressed as a percentage of its oven-dry weight) in sagebrush were approximately 90-106%.

3. Dead fuel (annual grasses and woody material) moisture levels (water content of a fuel expressed as a percentage of its oven-dry weight) were 2-6%.

4. Dead fuel content (sagebrush) was about 25%.

5. The fuel types present coupled with their low moisture content caused an extremely fast rate of fire spread when combined with the high winds that prevailed on the fire at the time of the accident.

6. Greater than normal spring rains had created an abundance of cheatgrass, exceeding 3,000 lbs. per acre.

7. The area encompassed by the fire was basically flat, with gently rolling terrain and few natural obstructions. This allowed an almost continuous fuel bed.

8. Afternoon temperatures on July 28 reached 100 degrees fahrenheit. Relative humidity was about 15%.

9. The thunderstorm that approached the fire from the south contained downdrafts and strong winds, estimated to be in excess of 40 mph.

10. The BLM Boise District Dispatch transmitted a red flag warning at 2022 on July 28 for the area included in the Point Fire.

11. A Haines Index of "6 high" was calculated for the area on July 28. The Haines Index is a tool used to measure the contribution of atmospheric stability to the growth potential of existing wildfires.

B. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

1. The control objective for the Point Fire area was influenced by its location within the Snake River Birds of Prey National Conservation Area. This area is classified as the second highest priority for the Boise District for fire control. The BLM Boise District's Fire Management Activity Plan (FMAP) objectives call for containment of fires at 50 acres or less in this area. Only the Boise Front area, with its numerous residential areas and critical watershed, is classified as a higher priority.

2. The Kuna RFD chief asked the BLM IC if assistance was needed in suppressing the Point Fire. The BLM IC responded by requesting 1 engine and a water tender from Kuna RFD.

3. A safety briefing specific to this fire was not done by BLM initial attack crews upon arriving at the fire scene. The Kuna RFD firefighters of Engines 620 and 622 received instructions from their command to stay together and to fall in behind the BLM engines prior to beginning firefighting activity.

4. Strategies and tactics used by the BLM IC were sound.

C. Control Mechanisms

Communications

1. Lack of common communication ability contributed to this incident. The BLM IC could not monitor Kuna Command because the frequency was not programed into his radio.

2. Some Kuna crews had the capability to utilize the Boise District frequencies while others did not. Kuna Command did not have complete radio communications capability at all times with all the units.

While Kuna RFD Engines 620 and 622 had communication capabilities with both BLM and Kuna Command, they could not communicate with Kuna Command when they switched to the BLM frequency.

3. A critical lack of communication occurred when the crew of Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not communicate its intention to leave the fire line.

4. The Salmon BLM crew (Engine 425), Kuna water tender 625, Kuna Command (6803) and the Ada County Dispatch Center did not hear the red flag warning broadcast by BLM Boise District Dispatch.

10 Standard Fire Orders/18 Situations That Shout "Watch Out"

1. Eight of the ten standard fire orders were compromised on this fire by one or more crews.

2. Eight of the 18 Situations That Shout "Watch Out" were not recognized by one or more crews.

D. Involved Personnel

Training

Team members reviewed all training records for the personnel involved in the Point Fire. A full copy of training records is available in the official investigative file.

1. Firefighters on the Point Fire had a variety of experience and training. BLM firefighter experience ranged from 3 months to 29 seasons. Kuna RFD firefighters' experience ranged from 2 months to 21 years.

2. While Kuna RFD personnel were well trained for fighting structure fires, most firefighters on the Point Fire had only five hours of wildland fire training in 1995. That training was requested by Kuna RFD in June and July, and was provided by the BLM Boise District.

3. Kuna RFD Engine 622 had a combined experience of 31 years. Kuna RFD Engine 620 had about 1.5 seasons of combined wildland fire experience. BLM engine crews had an average of 8 seasons of experience. (A season equates to 4 months.)

ATTITUDES

1. Kuna RFD engine personnel at times did not follow orders issued by Kuna Command or the BLM IC. For example, the Chief directed Kuna RFD Engines 620 and 622 to stay together on the fire and Kuna Command 6803 instructed both Kuna engines to fall in behind the BLM engines.

2. A relaxed attitude prevailed when the fire's spread was stopped. That was evidenced by requests from both BLM and Kuna RFD to allow inexperienced personnel to operate engines on the firelines.

3. A complacent attitude toward safety was displayed by some BLM firefighters, particularly regarding the use of PPE. Agency standards regarding safety were overlooked or ignored in several instances on the Point Fire.

4. No attempts were made to verify a safe location of all crews by BLM or Kuna RFD when the blow-up occurred.

LEADERSHIP

1. Kuna Command (6803) stayed on Swan Falls Road, where he could see much of the fire activity. However, he had limited radio communication with Kuna crews, and no communication with BLM during initial suppression efforts.

2. Two less experienced Kuna RFD firefighters occupied the same engine. To compensate, however, Kuna Command ordered the two engines to stay together on the fire and follow the BLM engines.

3. The BLM IC and Kuna Command 6803 did not make physical contact to clarify details of the shared command process.

4. Kuna RFD had successfully participated with BLM on a previous wildland fire on July 3, 1995, using the Unified Command approach outlined in the Incident Command System.

5. The Boise District and Kuna RFD has no formal mutual aid fire protection and suppression agreement that details radio frequencies to use, incident command protocol and standard operating procedures, safety, personal protective equipment requirements, training, and qualifications for firefighters.

E. EQUIPMENT

1. The Kuna RFD engine crews had personal protective equipment, including bunker pants and structural (rubber) boots, and structural helmets. They did not, however, have fire shelters.

2. Kuna RFD Engine 620 experienced mechanical problems (overheating) earlier in the season and on the Point Fire prior to the blow up.

3. There were adequate resources (both equipment and personnel) to successfully fight this fire in its initial stages.

4. Kuna RFD Engine 620 was reported by its crew as stalled just prior to the burnover.

5. The crew of Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not have adequate means to spray the vehicle, thus eliminating one possible way of protecting themselves and the truck.

6. No maintenance records were kept for Kuna RFD Engine 620 to help determine its reliability for fighting wildland fires.

It is not known exactly when or why the Kuna RFD Engine 620 crew left the safety of the burned area and proceeded into the unburned area north of the fireline at a time when the fire appeared to be stopped. The most likely explanation is that the crew of Kuna RFD Engine 620 had run out of water and believed that the water tender was located farther north on Swan Falls Road. Kuna RFD Engine 620 may have left the safety of the burned area when the fire's progress had been halted and embarked cross-country in an attempt to save time. A definite explanation will never be known. It is clear that the failure of their vehicle in dense fuels at the critical time when the winds picked up placed the crew members in a perilous situation from which they could not escape.

CAUSAL FACTORS

More than any other factor, the accident hinged on Kuna RFD Engine 620 leaving the safety of the burned area. By leaving the burned area and traveling into unburned fuels as a serious storm front approached, the crew of Kuna RFD Engine 620 placed themselves in an extremely dangerous situation.

Other omissions of safe firefighting procedures also occurred on the Point Fire. An analysis of the 10 Standard Fire Orders and 18 Situations That Shout "Watch Out!" was completed. The results of this analysis appear later in this report.

DIRECT CAUSAL FACTORS

- Mechanical failure of Kuna RFD Engine 620.

- Kuna RFD Engine 620 crew members did not communicate their intent to leave the burned area, which was their safety zone.

- Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not follow instructions of Kuna Command.

- Extreme weather phenomenon combined with the very heavy flashy fuels located where the vehicle stalled.

INDIRECT CAUSAL FACTORS

Leadership deficiencies indirectly contributed to this incident.

- The BLM and Kuna ICs never met on the fire.

- Kuna Command remained on Swan Falls Road without the capability to communicate with Boise BLM, and allowed less experienced personnel to staff one engine.

- There is no formal mutual aid agreement between Kuna RFD and BLM, or operational plan similar to that which exists for wildfires in the Boise Front.

- There is no local or state entity in Idaho that has an oversight role and the responsibility to set training and qualification standards for rural firefighters and equipment involved in wildland and urban interface fire management.

ENTRAPMENT INVESTIGATION ELEMENT MATRIX

	DID NOT CONTRIBUTE	INFLUENCED	SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION
I. FIRE BEHAVIOR			
Fuels			✓
Weather			✓
Topography	✓		
Predicted vs. Observed	✓		
II. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS			
Smoke	✓		
Temperature			✓
Visibility		✓	
Slope	✓		
Other	✓		
III. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT			
Incident Objectives		✓	
Strategy	✓		
Tactics	✓		
Safety Briefings/Major Concerns Addressed		✓	
Instructions Given	✓		
IV. CONTROL MECHANISMS			
Span of Control	✓		
Communications			✓
Ongoing Evaluations		✓	
"10 Standard Fire Orders/ 18 Watch-Out Situations"			✓
V. INVOLVED PERSONNEL PROFILES			
Training/Quals/Physical Fitness			✓
Operational Period Length/Fatigue	✓		
Attitudes		✓	
Leadership		✓	
Experience Levels			✓
VI. EQUIPMENT			
Availability			✓
Performance/Non-Performance			✓
Equipment Adequacy, Flexibility, and Options		✓	

ENTRAPMENT INVESTIGATION

FIRE BEHAVIOR

FUELS

(Significant Contribution) Fuel types on this fire were pertinent to the incident. Fuels consisted of an unbroken expanse of dense, cured cheatgrass, about 1-2 feet high, mixed with mature sagebrush 3 to 4 feet tall, of which about 25 percent was dead (Model 2). Sagebrush contributed to the burn duration. Live fuel moisture was 90-106%; dead fuel moisture was 2-6%.

Wet spring weather allowed the cheatgrass to reach unusual density and height. Recent dry and hot weather cured the cheatgrass to a point where it became a fuel that would ignite easily and burn rapidly.

WEATHER

(Significant Contribution) In the days preceding the incident, the weather had been hot and dry. On the day of the incident, temperatures were near 100 degrees. Relative humidity was approximately 15%; the Haines Index was 6 high.

Dry lightning ignited the Point Fire late in the afternoon. Winds were light at ignition and for some time thereafter while initial attack measures were being taken. No weather observations were taken at the site.

A red flag weather warning for the area was transmitted by the BLM Boise District at 2022.

A severe storm cell began to move in from the south, reaching the fire about 2040. Winds from the south increased, with gusts up to 50 miles an hour. Strong winds continued for several hours into the late evening and night.

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

HEAT

(Significant Contribution) Heat generated by the burning fuels when the fire overran the truck, coupled with heat from the burning vehicle itself, made the victims' environment unsurvivable.

VISIBILITY

(Influenced) The gently rolling terrain may have hidden the location of engines, depending on their position on the fire. Consequently, Kuna RFD Engine 620 was out of view and able to move off the fire line without being observed by other engines.

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

INCIDENT OBJECTIVES

(Influenced) The objectives of fire control in this area are influenced by the fact that it lies in the Snake River Birds of Prey National Conservation Area. This designation prompted BLM to classify

the area as the second highest suppression priority of the Boise District for fire management purposes. FMAP objectives call for containment of fires at 50 acres or less.

SAFETY BRIEFINGS

(Influenced) A safety briefing was provided to the Kuna Rural Fire District by its chief and captain prior to beginning suppression action. The BLM crews did not have a safety briefing prior to initial attack of the Point Fire. The "LCES" (lookouts, communications, escape routes, safety zones) was not established.

No briefings were held jointly between BLM and Kuna RFD firefighters. No special safety briefings were conducted at the time the red flag warning was issued.

CONTROL MECHANISMS

COMMUNICATIONS

(Significant Contribution) Lack of common communication capability hampered coordination of resources on the fire scene. Some of the Kuna RFD units had the ability to switch to the Boise District frequencies and those tactical frequencies used by BLM personnel on the fire itself. Other Kuna RFD units lacked any common frequencies with BLM. Kuna Command did not have complete radio coverage with its own engines and personnel on the fire when a mobile hand-held radio was used. Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not communicate its intention of leaving the burned area, which was its safety zone.

Kuna Command was on Swan Falls Road with a hand-held radio that did not have BLM or B-Front frequencies. Kuna RFD 625, the water tender, was parked on Swan Falls Road with a radio that did not have BLM frequencies. Kuna RFD Engines 622 and 620 were driving along the fireline and had their radios on channel 16, which enabled communication with BLM. All radios have scan capabilities, with a selected priority channel. The priority channel is the channel that is selected on the dial. The BLM radios were not capable of communicating on the Kuna frequencies. BLM engines and the IC along the fireline had their radios on BLM frequencies. Because of the limitations of Kuna Command's radio, communications with Kuna RFD Engines 620 and 622 were not possible while they were communicating on channel 16. At the time Kuna RFD Engine 620 was overrun by the fire, its radio was on channnel 154.400.

The problem with communication on the Point Fire was illustrated most dramatically at the time of the blow up. The Unit C Leader was aware of Kuna RFD Engine 620's location and the peril faced by the crew, but could not contact anyone from Kuna. At the same time, Kuna Command knew of pending trouble, but did not know Engine 620's location, and was trying frantically to contact anyone who did.



Typical fuels at the Point Fire were mature sagebrush with an understory of cheatgrass.

Kuna Rural Fire District has the following radio capabilities:

BLM	6803 (KUNA COMMAND)	625	622	620
163.9375 DIRECT 163.175 TAC-2 163.837 TAC-1 167.950 AIR NET 154.280 B-FRNT	1- 154.400 YEL 1- 154.175 K/T 3- 154.250 RED 4- 154.190 NAMPA 5- 155.055 PURP 6- 155.280 F-1 7- 155.340 F-2 8- SCAN	1- 154.400 YEL 2- 154.250 RED 3- 154.370 BRNZ 4- 154.430 ORNG 5- 154.160 GRAY 6- 154.280 B-FRNT 7- 154.190 NAMPA 8- 153.890 MELBA 9- 155.340 F-1 10- 155.280 F-2 11- 155.055 RXEMS 153.995 TX 12- 155.265 ACEMS 13- 154.265 CCEMS 14- BLANK 15- BLANK 16- BLANK 17- BLANK 18- 155.260 S&R 19- BLANK 20- 154.175K/T	1- 154.400 YEL 2- 154.250 RED 3- 154.370 BRNZ 4- 154.430 ORNG 5- 154.160 GRAY 6- 154.280 B-FRNT 7- 154.190 NAMPA 8- 153.840 MELBA 9- 155.340 F-1 10- 155.280 F-2 11- 155.055 EMSRX 153.995 TX 12- 155.265 ACEMS 13- 154.265 CCEMS 14- 163.8375 BLM 15- 163.175 BLM 16- 163.9375 BLM 17- 163.9375 BLM 163.125 BLM 18- 155.160 S&R 20- 154.175 K/T	1- 154.400 YEL 2- 154.250 RED 3- 154.370 BRNZ 4- 154.430 ORNG 5- 154.160 GRAY 6- 154.280 B-FRNT 7- 154.190 NAMPA 8- 153.840 MELBA 9- 155.340 F-1 10- 155.280 F-2 11- 155.055 EMSR 153.995 TX 12- 155.265 AEMS 13- 154.265 CEMS 14- 163.8375 BLM 15- 163.175 BLM 16- 163.9375 BLM 17- 163.9375 BLM 163.125 TX 18- 155.160 S&R 20- 154.175 K/T

Other communication problems existed on the Point Fire.

The BLM Boise Dispatch radio system experienced a brief operational problem with Tactical Net 2 at the time of the fire. It was later remedied.

BLM Boise Dispatch did not notify all persons involved in the Point Fire that Kerby was the designated IC.

The Salmon BLM crew leader stated he did not hear the broadcast red flag warning relayed by Boise Dispatch. Ada County Dispatch Center does not receive Weather Service red flag warnings.

The BLM Boise Dispatch does not have a continuous tape recording of its radio traffic with time encoding capability. A radio logbook is used. Some sharing of a single logbook between two radio dispatchers occurs. The radio log lacked significant documentation pertaining to events on the Point Fire.

ONGOING EVALUATIONS

(Influenced) At the time the red flag warning was broadcast from BLM Boise Dispatch, no regrouping of personnel for a safety briefing occurred. No request for confirmation was made that the message had been copied by all units on the fire.

Eight of the 10 Standard Orders and 8 of the 18 "Watch Out" Situations were compromised on the Point Fire.

INVOLVED PERSONNEL PROFILES

TRAINING/QUALIFICATIONS

(Significant Contribution)
The investigative team examined all training records for involved personnel. A full copy of the records is in the official investigative file.

The firefighters on the Point Fire represented a wide range of firefighting training and experience. The BLM firefighters' experience ranged from 3 months to 29 seasons. (A season equals 4 months.) Their qualifications ranged from firefighter type 2 (40 hours) to Incident Commander type 3. These qualifications are in accordance with Wildland Fire Qualification Subsystem Guide, PMS 310-1.

The Kuna RFD firefighters' experience ranged from 2 months to 21 years. Their qualifications ranged from firefighter with 12 hours of training to Fire Captain. Kuna RFD's Engine 622 had a combined experience level of 31 years. Kuna RFD Engine 620 had a combined experience level of 1.5 seasons of wildland fire experience. BLM's engine crew had an average of 8 seasons of experience.

The training records provided by Kuna RFD showed BLM provided the following wildland firefighter training:

June 15: Basic Firefighter Safety - 3 hours.
July 6: Helicopter Training - 2 hours.

This training was provided by BLM Boise District. (The agenda for this training is listed in the "Records" section.)

Both organizations provided the necessary training for the firefighters to do their primary job; wildland fire suppression for BLM, and structural fire suppression for Kuna RFD. Rural fire departments in Idaho have no standards for wildland firefighting equipment, personal protective equipment, or training.

All firefighters had met their organization's required physical fitness levels. Again, these levels are different for their primary job. Fatigue (long work hours) was not a contributing factor in this accident.

ATTITUDE

(Influenced) The first of the Ten Standard Orders speaks to fighting fire aggressively, but providing for safety first. This is a basic policy of wildland firefighting. On the Point Fire, the aggressiveness demonstrated by firefighters put themselves at risk. Kuna RFD Engines 620 and 622 in at least one instance attacked the fire very aggressively without due regard to the limitations of their engines and equipment. This was apparent when the Kuna RFD engines did not follow the lead of BLM engines as directed by Kuna Command, choosing instead to move ahead and attack hot spots.

There was a lack of cohesiveness between units on the fire as evidenced by failure to understand the differences in the capabilities among units, the lack of teamwork, a feeling of competition between units to attack the fire, and failure to maintain communication among engines and firefighters.

A "relaxed" attitude became apparent at the time the fire's spread was essentially stopped. This is evidenced by shedding of required PPE by some federal crew members, and switching to less experienced drivers during a time when the fire was knocked down, but not controlled.

It was at the time when the fire had slowed that Kuna RFD Engine 620 was last seen on the fireline. Evidence suggests it was at that time that the engine turned into the unburned area.

No attempts to verify location of all crews by either the BLM IC or Kuna Command were made when the fire blew up.

Leadership

(Influenced)

Command Structure Prior to the Blow Up: The first crew boss on the wildfire was Dave Kerby, who arrived at 1900. He assumed the role of IC as the first crew boss on site, which is a standard BLM Boise District practice. However, no confirmation of his IC status was given over the radio by BLM Boise Dispatch.

When Unit C arrived at 1927, Blas Telleria worked on the fire in the crew boss capacity. He was given geographic responsibility from the BLM IC to coordinate fire suppression efforts along the northern perimeter and Swan Falls Road.

The Kuna RFD engines and Kuna IC, Doyle McPherson, arrived at 1930 hours. The Kuna IC attempted to contact the BLM IC, but was unsuccessful. The Kuna IC briefed his crew and sent them into the fire area, and he remained on Swan Falls Road. From this point until the blow up occurred, the Kuna IC was not involved in the strategies, tactics or coordination with either Kuna RFD Engines 620 and 622, or the BLM IC. Kuna Command communication capabilities consisted of a handheld radio that did not have the frequency to contact BLM.

Command Structure During the Blow Up and Accident: The BLM IC was not in proximity of the accident, and was cut off from the northeast side of the fire when it blew up. The Unit C crew boss informed him that he would handle the accident. This allowed the IC to maintain tactical control of equipment and personnel still fighting fire on the west flank. Unit C crew boss coordinated information with BLM Boise Dispatch about the accident. Kuna Command used a cellular phone to coordinate efforts through Ada County Dispatch.

In summary, from 1930 to 2046, the approximate time of the blow up, neither the IC nor Kuna Command made contact with one another. The BLM IC was not aware that Kuna Command was present on the fire.

Experience Levels

(Significant Contribution) The Point Fire was from the start a potentially serious fire and a threat to the safety of all firefighters. The wildland firefighting experience level of the various Kuna RFD firefighters varied from two months to many years. Crew members of Kuna RFD Engine 620 had a combined total of 1.5 seasons of wildland fire suppression. The BLM crews had an average of eight seasons of experience in fighting this type of fire.

Equipment Availability

(Influenced) Fire shelters were not available to the victims, nor to any other of the Kuna RFD firefighters. It cannot be determined with certainty that additional PPE would have altered the outcome of this incident. Reports show that some firefighters have survived in similar circumstances when fire shelters were properly deployed.

At the request of the investigative team, experts at the U.S. Forest Service's Missoula Technology and Development Center (MTDC) inspected and analyzed the protective clothing and equipment recovered from Kuna RFD Engine 620. (See the full report, *Technical Analysis of Personal Protective Equipment*, in the "Records and Reports" section.)

They concluded that the clothing worn by the victims was adequate for fighting structural fires, but was not suitable for wildland fire. The report suggests that the victims' decision to stay in the truck caused them to be exposed to higher temperatures for a greater length of time than if they had left the vehicle and laid on the ground.

Performance of Equipment

(Significant Influence) The Kuna firefighters reported that Engine 620 was stalled. Kuna RFD Engine 620 had overheated on a previous wildfire and it was having overheating problems on this fire prior to the burnover. The driver of Engine 620 did not state the specific problem with the truck prior to the burnover, only that "This thing has died."

Equipment Adequacy, Flexibility, and Options

(Influenced) The accident may not have had such dire consequences if the vehicle been equipped to deal with the emergency situations that occurred during the burnover. The engine had no live reels, no way to quickly protect itself with direct water spray, and no fire shelters. Had there been sufficient remaining water, those devices may have provided enough protection to weather the burnover. No maintenance records were kept for Kuna RFD Engine 620, making it difficult for the investigative team to determine if it was in suitable condition for wildland fire fighting.

TEN STANDARD ORDERS

The Ten Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 "Watch Out " Situations are designed to help firefighters be aware of dangerous circumstances and reduce firefighting risks. They also serve as an analytical tool to help assess what errors might have occurred during an incident. Federal wildland firefighters are instructed in the 10 Standard Orders and 18 "Watch Out" Situations and are expected to recognize and know them.

An asterisk denotes orders or watch out situations that were compromised or ignored.

1.* *Fight fire aggressively, but provide for safety first.*

Most crews on the Point Fire did this consistently.

Some crew members were not wearing all items of PPE.

Kuna RFD did aggressively attack the fire, but did not adequately provide for safety as evidenced by the fact that fire shelters were not provided.

Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not maintain an adequate safety zone.

2.* *Initiate all action based on current and expected fire behavior.*

Some crews were pulled into the burned area and the dozer was repositioned. IC Kerby told Kuna RFD Engine 622 to standby because of expected high winds.

Some of the crews on the Point Fire did not receive word of the expected rapid change in weather.

Not all personnel reacted appropriately upon receipt of the red flag warning.

3.* *Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.*

Some crews recognized a storm was coming before the warning was issued.

A red flag warning was broadcast by BLM Boise District. Kuna RFD was not able to convey this information to all its crew members.

One BLM crew leader did not receive this warning, but recognized the oncoming storm cell.

4. *Ensure instructions are given and understood. (Not compromised)*

BLM IC gave appropriate tactical instructions to all crews.

Kuna Fire Command provided initial instructions to its crews.

5.* *Obtain current information on fire status.*

The fire's status changed dramatically when the high winds struck. Information about fire behavior and the location of all firefighters was incomplete due to poor communication capabilities.

Kuna Command failed to contact and obtain briefing from BLM IC upon arrival at the fire.

6.* *Remain in communication with crew members, your supervisor and adjoining forces.*
This order was compromised by all parties on the fire at times. BLM Boise Dispatch had momentary radio frequency problems that caused some confusion.

There was no communication between the BLM IC and Kuna Command.

The Kuna IC left Engine 620 (which had provided him with all operating radio channels on the incident) and operated on foot with a handheld radio that was unable to transmit/receive on all channels used on the fire.

Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not communicate its intention to turn north and leave the safety of the burned area.

7.* *Determine safety zones and escape routes.*
BLM crews and Kuna RFD Engine 622 were very cognizant of the burned area as their safety zone and used it throughout the fire. Some engine crews failed to utilize the burned area consistently. This failure ultimately lead to the burnover of Kuna RFD Engine 620.

No reminder was given to firefighters that the burned area was their safety zone, although the majority of firefighters recognized it as such.

8. *Establish lookouts in potentially hazardous situations. (Not compromised)*
The fire location was in gently rolling terrain, providing no potentially hazardous situations, so no lookouts were posted. Personnel, both BLM and Kuna RFD, had a generally good view of the fire.

9.* *Retain control at all times.*
Kuna Command did not contact the BLM IC to notify him of his presence. Prior to the accident, the BLM IC and Kuna Command were separated physically in the early stages of the fire, making unified control difficult or impossible. Consequently, no unified control organization was established. Kuna Command, after giving specific instructions to its engine crews, did not intercede when these orders were violated.

10.* *Stay alert, keep calm, think clearly, act decisively.*
While most firefighters did this, there were instances where firefighters did not follow all of this standard order.

18 Situations That Shout "Watch Out"

1. *The fire is not scouted and sized up.*
   This was accomplished, both on the ground and by helicopter.

2. *You are in country not seen in the daylight.*
   This was not an issue.

3.* *Safety zones and escape routes are not identified.*
   Though not specifically identified, most crews demonstrated their understanding that the burned area was their safety zone throughout the course of the fire.

   Kuna RFD Engine 620 did not use the burned area as a safety zone.

4.* *You are unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.*
   Even the most experienced members of fire crews were surprised at the extreme rate of spread as the erratic weather behavior reached the fire. The Kuna RFD Engine 620 crew did not recognize the effect of changing weather conditions on fire behavior.

5. *You are not informed of tactics, strategy, and hazards.*
   All units were given strategy and tactics information.

6.* *Instructions and assignments are not clear.*
   Instructions were not an issue, but there was confusion because of lack of communication and coordination between BLM and Kuna RFD on the incident.

7.* *No communication link has been established with crew members or your supervisor.*
   Various units on the fire did not have communications with BLM IC and/or BLM Boise Dispatch.

   Kuna IC could not maintain continuous radio contact with all the units on the fire, nor with the BLM units.

8. *You are constructing line without a safe anchor point.*
   This was not an issue.

9. *You are building fireline downhill with fire below.*
   This was not an issue.

10. *You are attempting a frontal assault on the fire.*
    This was not an issue.

11.* *There is unburned fuel between you and the fire.*
    Kuna RFD Engine 620 crossed into unburned fuels to a location 1,750 feet from the fire's edge.

12. *You cannot see the main fire and are not in contact with someone who can.*
This was not an issue.

13. *You are on a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below you.*
This was not an issue.

14. *The weather is becoming hotter and drier.*
This was not an issue.

15.* *The wind is increasing and/or changing direction.*
While most crews were aware of this, the firefighters of Kuna RFD Engine 620 apparently were not, at least until it was too late to take evasive action.

16.* *You are getting frequent spot fires across the line.*
This in itself was not a direct cause of the incident. Though spot fires were not present, frequent breakouts were occurring along the line.

17.* *The terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.*
Once the fire escaped the lines, given the winds at the time and resulting rapid spread rates, escape to safety zones could be extremely difficult for someone in front of the fire. This is the situation in which Kuna Engine 620 found itself.

18. *You are taking a nap near the fireline.*
This was not an issue.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATIONS

The most important part of this report could very well be the recommendations found in this section. Lessons, however painful, can be learned from the tragedy that occured at the Point Fire. If the recommendations help to make the difficult job of fighting wildfires safer, then the investigation team's efforts will have been worthwhile.

Some of the recommendations are of limited geographic applicability; others may have far-ranging utility. Recommendations that require immediate attention are marked by an asterisk.

A. Incident Command and Leadership Factors

A lack of coordination between the BLM IC and the Kuna RFD command was apparent on the Point Fire. No physical contact was made or radio communication maintained between the two entities. No mutual aid agreement exists defining wildland firefighting roles and responsibilities.

Recommendations

1.* BLM and cooperating local entities should review Incident Command System alternatives to clarify roles under combinations of jurisdictions.

Where there is a multi-agency response to a single jurisdiction, a single IC should be used. Multiple jurisdictions, such as mixed ownership lands where structure protection is required, may continue to require a shared command. If there is a question about jurisdictions, agency supervisors must mutually decide on the command structure as soon as they arrive at the fire. Once this decision has been made, the organization in use should be broadcast to all units on the fire as well as dispatch centers.

2. All adjoining federal, state, and local agencies should work toward securing formal mutual aid agreements for fire protection and suppression. Formal agreements should identify operating procedures, including command structure, and common radio communications.

3. All mutual aid entities should foster increased interaction between agency fire management personnel and local entities (primarily rural fire departments) to generate better understanding of the duties, responsibilities, and capabilities of the cooperating entities. Activities such as prescribed burns, training, post-wildfire critiques, and managed or simulated fires could provide valuable experience in fire control and firefighting skills.

4. BLM needs to reaffirm the necessity of providing basic safety briefings to crews when fire conditions or weather conditions change significantly.

5. The State of Idaho is urged to establish an entity whose role would include oversight responsibility to establish, coordinate and maintain standards for wildland firefighter qualifications, training and equipment. Without such oversight, rural volunteer firefighters will continue to be asked to perform duties for which they may not have been adequately trained.

6. It is further recommended that the Idaho State Association of Fire Chiefs take the lead in explaining to the public and elected officials the need for the above-mentioned oversight role in the Idaho State government.

7. It is recommended that agencies not request, accept or use wildland firefighters or equipment that do not meet mutually negotiated standards as identified in mutual aid agreements.

B. COMMUNICATIONS

Communication, or lack of adequate communication, was a significant factor in this incident. Specifically, common radio communications were not always available to all firefighters on the Point Fire. Instructions and warnings were not always received, and consistent radio contact with engines was not always possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. BLM and local cooperators should begin to develop and strengthen regional mutual aid communication plans, including radio frequency use and management.

2.* All cooperating entities should inventory their capabilities to ensure that they are able to communicate on common radio channels. BLM and rural fire departments should consider exchanging radios during multi-agency wildfires.

3. The BLM Boise District should provide its Dispatch Center with tape recording capabilities that include automatic time encoding.

4.* BLM Boise Dispatch should immediately modify its current logging process for documenting radio transmissions by providing a log for each radio dispatch console. Also, BLM Boise Dispatch should initiate a separate log specific to each fire whenever possible and limit entries to activities specific to that fire.

5. BLM Boise District should better observe National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) standards for engine designation, identification of individuals and so forth. Use of "clear text" guidelines need to be emphasized. Agency-specific terms, slang, and ten codes need to be eliminated.

6. All agencies should reaffirm the need for engines to notify the IC when they re-position themselves, run low on water, and the route they will take to refill.

7.* Severe weather warnings should be provided to the appropriate city or county dispatch center annd the center should broadcast these warnings to those monitoring their frequencies.

C. EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

This incident identified significant variations between federal and rural organizations in the types of equipment and training provided for wildland firefighters. Rural fire departments have no uniform standards for equipment and training for wildland firefighting.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Cooperating entities involved in wildland firefighting are encouraged to provide themselves with personal protective equipment that meets the National Fire Protection Association Standard #1977. Further, it is strongly recommended that each wildland firefighter be equipped with a fire shelter.

2.* BLM and cooperators should perform and document weekly inspections of equipment and personal protective equipment, including fire extinguishers, hoses, fittings, connectors, vehicle fluid levels, drive lines, tires, etc. Equipment that experiences a breakdown on an incident or exercise should be thoroughly examined by qualified personnel and certified by management to be in working order before it is again placed in service. Equipment with a history of mechanical failure should not be used in off-road wildland fire suppression efforts, unless corrective steps have been taken.

3. BLM should contact the MTDC for information currently being gathered regarding staying in a vehicle overrun by fire versus leaving the vehicle and deploying fire shelters. Such information, when available, should be shared with all cooperators involved in wildland fire suppression.

4.* Engines must be equipped to distribute water around the entire vehicle for protection in emergencies. Engines must retain enough water in the tank at all times to provide protection in an emergency.

5. Engines should always carry one or more individuals with enough training and experience to recognize and avoid unsafe practices.

6. Federal agencies, in cooperation with state and local officials, should implement basic wildland firefighting training, using the NWCG wildland firefighter training program as a standard for rural fire departments and other cooperators involved in wildland fire suppression.

D. INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although not directly tied to the Point Fire, the team suggests that three improvements in the investigation process be incorporated in any similar efforts in the future.

1. The investigation process must begin promptly after an incident occurs. Incidents with the loss of lives should receive an immediate response, by the local unit involved and by agency officials. When logistically possible, the investigation team should be on site within hours of a fatality.

2. The local unit involved must also act quickly to preserve evidence, gather initial statements and photographs, provide for site security and prepare for investigation team briefings. It should prepare a list of persons to contact, and prepare maps and other documents that will be needed.

3. An investigation "handbook" needs to be developed that provides guidelines for team membership, investigation process and other relevant information.

SUPPORTING DATA

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: JULY 28 · 1995

1829 BLM lookout reports fire from Danskin Lookout.

1831 BLM dispatcher dispatches Wild West Crew to the Point Fire.

1833 Unit C, with crew boss Blas Telleria, requested to go to Point Fire.

1857 Helicopter off from Boise enroute to Point Fire.

1900 Wild West crew arrives on fire. Crew boss Dave Kerby becomes Incident Commander (IC).

1905 Kuna Rural Fire Department Chief (650) asks BLM IC if assistance is needed. IC Kerby requests a brush truck and water tender.

1907 Kuna RFD Chief dispatches engines 620, 622, and 625 to the fire via Ada County Dispatch.

1911 Kuna RFD engines depart Kuna fire stations for the fire.

1915 Kuna Rural Fire Chief instructs engines 620 and 622 to stay together on the fire.

1927 BLM crew leader Telleria and Unit C arrive on fire.

1930 Kuna RFD engines 620, 622, and 625 arrive on fire, with 6803 in engine 620.

1937 BLM helicopter is released from fire.

2010 IC Kerby estimates spread of fire has been stopped at 120 acres.

2022 BLM broadcasts red flag warning via BLM radio frequency.

2046 Approximate time fire blow-up begins.

2049 Kuna RFD Engine 620 reports via radio to Kuna Command, "We're on the north line, Doyle, we got fire coming hard, this thing has died."

2050 Kuna RFD Engine 620 reports, "It's not going to let us out of here."

2051 Kuna RFD Chief asks Engine 620 what kind of problem they have. Engine 620 responds, "We're surrounded by fire." Chief asks for repeat. Engine 620 responds, "The truck's been overtaken by fire!"

2052 Kuna unit 650 (Fire Chief) departs for fire. Kuna Unit 641 dispatched to fire.

2055 Kuna ambulance dispatched to fire.

2104 Law enforcement unit dispatched to fire for traffic control.

2115 BLM crew leader Telleria reports to BLM dispatch that Kuna fire engine is on fire and personnel not accounted for.

2121 Kuna RFD Enginne 620 is reached and bodies discovered inside cab.

2130 Law enforcement authorities are notified of deaths.

Bureau of Land Management Organization
July 28, 1995
Point Fire



KUNA FIRE DISTRICT ORGANIZATION
JULY 28, 1995
POINT FIRE



OTHER UNITS DISPATCHED LATER

- 641
- 605
- 601

SITE INVESTIGATION

GROUND CONDITIONS

The area where the fire burned and the fatalities occurred was sagebrush with annual grass cover. Above-normal winter and spring precipitation led to a thick, lush growth of cheatgrass (3,000 lbs/acre). The cheatgrass was fully cured at the time of the fire.

The sagebrush and grasses were fairly continuous and heavy. Shrub heights were 3 to 4 feet. Live woody fuel moistures were estimated to be in the range of 90% to 106%, based on Weather Information Management System (WIMS) indices. About 25% of the stand of sagebrush consisted of dead plants and plant material.

The primary carrier of the fire was grass. The sagebrush contributed to the intensities and longer duration of the fire. The fuel model classifies out as fuel Model 2 under the Fire Behavior Prediction System, and fuel model "T" under the National Fire Danger Rating System.

The fuel moisture content of the grasses was likely 2% to 4% at the time of the fire. The larger dead woody material had moistures ranging from 4% to 6%. These estimates match the readings taken from WIMS outputs from the Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS).

After the burnover, the fire rapidly spread into areas of similar fuels as well as Fuel Model 1 (grasses) and Model 3 (wheat fields).

Because of the intensity of the burn, virtually all ground cover was removed. Even the sagebrush stems were burned level with the ground.



Kuna RFD Engine 620 after burnover.

Kuna RFD Engine 620 after burnover. Note cotton hose still intact on reel. Fire approached engine from rear.

FIRE BEHAVIOR REPORT

FUELS

The area where the fire burned and the fatalities occurred was sagebrush with a thick grass cover. Above-normal winter and spring precipitation led to a thick, lush growth of cheatgrass. The cheatgrass was fully cured at the time of the fire.

The sagebrush was fairly continuous and heavy. Shrub heights were 3 to 4 feet. Live woody fuel moistures were estimated to be in the range of 90%-106%, based on Weather Information Management System (WIMS) indices. About 25% of the stand of sagebrush consisted of dead plants and plant material.

The primary carrier of the fire was grass. The sagebrush contributed to the intensities and longer duration of the fire. The fuel model classifies the vegetation as fuel Model 2 under the Fire Behavior Prediction System, and Fuel Model T under the National Fire Danger Rating System.

The fuel moisture content of the grasses was likely 2%-4% at the time of the fire. The larger dead woody material had moistures ranging from 4%-6%. These estimates match the readings taken from Weather Information Management System (WIMS) outputs from Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS).

After the burnover, the fire rapidly spread into areas of similar fuels as well as Fuel Model 1 (grasses) and Model 3 (wheat fields).

WEATHER

PRIOR CONDITIONS

Above-normal precipitation during the winter and spring led to abundant growth of cheatgrass and other grasses. Listed below is the precipitation in inches compared to normal at the Boise National Weather Service office between November 1994 and July 1995.

Inches	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July
Actual	1.78	1.79	2.10	.51	1.51	1.03	2.36	.88	.59
Normal	1.48	1.36	1.45	1.07	1.29	1.24	1.08	.81	.35
Diff.	.30	.43	.65	-.56	.22	-.21	1.28	.09	.24

The weather pattern two weeks prior to the fire was more typical for the area, with temperatures ranging from the upper 80s to upper 90s, relative humidities in the low to mid-teens, and no precipitation. These conditions led to rapid curing of the grasses and lowering the live fuel moistures in the shrubs. The 10 hour fuel moisture, measured at the Boise National Weather Service Station, reached a low of 4% by July 28.

FRIDAY, JULY 28, 1995

After several days of hot, dry high pressure, an upper level trough of low pressure approached the area. This brought in enough moisture to trigger strong, dry thunderstorms, prompting the National Weather Service to issue a fire weather watch for dry lightning for the late afternoon and night. Dry thunderstorms did actually develop in the afternoon and within 24 hours started 21 wildfires in the Boise District, including the Point Fire.

Weather conditions during initial attack activities were hot and dry with light winds. Initial attack resources did not take weather readings at the site. They did, however, report winds to be light and predominantly out of the west at 4-6 miles an hour. Temperatures were near 100 degrees fahrenheit, and relative humidity was about 15%. The crews did notice more thunder cells building to the west and south.

At 2022, the National Weather Service issued a red flag warning for dry lightning and locally strong winds. Information relayed to the Point Fire IC called for expected wind gusts of up to 50 mph, with the storms moving northeast at about 30 miles per hour.

About 15 to 20 minutes after the red flag warning was issued to the initial attack IC, strong winds associated with a dry thunderstorm hit the fire area. Strong downdrafts caused the fire to blow up in a northerly direction, then northeasterly. Wind speed estimates from personnel on site ranged from 20 to 40 miles per hour. The wind speed 20 feet above the surface was about 20-30 miles per hour, with gusts over 40 miles per hour.

HAINES INDEX

The Haines Index for July 28, 1995, was calculated to be "6 high." Based on the atmospheric conditions over the fire, a Haines Index value of 6 high correlates to a high potential for large fire growth. The combination of strong thunderstorm-associated winds and a 6 high Haines Index contributed to the blow up on July 28.

RAWS Units

RAWS units used to help in analyzing weather conditions were the Boise Test Unit, located about 15 miles northeast of the fire, and the Triangle Unit, located about 25 miles southwest of the fire.

Boise RAWS
July 28, 1995

Time	Temperature	Relative Humidity	Average Windspeed	Direction	Peak Windspeed
1200	98	12	3	204	17
1300	99	13	5	311	10
1400	99	13	6	022	12
1500	101	13	4	040	10
1600	102	13	5	335	11
1700	103	13	4	351	14
1800	105	13	2	029	10
1900	102	13	4	139	10
2000	97	16	2	30	12
2100	92	20	15	285	25
2200	94	16	20	264	40
2300	91	19	7	253	49
2400	88	22	5	095	9

TRIANGLE RAWS
JULY 28, 1995

TIME	TEMPERATURE	RELATIVE HUMIDITY	AVERAGE WINDSPEED	DIRECTION	PEAK WINDSPEED
1200	90	19	14	213	22
1300	91	17	17	237	32
1400	92	18	17	241	32
1500	93	18	17	241	31
1600	94	15	16	228	28
1700	94	15	15	256	32
1800	92	15	18	239	35
1900	90	16	17	230	28
2000	84	20	11	269	25
2100	71	48	22	262	43
2200	72	44	7	215	22
2300	73	40	10	200	13
2400	81	23	27	227	49

TOPOGRAPHY

The terrain in the Point Fire area was relatively flat, with some rolling hills. Topography did not have much influence on the fire. The open nature of the terrain did not provide any natural breaks, leaving the area open to wind flows.

POTENTIAL FIRE BEHAVIOR

No formal prediction of fire behavior was made on the Point Fire before the tragedies occurred since it was in the initial attack stages. Using information gathered through interviews, witness statements, RAWS outputs,weather forecasts, photographs. video tape, and on-site visits, it is possible to use the fire behavior prediction systems to determine rates of spread and fire intensities. This information can aid in approximating the time that the fire escaped the fire line and overran the two firefighters.

The inputs and data sources for the potential fire behavior calculations are listed below:

Fuel Model	2	Model 2 is used to model fire behavior in grass with shrub overstory and litter.
1 hour fuel	2-4	1 hour fuel moisture was calculated using forecasted moisture temperature and humidity. They were also taken from RAWS outputs.
10 hour fuel	4	Value from Boise RAWS moisture
100 hour fuel	6	Value from Boise RAWS and moisture meter probe tests moisture.
Herbaceous	3	Value from Boise RAWS fuel moisture
Mid-flame	18	Estimate from sources on the site during blow-up. Some gusts were estimated to be higher, but the 18 mph estimate coincides with RAWS data.

The calculated rate of spread (ROS) during the initial stages of the blow-up and ensuing burnover on July 28 was 510 chains/hour. This computes to ann ROS of 561 feet/minute.

The calculated flame length (FL) was 23 feet. Actual visual observations ranged from 15 to 30 feet. Fireline intensity was calculated to be approximately 4966 BTU/foot/second. The predicted ROS and FL are in a range where major fire runs are probable, and control options are limited.

ACTUAL FIRE BEHAVIOR

The fire behavior on the evening of July 28 is referred to as a blow-up. A blow-up is defined as a sudden increase in fireline intensity sufficient to preclude immediate control, which is what happened at the Point Fire. (See Maps 4-5.)

Lightning started the Point Fire at about 1829. The fire spread to the east at about 57 chains per hour. The fire burned up a gentle westerly facing slope toward Swan Falls Road in sagebrush and

grass. Flame lengths at the head of the fire were about 6 to 9 feet, too intense for attacking. By the time the initial attack crews began suppression action at the rear of the fire, it had burned 60 to 65 acres, and the head was near Swan Falls Road.

Flame lengths along the flanks were about 3 to 5 feet. Winds during the initial attack were westerly at 4 to 6 mph. Primary wind direction encountered by the initial attack crews was northwest, with temporary gusts from the southwest. By the time the initial flanking action was completed, the fire was temporarily stopped at 120 acres.

When the strong winds associated with the thunderstorms began to blow at about 2046 from the south, re-kindling of the sagebrush began along the edges. This was particularly true along the north line.

The initial attack crews reported numerous breakouts over the north line. Although their fire line was only a temporary wet line at the time, it is unlikely it would have held under the windy conditions even if a dozer line had been constructed.

As the numerous breakouts occurred, they quickly burned together and became a large line of fire moving to the north. The northwest portion of the line apparently escaped first, which was likely to happen since the eastern portion of the line was sheltered somewhat by a small ridge. At almost the same time, a finger of fire began burning just west of the fence along Swan Falls Road.

The resulting flame front looked like a horseshoe to observers on the Swan Falls Road, with two fingers moving north. Its likely that much of the control line between the two fingers broke out a short time later and started filling in between the two fingers. The lead finger of fire was likely past Kuna RFD Engine 620 on the ridge west of the truck's location about 3 minutes after the fire escaped. The remainder of the flame front likely overran Kuna RFD Engine 620 within 4 to 5 minutes after the blow-up began.

The heavy, continuous sagebrush led to a longer duration of fire than normal grass fires usually sustain. This is evidenced by the time (about 20 minutes) it took for anyone to reach the site of the burned-over truck to attempt a rescue. Virtually all plant material, both herbaceous and woody, was consumed by the fire.

Shortly after the truck was overrun by fire, the wind switched to the northwest, according to observers on Swan Falls Road. The wind also appeared to increase.

Although no calculations have been made for the remainder of the fire, it made a rapid run to the northeast and ended up burning about 10,000 acres in the next 3 hours. The fire burned through 3 basic fuel types: grass/sagebrush, grass, and grain fields. Some structures were lost during the burn. Fuels were broken in places by green fields, plowed fields, and roads. Winds started subsiding around midnight, but not until the fire had run over 9 miles. The ROS can be measured to be about 240 chains/hour, but it would likely have been much more if it had not been for the broken continuity of the fuels and the higher night-time fuel moistures.

PROPERTY DAMAGE REPORT

WRECKAGE EXAMINATION

General Description: Surplus military 6-wheel drive truck

USFS/BLM designation: Type 4X

ID Number: 33,3332

Engine: Regular Gas

Tank: 1,500 gallons

Pump: Single Stage Hale — Wisconsin 2 cylinder

The vehicle, a converted 1954 surplus military 6 wheel drive, was removed from the site of the burn-over on the night of July 28 by lifting it intact with a crane-type wrecker. It was placed on a flatbed recovery truck and transported to a secured area. The truck was inspected in the tow operator's yard.

GENERAL APPEARANCE

Kuna RFD Engine 620 was sitting on the ground directly on the rims and axles. The springs were warped and had lost their flexibility. The tires were completely burned off, with the exception of the area that contacted the ground. Tire pieces were found in the cab of the truck, where they were put during transport. The metal was discolored and many of the flat areas on the tank and cab were warped due to the extreme heat of the fire. The red paint was burned off and only a tinge of color was found on the top near the water tank fill hatch.

THE CAB

The top of the cab, a fiberglass aftermarket addition, was gone. The remains (small, de-laminated pieces of glass cloth) were found on the seats and floorboards, along with the bracket and rotators from the Code 3 lightbar.

The seats, a driver's bucket and a 2-passenger bench, were mostly burned. The seat backs were only wire and flat metal, and the seat bottom sections were partially destroyed with springs visible and melted insulation showing. The canvas covering was partially intact but blackened, charred, and in many places, gone. The instruments were still in the panel, but the glass was gone and the gauges were inoperative. The steering wheel handgrip was burned off as was the handle to the automatic transmission.The glass was broken and gone, and there were melted fragments left in the rims of the windshield and side windows. The side windows appeared to have been rolled up. The doors were warped and there were signs that they had been forcibly opened. Opening the doors required use of hand tools. Investigation of the floorboards was complicated by roof items that had fallen into the cab, and by many pieces and parts that were picked up at the scene by the tow company and placed there. Under the passenger's bench was an intact bucket holding hose adapters and fittings. On the floorboards in front of the seats, separated from the roof, tire, and unrelated parts, were remains of the crew's personal protective gear. A number of clothing items were bagged and labeled for testing.



Kuna RFD Engine 620 after burnover. Extreme heat from burning tires exacerbated damage to truck.

Engine compartment of Kuna RFD Engine after burnover.



Interior of cab, Engine 620. Fiberglass roof disintegrated. All windows broken by heat.

Kuna RFD Engine 620 that was burned over.



Type of nozzles used by Kuna RFD to fight grass/brush fires.

PASSENGER SIDE — SERVICE BODY

The main feature of the body was a 1,500 gallon water tank. The tank was steel, about 10 to 12 feet long and from the rear, was hexagonal. Attached to the length of the right side was a sheet-metal sleeve that contained the frame of a portable dump tank, its liner a pile of ashes. The dump tank would be removed from the rear of the truck.

Below the dump tank sleeve and just behind the passenger's door was a large fuel tank. The tank was blistered and blackened, with no visible sign of rupture.

DRIVER'S SIDE — SERVICE BODY

Directly behind the cab and below the tank was the pump assembly. The tank discharge protruded down at approximately a 30-40 degree angle (from the lower side bevel of the tank). The connection between the pump intake and the tank was gone. The pump, a single stage Hale was driven by a 2-cylinder Wisconsin gas engine. The only discharges were piped to the front bumper where two 1.5 inch nozzles had been mounted at angles to spray the ground in front of and to the side of the truck.

The plumbing of the pump had broken and the package was resting on the ground although still attached to the truck. To the rear of the pump, mounted on the rear fenders was a double hose tray. The trays each held the remains of hose. The outside tray was used for 1 inch hose and all that was left were ashes and the couplings (length or quantity held in the tray was unrecorded). The inside tray, nearest the tank, held a larger diameter hose (1.5 or 2.5 inches) with only the fittings left.

On the upper left side of the tank, mounted on the beveled section of the hexagonal tank, was a metal sleeve that had held two sections of 2.5 inch flexible hard suction hose Only the coil wires were left in the holder.

REAR

The back of the tank was clean as most of the mountings were from the extended rear step bumper. Facing the rear of the truck from left to right, a Hannay electric rewind hose reel was mounted facing the rear. The reel had several hundred feet of cotton jacketed hose on it with some of the outside layer burned off, but a great deal of the hose appeared to be intact and usable. To the right of the reel was an extended 6-8 inch diameter tank dump with a quarter turn valve, blackened but complete. In the center of the tank, in a metal mount, were the remnants of an orange drink-dispenser. The outside of the dispenser was melted, but identifiable and even had a distinguishable spigot still attached. The lid of the dispenser was gone but the inside was still fairly intact, as the foam insulation was visible and the orange inner liner was still there. To the right of the dispenser was a 2.5 inch intake/discharge, blackened but unremarkable. To the right of this intake/discharge was the opening and frame of the dump tank.

TANK TOP

The top of the 1,500 gallon tank was flat except for a large, round fill port which had a hinged lid. Inspection of the tank showed that any paint coating that was on the inside had been blistered off and there was no sign of water or a possible boil line on the inside or outside of the tank.

FRONT END — BUMPER

The truck had an extended front bumper that had the charcoaled remnants of several shovels and pitchforks. The heads of these implements were found lying in a depression on the driver's side of the bumper. The radiator had partially melted and was slumped behind the metal grill. The hood was found unlatched, and when opened, displayed a burned-over gas engine with near-total destruction of the wiring and carburetor areas. The spray attachments under the bumper had no sign of the red twister nozzles reported to have been installed on them. The hose that was used to connect each sprayer to the pump was gone.

The vehicle is considered a total loss.

The vehicle is being inspected by an engineering firm in an attempt to pinpoint the cause of its engine failure. The results were not available at the time of this report's publication. Findings will be included in the official investigative file when the engineering report is completed.

WITNESS STATEMENTS

1. David Kerby
2. Blas Telleria
3. Kevin Burns
4. Brian Barney
5. Lance Lane
6. Dustin Jones
7. Mike Ellsworth
8. Robert Hansen
9. James Buchanan
10. David Auwen
11. Jose Lopez
12. Hallie Daniels
13. Christopher Ottenello
14. Nathen Mauzerall
15. David Harrison
16. Mike Whitworth
17. Joseph Yockum
18. Joshua Fuhriman
19. Joel Rittenhouse
20. Dave Brown
21. Randy Miller
22. Carrie Sandner
23. Linda Hunt
24. Richard Cromwell
25. Doyle McPherson
26. Joe Stear
27. Robert Black
28. Michael Law
29. Dick Watts
30. Terry Roedel
31. Bob Stroud
32. Lynn Miracle
33. Boyd Yee
34. Jerry Worden
35. Terry Beck

To: Fire Investigation Team 8/2/95

Re: Initial Point Fire F056

I, Dave Kerby, was the incident commander for the BLM on the initial point fire near Kuna when the tragic deaths of two Kuna Rural Firefighters occurred. I am the crew boss for a crew called "Wild West" which consists of seven firefighters, one 1000-gallon fire engine, one 200-gallon fire engine and one suburban carry-all. Our crew is stationed near Caldwell, Idaho. Just prior to the Initial Point incident, we were called to the Boise District BLM office to be available for initial attack on fires in the area because most of the other crews had been called out on other fires in the district. A BLM crew from Salmon, Idaho consisting of five firefighters with one 1000-gallon fire engine and one crew cab pickup was working with us as a part of our crew.

Friday, July 28, at approximately 18:30 the Boise District BLM dispatch received a fire report near initial point. Our Wild West crew with the Salmon crew responded to the incident. We arrived at the scene at approximately 19:00. On our way to the fire, I talked to our Boise District BLM Dispatch on channel 11 which is our Boise District frequency and learned that the reinforcements that had been dispatched our way were the Boise District helicopter with a helitack crew, a 3500 gallon water tender, a caterpillar tractor, and a three engine Boise District BLM crew led by Blas Telleria, a seasoned crew boss.

The temperature was over 100 degrees and there was light wind out of the west. At that time the fire was on the west side of Swan Falls road, running east toward the road and somewhat south. When I first saw the fire it was just over a small ridge from Swan Falls road running up a slight incline in heavy sagebrush and thick cheat grass. Approximately one-half mile to the south of the fire was a dirt two-track road heading back to the northwest where I led our two heavy trucks into the fire. Our light fire engine stayed on Swan Falls road and was instructed to try to hold the fire from jumping the road by burning out as needed while moving south to stay ahead of the fire.

The two heavy trucks followed me to the west finger of the fire which appeared to be the

origin. They were instructed to begin at the tip of the finger and split up working east toward Swan Falls road—the Salmon truck worked the southern flank and the Wild West truck worked the northern flank.

About this time, I was contacted on my radio, channel 11, by a Kuna rural fire commander identified as 650 or engine 650. He asked me if we needed any help and how they could be of assistance. I told him that we could use a water tender and a brush truck if they had one available.

Shortly after our flanking operation began, a BLM caterpillar tractor arrived on the scene and was brought in on the same dirt two-track road just south of the fire. At that time the prevailing winds were still out of the northwest and the trucks were making good progress flanking the fire to the east. The caterpillar tractor off-loaded to begin flanking from the west to the east on the southern flank behind the Salmon truck. The trucks were stopping the spread of the fire, but the brush was so thick I wanted to put a cat-line around the entire perimeter to keep the fire from re-igniting. I felt at the time because of the prevailing winds that there was more potential for the fire to break loose to the south than to the north.

At approximately 19:15 the Boise District helicopter, One Echo Alpha, arrived at the scene and picked me up so I could better see the entire fire and assess the situation. From the air I could see that the cat was beginning to cut line and the trucks were making progress. While I was flying, another crew arrived from the Boise District BLM led by Blas Telleria at approximately 19:30. His crew was made up of 10-12 firefighters, three 1000-gallon fire engines, and a suburban carry-all that Blas was driving.

Also at that time the head of the fire had hit Swan Falls road and the road was holding with help from a burnout operation begun by the Wild West light engine on the road at the southeast head of the fire. I asked Blas to start two engines from Swan Falls road working west on the north flank to tie in with the Wild West engine. I asked him to send his other truck to the south to work back toward the Salmon engine and the cat to tie off the south flank. Blas then bumped south in his carry-all and joined the light engine from Wild West to help him secure the road.

While this operation was underway, two brush trucks and a water tender arrived from the Kuna Rural fire department. The brush trucks called me on our channel 11 frequency and identified themselves as engines 620 and 622 and asked where I wanted them to work. I asked them to bump in behind the two BLM trucks that had just started off Swan Falls road working to the west on the north flank. At the time, having observed from the air, I felt that the two trucks and the cat on the south side were going to stop the advancing fire on the south flank. I wanted to get more water on the north flank to hold it until the cat could bump around to help secure it as well.

Blas' two trucks who had started in front of the Kuna engines to the west were working in hot conditions. They ran into a finger of fire burning extremely hot in brush approximately 100 yards west of Swan Falls road. They backed off the fire into the black to regroup as they felt that the finger was burning too hot to attack. As they were waiting, the two Kuna engines bumped ahead of them and began initial attacking the fire to the west toward the Wild West engine. The two BLM engines then followed Kuna's engines 620 and 622, mopping up behind them.

At about 19:30 Boise dispatch radioed that a fire had been reported at Jump Creek and the helicopter dropped me off at my carry-all and left with the helitack crew enroute to another fire.

At approximately 20:10 the engines on both flanks of the fire met and the spread of fire had been stopped on both flanks. The cat continued working the line toward the fence on the south side. (There is a barbed wire fence approximately 100 yards west of the Swan Falls road which runs parallel to the road. I felt that the cat could stop at the fence when he reached it. It looked as though we should be able to control that small section of line from the fence to the road with a truck since the fuels in that area were grass with no sage.) At this time, the trucks continued putting water on the perimeter of the fire and many trucks filled up from both the BLM and Kuna rural water tenders which were on the Swan Falls road.

At approximately 20:15 I met engine 620 and 622 near the west side of the fire. I pulled up beside and spoke with the driver of 622 and asked them to continue working the perimeter down around the west end.

I recall seeing a third Kuna engine in this area, but I don't know who it was.

At 20:22 we received a Red Flag warning over channel 11 that high winds would be moving into our area and would be blowing to the north. The winds at the time were light but we were getting small gusts in different directions. The trucks were continuing to mop up and several had gone to Swan Falls road to get water. Some trucks were getting water at about this time and as they filled, we began sending them to the north side. Blas and his assistant both called me on channel 11 to reiterate that because of the Red Flag warning we should begin placing our forces on the north side to strengthen the line and be ready for a possible blow up. The Wild West engine had filled up and was heading to the west side with instructions to begin working around to the north flank and back to the east. Also, the cat tied into the fence on the southeast side and I instructed him to bump north across the burned area by the fence line and start cutting line on the north flank working back toward the west.

At approximately 20:35 as the cat was moving across, Blas' assistant called again stating that the winds were picking up and we needed more people on the north side. His engine was positioned about 500 yards west of swan falls road on the perimeter of the fire. Engine 61, one of Blas's engines, was positioned on the north side approximately 300 yards from the western tip of the fire. The small Wild West engine was filling with water on Swan Falls road on the south side of the fire. Blas was on Swan Falls road and began moving to the north followed by the Salmon truck. A Kuna engine was ahead of Blas.

I was in a carry-all near the heavy Wild West truck circling the fire near the western tip going back on the north flank of the fire when extreme winds hit our complex blowing toward the north. Blas' assistant radioed that a breakout had occurred on the northeast corner of the fire and was racing to the north. Almost simultaneously, a second breakout occurred behind the Wild West engine and just in front of my position on the northwest side and fire began racing toward the north. The Wild West engine circled around through the black back to the west and began working toward the north flanking that second breakout.

At this time, approximately 20:55, I heard Blas calling Kuna command on channel 11. I

didn't hear any response. I also heard him call his own assistant who is medically trained and tell him that his services may be needed. I also heard him call Boise District BLM telling them that he may have a need for an ambulance, police personnel and communications representatives. I also heard him say that he wasn't sure these would be necessary. At the time, there were 40-50 mile an hour winds pushing the fire to the north through the thick sagebrush and cheat grass. The fire was raging and I was completely cut off from Blas' area. At that time I knew that a medical incident had happened or may have happened and that Blas was dealing with it as best he could. I contacted Blas and confirmed that he would deal with the situation on that side of the fire as best he could and I would stay on the west side working to the north chasing the escaped fire to try to tie it off back to the the Swan Falls road. Engine 61 and Blas' assistant pulled into the black and circled around to join the Wild West engine on the western finger of fire and began flanking that finger to the north.

I called Blas at 22:24 on channel 11 and asked him to go to channel 17, an unused channel. I asked him what the incident was, and he told me at that time that two Kuna firefighters had died after their truck was burned over.

These were my thoughts, instructions and observations on the fire F056 as best as I can remember them with some time reference help from the Boise District BLM dispatch log.

Sincerely,

Dave Kerby

Dave Kerby
Wild West Crew Boss

Blas Telleria
Boise District BLM
Strike Team Leader for Unit C on the Point Fire
Division Group Supervisor--North Flank
7-30-1995

Unit C was dispatched from the mile post 84 fire to the Point fire arriving at the incident at 1927 hrs.

On our way over to the fire I overheard Incident Commander Kirby, on the BLM tactical radio net (Ch. 11), talking with Kuna Command about possible assistance; Kuna would assist.

Upon arriving on the fire Kirby assigned two of Unit C's three engines to the north flank of the fire; the third engine was assigned to the south flank.

I opened a hole in the fence on the north flank. My two engines had just gone through the opening when a gust of wind pushed a small finger of fire towards them. Feeling they were not quite ready to Initial Attack I told them to go into the black-- which they did. As they were repositioning, two Kuna engines IA the finger (now not running). My engines fell in behind them.

I moved further down the line to the west to scout the north line; shortly thereafter, I returned to Swan Falls road to check the south line. I determined we needed to backfire a stretch of grass along the road whereas Joe Yochum's engine would soon be in position to tie the south flank into the road. I asked Bob Stroud to assist in the backfiring .

After completing the backfire and tying into the road, I returned to the north flank. Bob went with me. It was about this time the Red Flag warning was issued by dispatched.

I continued to drive down the line to the west sizing-up the north flank.

Near the northwest corner the two Unit C engines (coming from the east) met Buchanan's engine coming from the west. The fire had been stopped. I got out of my vehicle and told all three engine drivers that we needed to reinforce the north flank as soon as possible because of the thunder cell southwest of the fire. I informed Kirby of my plan.

I cut across the fire to the south flank noting the progress of the crews that IA from the south. The cat had punched in a line along the south flank.

Linda Hunt reported a breakout along the road on the north flank. As I moved from my position on the south flank to the north flank in order to size-up the breakout, I overheard Lance Lane reporting another breakout. The wind started to pick up (est. 7- 10 mph.).

I called Kirby and told him an engine was needed along Swan Falls road. He acknowledged and said he would send one. The Salmon Crew was sent.

I moved in front of the east finger which was starting to run along the road to the north. Someone stated over the radio that there was another finger to the west which was starting to run to the north.

I had moved a fair distance to the north, down Swan Falls road, when I noticed the red Kuna engine approximately 900 feet off the road and stationary. The fire now had two raging fingers--the red engine was in a "horseshoe" of fire. Something was gravely wrong.

Repeatedly, I attempted to call the Kuna engine and Kuna Command on BLM tactical Ch. 11.

No contact.

I called Lance Lane and advised him that his medical skills may soon be needed --be ready and available.

Again. I attempted to contact Kuna Command as I searched the area for people running.

No contact.

I called 426 (Boise Dispatch) and requested an ambulance.

The sides of the "horseshoe" of fire were now moving past the Kuna engine. The fingers were several hundred feet to the west and east of the engine (that is. there remained as great deal of unburned fuel between the engine and the fingers). The winds increased and shifted slightly to the west. A portion of the east finger moved across the front. but not over or through. the engine. The engine disappeared into the smoke and flame as the east finger moved past my position.

I called 426 informing them of the entrapment and asked that they immediately send out the appropriate people--police. medical. public relation specialists. etc.

The Salmon engine. a Kuna engine. and Bob's vehicle were now at my position.

I asked Bob to try finding a way into the area from the south.

As he left the winds became very strong and shifted to the east-northeast. Ash. fire brands. dust. smoke. and flame reduced visibility to near zero.

I called Kirby and told him I would be involved in this incident and would not be assisting him in fire suppression efforts.

I got out of my vehicle and told Kevin Burns (Salmon Crew foreman) that we should try to get out of the area at the first opportunity. The ash. heat. dust. and smoke forced me back into my vehicle: a matter of safety.

Bill Casey informs me an Incident Management Team will be assigned to manage the incident.

It got very dark and eerie. I became slightly fearful and very concerned about my safety as well as the safety of the Salmon and Kuna engine crews. The inside of the carryall lit up as fire brands crossed over and around the vehicle---it was time to attempt getting out of the area.

The wind changed slightly to a more northerly direction. I called the Salmon engine. stating that we should try to move out of the area. Shortly thereafter visibility improved enough to creep backwards.

To my left (west) I spot the burning engine.

I got out of the carryall. made contact with Kevin and asked if he would go search the area. Visibility continued to be very poor.

I went to the Kuna engine driver (on Swan Falls road) and asked how many people were in the truck.

Two people.

I remained on the road to keep radio contact with Kevin. Bob. and 426.

Bob calls. he cannot make his way over to the truck.

Kevin returns. no confirmation on the status of the fire fighters.

I inform him that there are two. He states he will try again.

A Kuna engine makes it's way over to the burning engine and extinguishes the flame.

Kevin returns....the fire fighters are in the cab of the truck.

We wait.

Noting the Kuna Fire Department had taken command of the situation and our assistance was no longer needed. we moved south down the road to "regroup" and get some fresh air.

Bob returns. A road block is established.

I ask Kirby for an update on the fire and the status of our BLM engines.

I contacted 426 and requested additional personnel to manage the fire front now moving to the north-northeast across Swan Falls Road.

Bob and I remain on the road securing the area. The Salmon crew joins the forces on the west flank.

Roger Cada is assigned as the BLM Incident Commander.

I physically make contact with Kuna Command (which was very. very busy managing the engulfment incident as well as other Rural Fire Departments arriving on the scene). We briefly talk about establishing a water source. exchange information about the fire on the south flank east of Swan Falls Road. as well as the progress we have made on the western flank.

Soon the western flank is secured.

Kirby and I meet with Roger. A plan is established. Jan Peterson is assigned to us.

I call the BLM crews together and briefly explain the situation. I ask them to not talk to anyone other than our own personnel about what they may have witnessed and/or believed to have happened. pending an investigation. Furthermore. I inform them they will need to write down what. if anything. they may recall relevant to the incident. prior to the entrapment. In addition. I explain what we are going to do next.

We move the forces to the southern flank and resume fire suppression efforts.



Kevin Burns
Salmon BLM Engine
"Crew Boss"

At 17:30 on July 28th we were dispatched to a fire South of Boise. After arriving at the fire, Kerby drove us around to the S.W. where we had a secure anchor point. We then started hotlining to the East towards Swan Falls road. We then ran out of water with 100-200 yards of line to contain before bumping into another Boise engine which was working from the East towards us. We continued up the line til we ran into them and I told them there was a short piece of line to do from where we cut off.

We cut the line into the black where we went thru a hole that had been cut in the fence. There, we filled our tank with a Kuna water tender. Then we made our way back to the line where we cut another hole in the fence to get back to the line. There we tied in with the line to secure the line from the East back to our anchor point.

We secured line 'til we ran out of water again. When we got to the end there were 2 Kuna engines. (White & Red that were securing the line that we went over.) I then

turned around heading East towards Swan Falls road securing the line. We ran until our water was empty and bumped behind the Boise engine to follow them out. We then left them to go into the Black where our fence was cut to refill.

After refilling we tied into a BLM employee by the name of Teleria. At that time winds were picking up and it was becoming Swan falls road and he told us to follow him down the road to the other side of the fire where we could possibly be of some help.

At this time, winds were really picking up. They were coming from the S.W. blowing to the N.E. with winds 30-40 mph as we proceeded, visibility was 0. We were creeping along. I had a trainee driver driver while I was standing on the step talking to him thru the window. I had people on the back of the engine who were experiencing a lot of dust, smoke, and heat. I kept telling my driver to proceed slowly because I really wanted to get out of there. He kept telling me that he couldn't see + he wanted

D)

to stop. At this point we were in a bad situation and I wanted him to keep going. Thinking maybe the smoke would clear. When almost coming to a stop we then ran into the back of Telina's Suburban. I then got out to see if the driver in front was O.K He then said "let's back out of the smoke & re-group" There was also a Kuna standing in front of him. I then told my trainee to back out because the major column had passed & visibility was getting better. Although winds were still blowing hard and dust was picking up.

When we backed out to where we could see a crew member said "That looks like an Engine on fire". I then jumped out and ran to Telina to tell him about the engine. He asked me to check where the crew members were who were in the engine. I then made my way to the vehicle that was totally engulfed. I asked my crew member who was with me to make a sweep around the engine to see if there were

(4)

any deployments.

I have run out of time to complete my statement. although things got <u>really</u> Shitty after that. If you have any more questions I will come in and answer anything.

I'm not exact on times because I have more to do [illegible] my watch. I'm responsible for 4 other people - I do mostly.

Kevin Burns

Bryan Borney
Wild West
I160429 200gal
(2 persons)

Dispatched from Boise yard about 6:30p.m.
July 2#, 1995
Arrive on fire West of Initial Point about 1:30p.m.
Assigned to watch at Swan Falls Road
Backfire if necessary to hold the Road.
Worked South ahead of flame front.
About 7:30 Yocum arrives to assist.
At that point we burned off grass from road to fence and Yocum's crew with a Heavy Engine began direct attack working South West.
About 7:45 Wind picks up blowing from the West Yocum pulls into burn (heard on Radio) I started in a 2-track road just south of the fire. When the 2-track met the fireline (with a cat-line) I turned West, I backed-up Kevin Burns from Salmon until we met the fence about 8:00 - 8:15.
About 8:30 The Cat (Dick Watts) Tied into the fence and started south along the fence. I was out of water by now and followed the Cat to my hole in the fence. 200yds N of SE corner
I re-filled with water from Terry Beck
This same time (8:30) Lance Lane called on the radio the winds from the south were blowing hard across the North line.
Soon after, the fire was burning to the north. I think the fire was going before I refilled with water.

I went north on Swan Falls Road. I saw a tremendous column of smoke and was concerned about the location of the Cat. Soon after I saw the outline of the top of the cat with the thick smoke behind it (to the north and west of his location).

I left one thing out. About 8:15 when I was working at the fence and before the Cat tied in, Drivers from a Kuna engine came up behind me and asked for directions. I called Dave Kerby for direction. He said to Water up (I think they said they were empty) so they can continue helping hold the perimeter. They heard this over my radio, rodded and headed back for their truck.

I also heard Kuna fire on the radio mention a truck was overheating - and I believe it was also out of water.

After the fire blew up Blas Tellaria was on the radio trying to locate the truck that was burned over. At first it was only known to be missing.

Bryan L Barnes

4 August 199

Initial Point Fire + Incident of 7-28-95
to: Hugh Thompson
from: Bryan Barney

I arrived at the Initial Point fire about 4 miles south of Kuna on Swan Falls Road around 7:05 p.m. This was a minute or so after the other engines from my crew. I was driving I 160429 usually referred to as the Wild West Slip-on. Our crew name is Wild West, and the truck, a. 1-ton Dodge Cummins Diesel with a 200 gallon pumper unit on a utility body. The truck is BLM yellow/green. I had one crew member with me, Juan Juarez, a first year firefighte

Approaching the fire I passed Lynn Miracle, a BLM Ranger who was watching traffic on Swan Falls Road. Bob Stroud and Linda Hunt from Investigation, (and I learned later Carrie Sandner) were south of the fire and on the road. Lynn Miracle was to the north.

I was assigned to watch the fire at Swan Falls road and backfire as necessary to prevent the fire from jumping the road. In two seasons with Shoshone District and seven with Boise District fire crews I had done this many times. I observed a 30 yard area bordering the road that was

grass with no brush. The fence was across this strip and across the fence was very thick sagebrush. From Kuna the smoke column was very impressive. At the scene it looked more routine. I remember recognizing the grass near the road as a benefit to suppression efforts, but I wanted to see how the fire reacted with the grass before deciding that it would make our job easier. The flame length in the sagebrush was about 3-5 feet and in the grass 2-4 feet and the rate of spread was about the same so the grass strip was helpful.

My assignment was given by Radio. I was on a channel referred to as "Tac 2" and scanning Channel 11 (Boise Direct) and Channel 17 (Salmon District). The latter was a channel our crew used to talk amongst ourselves.

I turned the truck around to face north so the action of the fire was on the driver's side and in front of me. I directed Juan to start our pump and get some fusees set-up to backfire. We proceeded South on Swan Falls road - I was backing the truck along the left edge of the road. We stayed 30-40 yards south of where the fire was meeting the road. I turned on a Yellow strobe light on

the roof for a while. Winds were 5-10 mph from the South west and everything went as expected.

Bob Stroud said over the Radio "Can you back-up some more." I didn't know he was talking to me until he called a second time. Then I saw that 50 yards behind me (to the South) several people were backfiring across the grassy strip to anchor a position for an engine crew to work the fire direct attack from the road to the west. The engine was driven by Joe Yocum. Joe asked me by radio to mop-up in the grass and fill in the burn-out So he has a safe anchor. I backed off the road and directed Juan to fill in the unburned spots of grass. The grass was not burning well so I got out of the truck and worked with a fusee to fill in the burn. I then had Juan spray while I drove the little strip. We sprayed the line from Joe's hole in the fence to the road 2 or 3 times.

I heard Joe on the radio say it was too hot with a wind shift and he bumped into the black. My corner was secure even if no longer necessary. I was requested to go to the line and work west to east. This ~~not~~ would be working with the wind and easier. I was to back-up the other engine(s).

I went south on Swan Falls Road to a 2-track road that went in to the fire to the west. A small pick-up was in the middle of the 2-track. There were 2 people in the cab and 2 or 3 kids in the back of the pick-up. I drove around them and stopped and told the driver, "We're going to be using this road." His reply was, "That's all I needed to know," and he began to leave. I continued up the 2-track and turned right at the Transport. Then right again at the fireline. There was a cat line I followed until I was behind the cat. I bumped around the cat to the right and approached the fireline in front of the cat. I directed Juan to begin spraying the line. The fire had already been knocked out. I think we were about ¼ mile from the road/fence area.

I cannot remember when this next thing happened. It may have been soon after passing the cat or it may have been when I was at the fence.

The driver from a Kuna engine walked or even ran up to my driver door. Actually I'm not sure ~~he~~ he was the driver. He indicated he was out ~~of~~ water and asked if he ~~(we)~~ was released or what? (He almost had to be the driver) -or (we are)

I was ~~[illegible]~~ focusing on my assignment and crew member and paid only partial attention to the fireman asking directions.

I remember thinking, "Why is he asking me?" and realized I could find out. I called Dave Kerby on the radio. He answered almost immediately. I told him I had a Kuna engine with me out of water and asking for instructions. I'm not sure if I identified an engine number or even why I thought (or knew) it was a Kuna engine. Dave answered, "Have them water-up, we can use them." The fireman heard this answer ever my radio and left before I could say or do anything. Since he left so quickly to comply I thought him to be anxious to comply and he seemed to know exactly what to do. I think the passenger in the truck approached my truck also because I remember seeing a person in my right rear-view mirror. Behind him was a truck - I think an old army truck and a dark color. From what I know now, I think it was #620. There was a lot of dust behind that truck that I think was the cat continuing up the line. Two things make me think I was at the fence at this time. First, I don't remember stopping to talk to the fireman, but I was stopped when we talked. I don't think I stopped until I was at the fence except momentarily to stay with my hoseman. Second, if I had stopped before I was some distance ahead of the cat, I would have been overtaken by the cat. I was not overtaken until at the fence.

About 50 yards from the fence as I proceeded east ahead of the cat I traded positions with a BLM engine. In my previous statement and in my interview I said I wasn't sure, but I thought it was Kevin Burns. I remember now that it was Joe Yacum's engine. Joe was on lead hose and Dave Brown was driving. I say traded places because they were going back west mopping-up their line. The sun was shining brightly and our corner of the fire was stopped. I mention the sun to indicate a lack of smoke. I smiled and waved as we passed - it felt like we almost had this fire licked. We soon after got to the fence. Before getting there I think I heard disaussion on the radio to leave the fence; that an engine would work from the road to the fence and others inside the fence. I thought the truck working between the road and fence was I-67 with Buchanan. There were several bushes across the fence that were burned but no real smoke left. I directed Juan to mop-up the bushes well and positioned the truck parallel with the fence so the hose would be easy to take out + retrieve. Juan just returned when Dave Kerby instructed me by radio to take care of that corner "real good". I answered that we just had, but will do it again. I had Juan continue and as he finished another loop we ran out of water.

At the corner I noticed someone started to cut another hole in the fence. The top wire was cut, but that was all.

While we worked the corner the cat tied into the fence and started north.

Juan and I started out to water-up. We followed the fence north looking for the previously cut hole through which to travel. At first I do not remember being in a hurry. We followed the cat for a bit and found the hole. I stopped to consider showing the hole to the cat operator (Dick Watts) but decided maybe he wanted to stay inside the fence.

Winds picked up from the south 15-20 mph maybe more. The dust kicked up by the cat was blowing rapidly north. After I went through the gate must have been when Lance ~~Lane~~ Lane requested more help to hold the North line because the wind was blowing hard across the line. I say that because refilling became urgent and then I was in a hurry. I drove quite a way in the grass (some black, some not) until I found a good place to get back on the road. I took my truck out of 4-wheel-drive, to drive on the pavement. A white Kuna engine was just pulling up to the BLM Water Tender driven by Terry Beck.

The Kuna truck was a white Army 6x6 and, I supposed, had a fairly large tank. My truck holds only 200 gallons, So I asked if I could go first. The driver seemed willing so I pulled in front of him and filled up.

While we refilled I saw a rainbow over us, and to the east.

I turned around and started north on Swan Falls Road. Linda and Carrie, I think were in the investigation Blazer just south of the fire on the hill probably watching traffic. As I drove I heard Blas Tellaria on the radio try to contact 620. No Response. He told Lance Lane that Medical assistance may be needed. He requested an ambulance from 426 (Boise Dispatch). I passed Blas and continued north. I heard Blas instruct Bob Stroud to get in a position so he could see where the lost engine was last visible. I did not see an engine anywhere but on the roads.

I think Lance Lane said on the radio that there was a breakout on the north line before I started north, maybe before I refilled with water.

When I drove by the head of the flames or rather on a line

even with the head of the fire, I think it was near the top of the ridge that was a continuation of the rocky outcrop that is just off the road. That puts the fire about 200-300 yards north of the engine when I drove past.

Lynn Miracle was at the intersection of Nickelson and Swan Falls Roads. I think I named it Nelson in a previous statement.

I considered a backfire South on Swan Falls or West on Nickelson. I thought I saw Blas Tellaria direct me with hand signals to go West. It could not have been Blas. I don't think it was Lynn Miracle, though he was in the area. I was concerned about a missing truck or people. There was nothing I could do about any of that.

Winds were from the South west 15-20 mph. I think the main head had reached Swan Falls Road by now. I could see a nearly straight line of flame stretching from Northeast to South west. I could see all the area between me and the fire too. No truck, no people just 200 yards or so of sagebrush.

I had Juan start burning along the road again. This time along Nickelson road headed West. He started the first fire about 20 feet west of Swan Falls road. I was concerned about that making a "run" toward Swan Falls Road So I sent him back to light right next to the road. Lynn Miracle moved his truck a little farther north to make it farther from our backfire. Nickelson Road was a good gravel road about 30' feet wide. We started along, doing well. I wanted to hurry because the fire was coming toward us quickly. The backfire was not spreading very fast and I was afraid there would be unburned "gaps" in the backfire.

I radioed Dave Kerby that we were backfiring the "next road north".

The grass was thin right at the road for a distance so I directed Juan a little farther in (about 10 feet) where fuels would light better. After 200 or 300 yards the fire did not seem to be coming toward us so fast. Everything seemed to be working very well. I kept pace just a little behind ~~Ken~~ Juan as he continued.

I understood from the radio that Dave and the engines were flanking the fire from Southwest to Northeast or toward me.

I was watching for engines working the line so I could stop backfiring before going too far up the road. I was watching the progress of the backfire; trying to see that the fire did not jump my road. I was watching the progress of the fire. I twice told Juan to make sure his fires actually light. All this and driving the truck too. It was too many things at once. Dave asked me once on the radio, "How far away is the fire from you?" I paused a moment to try to judge the distance, "about 50 yards", I estimated. What seemed like 15 seconds Later Juan said, "Let's get out of here".

I looked around and something felt different, I couldn't tell what. I think I said, "Yes, Let's go," as Juan dropped his fusee and ran for the truck. He was maybe 20 yards from the truck. As he came I rolled my window up. I was watching straight ~~ahed~~ ahead and a finger from the fire spread smoke across the road 40-50 yards ahead of us. The wind was suddenly blowing from the south maybe 25-30 mph.

I started moving when Juan's door closed. I started in 2nd gear as is normal with that truck on smooth and level ground. I saw Juan was rolling

his window up also.

I think I went to 3rd gear before going into the smoke. I noticed later that the truck travels 30-35 maximum in 3rd gear. I probably went into the smoke at 20-25 and came out at 25-30. Past the smoke I saw flame across the windshield. The flames were just taller than the cab maybe 7-8 feet. I was in the middle of the road and a distance from the fuel. The wind was pushing the flames horizontally and flame lengths were 20-25 feet estimated. Then there was more smoke (I think) and we were clear. Into smoke to out of smoke was perhaps 5-10 seconds. The cab seemed to fill with smoke (even with Vents, Air Conditioning and so forth all turned off). I said, "Roll your window down." As we did wind cleared the cab almost instantly. The wind sounded like driving 45-50 mph but we were going about 30mph.

I drove about a half mile down the road. I informed Dave Kerby the fire had jumped the road.

I stopped to assess my truck and I think I asked Juan if he was O.K. He was badly shaken but complained of no discomfort. He wore his fire shelter the rest of the day and continued work.

The pump was still running. I think I turned it off to check things over.

The paint was blistered on the entire left side, both the cab and the utility body (made of fiberglass).

All plastic parts on the front, back, and left side are distorted:

Marker lights
Signal lights
Back-up + Tail lights
Radiator Grill

We had a chain saw kit in it's box behind the cab and on top of the tank. The box was charred and the ~~corners~~ two upper corners were burned away.

The left side of my face was uncomfortable like a very mild sunburn. I put some water on it to cool and I was fine.

I could not maintain a prime on the pump for an hour or so until I found a loose and leaking fitting on the suction side of the pump.

When I finally found and repaired the fitting we continued working through the night.

Between 9:30 and 10:00pm. a Kuna Rural truck came by and the occupants seemed to think that the missing firefighters were not in the truck.

Questions.

Is there a specifie policy on a multi-agency fire about who workers are to take orders from?

That is worded poorly.

Is there a policy that orders to Rural Fire Departments from the Incident Commander go only through that Rural Department's commander?

Recommendations about Slip-on Incident.

1. Back-firing requires more than 2 people.

2. Post a lookout - maybe two.
   The lookout can have no other job at the same time (ie driving).

3. No riders on back of Engine.

4. Burn out safety zones.

5. Guard against sudden wind changes.

6. Larger safety margins when sudden gusty winds are experienced.

FRIDAY JULY 25TH UNIT C W/ THREE HEMET ENGINES WERE MOPPING UP ON SMOKE INTERSTATE FIRE MIDSH ON INTERSTATE 8, WHEN A CALL CAME IN ABOUT A REPORT OF A FIRE AT INITIAL POINT, WHICH IS OFF SAN FELIS ROAD SOUTH OF KUNA.

WILD WEST GUARD CREW WAS DISPATCHED TO FIRE, UNIT C SHORTLY AFTER. WILD WEST INITIAL ATTACKED FIRE. WHEN WE ARRIVED, FIRE WAS BURNING ON WEST SIDE OF SAN FELIS ROAD. UNIT C ENGINE 83 AND 61 ~~FOR~~ STARTED WORKING THE NORTH FLANK TOWARD THE WEST. WILD WEST WERE FLANKING SOUTH SIDE OF FIRE WORKING TOWARD THE WEST ENGINE 64 ALSO STARTED WORKING SOUTH SIDE BEHIND WILDWEST ENGINE. WIND DIRECTION WAS FROM WEST, BLOWING INTO SAN FELIS ROAD.

A SHORT DISTANCE INTO FIRE KUNA ~~FOR~~ RURAL FIRE DEPT BURNED IN FRONT OF OUR ENGINES (3 TRUCKS) WHITE DUCK AND A SIDE DRIVING IN TANDEM CREATING LINE IN FRONT OF OUR ENGINES, WE CONTINUED THEN IN WITH WILD WEST CREW ON N W EDGE OF FIRE, WE CONTINUED WEST MOPPING UP LINE. WE HAD NO RADIO CONTACT WITH THE KUNA RURAL ENGINES.

REPORT OF A STORM FROM FROM THE SOUTH - SOUTH WEST WAS RELAYED TO CREWS SEVERAL TIMES. REPORTS OF STRONG WINDS FROM SOUTH WERE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT

HALF HOUR.

ENGINE 83 RETURNED TO NORTH FLANK AND CONTINUED TO MOP UP AFTER REPELLING WITH WATER. ~~WE~~ WE WERE APPROXIMATELY HALF WAY DOWN NORTH FLANK WORKING TOWARD WEST ~~FLANK~~ WHEN THE WINDS STARTED PICKING UP FROM THE SOUTH. SHORTLY AFTER WIND STARTED BLOWING HARDER TWO BLOWOUTS OCCURED ON LINE WE ATTACKED ~~THE~~ ONE DIRECTLY BEHIND US WHILE ENGINE 61 ATTACKED ONE IN FRONT OF US. THESE BLOWOUTS WERE APPROX 75 YDS APART WE STARTED TO ATTACK OUR BLOWOUT AND REALIZED WE WERE NOT GOING TO CATCH IT BECAUSE OF WINDS 30-40 MPH ~~WITH~~ ~~FLAME~~ ~~ON~~ ~~FOOT~~ ~~BURNOUTS~~

WE TURNED INTO BURN AND DROVE TO THE WEST AND TURN IN WITH WILD WEST ENGINE ON WESTERN FLANK WORKING NORTH IN TONOPAH.

FIRE BEHAVIOR WAS EXTREME DUE TO STRONG WINDS AND FUELS.

BOTH ENGINES CONTINUED WORKING NORTH ALONG FLANK WHEN MY CREW BOSS NOTIFIED ME OF A POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION AND POSSIBLE NEED FOR MH MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

LANCE S. LONG
ENGINE BOSS
UNIT C
BODIE DISTRICT BLM

Dustin J. Jones
Salmon BLM

On July 28, 1995 the Wildwest Guard Station was notified of by the dispatchers in Boise to come in for standby. At approximately 18:30 a fire broke out near Swan Road in Kuna. We arrived on the fire at about 19:15. Upon arrival the Salmon engine worked the Southern fire line, while the WildWest Engine flanked to the North. Being on the Salmon engine we were happy with the initial attack from our side of the fire. Things seemed to be going well on our line. We ran out of water and left the fire line almost wet to the Swan Road where Yokum and another engine were flanking the fire. We drove through the black and filled our heavy. Driving back through the black we secured the line on the south side again until running out of water. We left the two kuna engines behind and headed for water. After filling up with water from Terry Beck on the Swan Road we followed Telleria North up the Swan Road, because of the break outs on the North Side. As we followed Telleria into the smoke it became intensely hot on top of the engine and very smokey until we could not see at all. While still moving along we hit Telleria's parked Suburban. When the smoke lifted enough to see a few feet ahead of us we decided to back up out of the smoke.

As we proceed to back Southward out of the Smoke we spotted an engine a couple hundred yards off the west side of the Swan Road. The engine appeared to be fully engulfed with fire. The Tires and Cab were on fire. We stopped our engine and Kevin Burns and Chris Ottonello head over to the engine hoping to find the passengers outside of the flaming engine. They swept the area searching for anyone. Chris came back to the engine asking for an engine to go over and ~~[illegible]~~ hose down the engine that was on fire. The other Kuna engine went over and began to put the fire out. While at the engine I hoped that no one was inside. Once the flames were put out Kevin Burns was able to look inside the Cab. He saw two people. After ~~the~~ telling Tellevia there were people inside we left and head South to move our Chase vehicle. Once it was moved we head for the west side of the fire. We tied in with the other engines and began flanking the fire from the North Side at about 21:00 to 21:30 P.M. I do not know why the engine was there, ~~or~~ but I feel ~~deep~~ deeply moved by the incident. At times I still think that it could have been us and our engine had we not gone for water earlier and driven through the BLACK.

My involvement with the Initial Point fire on July 28, 1955 began at 6:30. ~~when~~ our guard camp, Wild West, was called to Base dispath to be placed on standby when quickly the fire call came through. We arived at the fire around 7:00 to 7:15. At approximately 8:00 8:30 we surround the fire and began to mop-up. I working the southeastern side, ~~when~~ saw the front began to bring the ~~fire~~ strong winds at 8:30-8:45 Because of the heavy fuel type, mainly the sagebrush, remain burning (candels) the strong wind blew the ~~ash~~ hot coal across any cat-line that was dug. once the fuels reached ~~the~~ across the line, and with the winds, the fire was gone.

IN respect to the deaths of the two Kona firefighters, I saw the trucks burning approximatly an hour to hour and half after the incident. I had seen nothing of the incident but alot of ~~hearsay~~ rumors were passed. The men were going to get WATER and were driving inside the unburned portion RATHER THAN inside the safety of the black. The truck quit and quickly the truck surround it. Rumor also says if the truck would not have stalled a slightly possibility they could

have made it to the Crooked Falls road. As a BLM fire fighter we are often assisted by other rural departments, and many times the equipment is handy also. The experience of some rural firefighters in brush fire is also a concern.

In consideration to the deaths of the two men of the Kuna fire department, I believe the blame could be placed on inexperience in brush type of equipment. The radio communication was open and everyone was well informed of the front that was passing. With the knowledge of the front, and strong winds, trucks should have been driving inside the black. The opportunity to backburn around the truck would not have been an option because of the winds and the fact sage brush burn longer than grass. Although these deaths are tragic, the only thing that be said is they were good men, doing a good thing, at the wrong place, in wrong conditions.

Mike Ellsworth
Wild West GAUSD Camp
Boise District - BLM

Tuesday August 1, 1995
Incident Report of
Initial Point Fire 7-28-95
Robert L. Hansen
Boise BLM, Mid West Crew

Time Line:

A: Arrived at Boise Dispatch at 6:30 PM the same time Danskin Lookout reported a fire near initial point.

B: Arrived at fire 7:15 pm. and attacked from south side heading west. Continued on to north side working east, At ¼ mile from Swan Falls exhausted water and bumped east to Kuna tender to refill. Fire (active Flame) Knocked down completely at approx. 8:15 PM Note: At this point I became Driver.

C. Returned to south side for mop up at 8:30 heading west. At 8:40 pm received high wind warning over radio.

D. At 8:45-8:50 pm. winds came at 30-40 mph and attacked first breakout on our section (S.W corner). We had to back off at which time Dave Kerby and Jim Buchanan arrived behind us. Being more experienced Jim assumed command of engine and we resumed attack of the breakout.

E: At 9:00-9:10 pm attacked another breakout in front of our position to the N.E. Sometime during this breakout we backed off again as the fire blew up totally out of control and race off to the north at a high rate of speed.

Aug 1, 1995

Statement from James Buchanan
East Crew Leader with West Zone Crew

On the day of the weekend we were called into Boise for standby. When we pulled into the yard at 8:30 a fire was called in at Tinta Paint. We were immediately dispatched to that fire. When we arrived at the fire it was burning toward Swan Falls Road a little bit East. We headed to Kuna to get on the West side. After going around the fire & seeing all progress of the fire, we started working it up. I then met the squad with Dave Harby & turned the truck over to Rob Hansen & the rest of the crew. We noted from a weather report to expect a cold front to come in from the South. So we were in the process on moving some crews to the north side to prepare for that. The wind started to pick up & we got a breakout on the north west side - so I got back in the truck. We heard Blue Villana ask Dance Lane to prepare for a medical emergency - this is all happening about 8:30. We continue to get breakouts along the north side of the fire - and the entire east side blew out. We eventually held the

west side because a cat line & the wind blowing east.

We continued working around the north flank to the east. We worked until we got to Kuna Cave road, noting that we could see fire for miles.

We drove back down Kuna Cave road to Swan Falls Road to fill with water. That is when we heard about the fatalities.

James Buchanan
Boise Dist BLM
Wild West Hand Station
Crew Leader

David Answer

On July 28 at 6:30 we got a fire call. By 8:00 we had the fire rocked down clear around. The Winds come up around 8:30 and the fire come across the wet line in 2 places. Then we went to fill the truck up at a water tender and was planning to get across the the side of the fire with brake outs. Blas Teleria told us to follow him down the highway to the other side of the fire through the smoke. We were following him and had zero visability. I wanted to stop because we couldn't see but it was hot and smokey. He stopped in the middle of the road and I ran into the back of his surburban. It's a good thing I was barely moving. He should had told me he had stopped so it wouldn't have happened. Especially since he had me follow him. The we backed out the way we came so that we could get out of the heat and smoke and get organized again. I looked out in the black and seen an engine on fire. My boss Kevin Burns talked with Blass Teleria and went in search of the people with Chris Ottonello to see if they survived. They were found burned in their truck. We then went around the other side of the fire and worked.

The wild west crew were called out from Dispatch around 6:30 towards the initial point fire, off Swan Falls Road. I was to ride in with Kerby, Dave in the carryall out in front of the trucks. We arrived on the fire at close to 7.00 with ~~an~~ active fire on the east. Winds were out from the west at around 3-5 m/h. Fire was burning in grass and thick shrub. Soon after the crews arrived and started on the west side of the fire. Dave Kerby took a flight on the helicopter, One echo Alpha, I was left in charge of the carryall with heli tack personal. After observing the fire in the air, Dave Kerby came back and we made some more rounds on the South West part of the fire. With not much flames, but alot of smoke from shrubs still burning in the black. We went back towards Swan Falls Road to meet with our Truck Driver Sean Buchanan, Mike Elsworth and Rob Hansen. Rob Hansen took over Driven the truck while Sime Rode around with Dave. I was assigned then to the truck for mop up, cause the fire was well under control around 8:30. As we started towards the West and South of the fire to mop-up. We were advised of a Storm coming in with Strong winds by this time the Cat had a secure line around the South and towards the west of the fire. Our Crew started mop-up on the south west portion of the fire, when winds Started to pick up causing shrubs to candle in the black. A lot of wind caused

many break outs behind us making us turn around to get them. Winds soon reached around 30-45 m/p gusts. Sim Buchanan got dropped off By Dave in the Carry all. So we had Sim Droing, me and Mike on the houses and Rob checking for break outs. Some spots were so hot that we would pull off a little then go in. We were out of water and headed back towards Swan falls road on the South side of the fire. When we reached Swan falls road there were many civilian cars parked. because of low visibility. As we reached the water tender I was pulling off the lids when I noticed a truck out in the Black that was on fire. My first Reaction was I hope their all right, not knowing that they had been trapped and burn. After filling up we went back toward were we had left off. I knew that some one was injured that night, But I Did not realized about the deaths till Dave told me about it in the morning.

Jose Manuel Lopez
Wild West Crew
Engine 67

①

Hallie Davis
Salmon BLM Engine

On the evening of July 28th at approx. 17:45 our crew, along with Old West, were called to standby at Boise. Shortly after arriving to Boise we got a fire call to go to Kuna. As we came to the fire, Dave Kerby told our crew to he'n at the S.W. End (which was our [illegible] point). From 19:15 to about 20:50 all the crews put in what I thought to be a Stable line. We were really excited because we didn't had a fire since we could really put the flames down.

About 15 minutes after securing the line, we went back to get more water. On our way back to the water tenders, the wind started picking up. I can remember returning towards the tenders and seeing a white Kuna engine, along with a Red Kuna engine going the opposite way securing the line more with their remaining water.

When we were almost to Swan Falls road the fire was making another run, towards the road. We started going towards it, but then I told the driver we only had about 8 galons of water left. So we left it and proceded to get water.

After getting water, we were told to try and drive thru the smoke to the other side of the fire. (On the Swan falls road). Before going thru the smoke I was taking pictures from on top of the engine up until we entered the smoke. I sat down and tied my bandanna so I could breathe. All of a sudden it was black, smokey, and there were fire embers flying - [illegible]. I looked over and saw my crew member was having a hard time. His face hurt because he didn't have a shroud so I told him to get behind me. All of a sudden we came to a abrupt stop as if we hit something. I was yelling and I couldn't hear anyone else around me. My eyes felt as if they were on fire, I felt like I was on fire, and I thought I was alone up there. At that time I was pretty scared and upset just wanting to get the heck out of there.

The engine started to slowly back out and the air was partly clear again. When we got out I couldn't believe what had happened and how much fire

there was around the fire again. I had my camera again and started to take more pictures. Just then someone yelled "That looks like an engine on fire".

We backed up more to get a better view. My boss jumped out and ran to talk to the guys who were behind us — then he ran out towards the engine to see if anyone was in or out of the engine. Another [illegible] went out to help

When they came back they said they didn't find anyone, then my boss went back out to the engine. I then saw another Kuna engine go toward it and started spraying it with water.

My boss then came back and said there were two firefighters in the engine. —

Christopher E Otterello
Salmon District BLM
Engine 425
GS-4

On Friday July 28, we were called from Wild West Guard Station at approximately 17:30 to Cover at Boise due to all other resources wereon fires. After arriving at about 18:30-18:40 we were called to initial attack the Initial Point fire near Kuna. My Engine (Salmon Engine 425) began flanking on the South side of the fire. At approximately 20:00 we had dropped 2 loads of water on the South flank. Other engines were working the side also. There was a wet line around the whole fire and no fire was visible along the line. We retured to the road and refilled when The wind picked up and The fire Blew out on the North Side. Blass Tellerie then notified us to ~~[illegible]~~ follow him down the highway. We began to follow him. I was sitting on the rear of the engine with two other Crew members (Dustin Jones, Hallie Daniels). ~~[illegible]~~ We drove into the Smoke visibility was extremely low. Dustin came and sat by me on the back. We the felt a jerk and then stopped. It turned out that we had hit Tellerie's Suburban. I could her Hallie near the front of the engine and I went to the front with her. We backed out and as we came through the smoke I noticed what appeared to be an engine on fire. I asked my boss (Kevin Byrne) if he heard if anyone had got out of the engine. He said no and went to talk with Tellerie. Kevin then

got his gear and began walking towards the engine. I jumped off ~~and~~ the engine and ran up with him. We got to the Truck and saw what appeared to be a Fire Shelter deployed inside the Engine. The Vehicle was totally engulfed and the cab was caved in. We tried to look into the vehicle but it was too hot. We made a sweep looking for people then headed back to the road. We talked with Tellerio and he asked us to go back to engine to find out if anyone was there. We returned to the truck and I began to make another sweep looking for people. A Kuna engine arrived and began hosing down the engulfed vehicle. Kevin sent me to talk with Tellerio and tell him the we found no signs of people and that we believed the were still inside of the vehicle. I talked with Tellerio and then Kevin called and asked for more water. Tellerio asked me to take our engine in to the I asked our Engine Driver, Ronald Aumen if he felt comfortable with taking the engine in there. He said he did & I began to walk the Engine in when I met Kevin and he turned us around and said another engine was there. We went back to the highway and talked with the Tellerio and he made the decision to pull every body out to an old burn. We drove down and got our chase. We then ~~started~~ moved our chase down the road. Everyone got back on the

engine and we hooked up with Tellerie again and started hot lining ground to the north side of the fire. We hit the main road again and everyone else left. We then headed down the road and got with the water tender. Jan Peterson and two other people showed up as a strike team. After an hour or so we began working the fire again.

Personally, I feel that the Kuna people should not have been on the fire. There was very poor communication with them. Also the fire was federally run and the Kuna people had no nomex or fire shelters that should have kept them off the fire line totally. Also not everyone was informed that a storm was coming in. No safety zones or escape routes were established (We assumed the black.) Another thing that my whole crew has noticed is that most people on the Boise District do not have their fire shelters and P.P.E. on or even have it readily available. I am disgusted with the higher management of the Boise District BLM, Do the not know about these things or do they just not give a Damn. I think Bill Casey has alot of work to do with this District if it's not too much trouble for him.

Christopher E. Ottenello GS-4
Salmon District BLM Engine 425

Nathan Maudeen

7-28-95- Initial Point Fire

We arrived on the fire at 8:30 p.m. and proceeded on the North flank of the fire. We knocked down small flames, and strengthened the fire line by putting down a 3 wet line. At some point we were given a 25 minute warning of Extreme winds forcasted. ~~So once the winds came~~ at that time we moved to the west and carried intense mop-up. As the winds increased we noticed a breakout - and proceeded in that direction - As we were flanking the fire on the west side. I noticed fence fume of another breakout behind us - and to the west. We turned around and flanked the other breakout on the west side until we had an ½ of a tank of water. I noticed during the breakouts very extreme fire behavior. and very gusty winds 40-50 mph. later in the night while refilling the tank, we learned of the Kuna truck was burned over and two crew members were killed.


N
W
E
S
KR = Kuna Rural
83 ~ John Joel Lance
6 - Randy
S.E. Swan Falls road
1.
I had no time frame
No communication with Kuna Rural
Temp. was 100°
winds at time of blow up 30↑ G
S
F
KR
KR
83
83
163
X Bias
Fire line
X
Fired
pump
went to the Black
suddenly K.R. showed
up
2
Blow up
over
Blow
out
KR 2
KR 1
83
Fire line
Blow
out
61
BLFS
S F
-Time lapse- between the time K.R.
turned around and the blow up

Aug. 1, 1995 - 1000 Hrs

On Fri. July 28, 1995 We (Engine 61) were dispatched to a Fire outside of Kuna at 1830. Upon arrival we started to Initial Attack the Fire on one Flank (until I have a map I cannot give accurate discription of Direction).

After the initial Attack we started in on the mop up phase of the Fire. Engine 61 was working on the N-NW side of the Fire Mopping up 5' from the Fire edge. While in the process of Doing this we recieved several transmitions on the radio concern Red Flag warnings for high winds. I also noticed a Front aproaching (Thunderstorms). This was about 2000 hrs. We continued our mop up and the winds proceded to intensify. ~~We started seeing the Fire blow out all along~~ About that time two Kuna Fire Engines passed us along my Right side in the Black (I assumed they were going to get a water refill and would stay in the Black). under the Condition Within minutes after they passed us we observed the Fire starting to blow out in several areas in Front and behind us. I never saw the Kuna Engines after that.

David Harrison Crew Super
Cascade Ranger District
Cascade, Id.

Engine 61

Operator (Driver) - David Harrison
Crew Personal - Randy Miller, Josh Furman (3d)

I would like to talk to someone about this incident.

Mike Whitworth
Unit C Ff.

(for July 28)

I arrived on the fire with my engine crew and proceeded to flank the south side of the fire. I observed the fire truck passing by while we were mopping-up on one occasion. This is the only time I directly encounte the victims. We received a red flag warning for winds from the south (I'm not sure they did) and used extreme precaution from that point on. We (engine crew on 09) experienc erratic fire behavior, and I was unaware of what was going on after that on the other side of the fire where the incident occured (other than the fact that it was running). The victims were ignorant of LCES!

On July 28, 1995, I took part in the suppression efforts of a fire South of Yuma. After knocking down the active flame, my crew was in the process of mopping up the fireline when a wind of 50-70 mph struck from the South (blowing to the North). We were on the South side of the fire at the time. Several minutes after the wind started, I observed that the fire had started again on the North side and was being rapidly pushed to the North by the high winds. Soon after I ran out of water and returned to Swan Falls Road to fill my tank. It was then that I learned that an accident had occurred. It should be pointed out that I observed the two victims after extinguishing the active fire we turned to go around the fire again

and were passed by the Tuna Tuck. They were also mopping up. We moved slowly and soon lost sight of them. It is obvious to me that they must have used fresh water until reaching the South Side, where upon running out of water, they began making their way toward Swan Falls Road. It was at this time, I assume, that the fire exploded.

This is a summary of events which occurred on July 28, 1995, between 6:30 P.M. and 8:30 P.M.

Joseph E. Jackson

JOSHUA D FUHRIMAN
F.S. ENGINE 61

INITIAL POINT FIRE

WE ARRIVED ON SCENE AND IMMEDIATELY STARTED MOPPING UP FROM NORTH TO SOUTH. AFTER THE INITIAL ATTACK WAS PRETTY MUCH COMPLETED WE WERE LEFT ON THAT SAME SIDE MOPPING UP. JUST AS THE WINDS STARTED TO BLOW, I HAD GLANCED BEHIND US AND NOTICED THE TWO KUNA ENGINES BEHIND US. AT THAT POINT THE WINDS WERE STARTING TO GET PRETTY ERRATIC AND WE HAD PULLED OUR ENGINE INTO THE BLACK JUST KNOWING THE FIRE WAS GOING TO BLOW UP. WE HAD A SMALL BREAKOUT IN FRONT OF US AND THE TWO KUNA ENGINES CAME UP AROUND US (IN THE BLACK) MY FOREMAN STOPPED THEM AND ASKED WHERE THEY WERE GOING. THEY SAID THEY GOING TO GET WATER. WE ASSUMED THAT THEY WOULD DRIVE THROUGH THE BLACK TO GET THERE JUST THEN THE WINDS WERE BLOWING VERY HARD AND THE TWO KUNA ENGINES HEADED INTO THE GREEN LIKE THEY WERE GOING TO CATCH THAT BLOWOUT. BUT WHY WOULD THEY DO THAT IF THEY HAD NO WATER? BY THEN THE WIND AND THE DUST WAS SO BAD WE COULDN'T SEE ANYTHING ANYMORE.

WE DIDN'T FIND OUT ABOUT THE BURNOVER UNTIL WE WERE AT A KUNA TANKER FILLING UP WITH WATER AND THE CORONER CAME UP AND ASKED US WHERE HE WAS SUPPOSED TO GO.

8/1/95

Terry Beck
Yocum
Wade
Stroad
Burns Buchanan
Egypt Lane
Swan Falls
Lynn Miracle
NE Loop Road

Joel Rittenhouse
Unit C
Boise BLM

My crew arrived on the fire at Kuna. We suppressed the active flame around the perimeter of fire. We were beginning the mop up around the fire when strong winds cause a breakout on the NW side. We began suppressing this breakout when we notice a breakout behind us. We drove through the black to work on this breakout [redacted].

Joel Rittenhouse
8-1-93

Dave Brown
Unit C
Boise BLM

July 25 1995

Unit C arrived and Engine 09 was sent to south side of fire attacking Fireline with active flame. The winds were high and very erratic and high velocity. Warnings were voiced about storm front coming in with very high winds. Engine 09 headed down south flank until we ran out of water and went to fill up. Kuna Rural trucks arrived on the fire the same time as Unit C. Many times during the fire we had to back off into the black in order to avoid being burned over. Communications with Kuna Rural were limited and ~~their~~ there trucks seemed to have no direction as far as combining forces and mopping up behind our engines. My opinion is that the Kuna engines chase flame and really don't know tactics and objectives well enough to effectively fight serious range fires. They should only work with the BLM behind us mopping up with one direction utilizing ~~their~~ potential capabilities to the fullest

Dave Brown

FOREST SERVICE ENGINE 61 - RANDY MILLER BOISE BLM DETAIL
GARDEN VALLEY RANGER STATION
462-3241

INITIAL ATTACK -

WERE WORKING SOUTH AND NW SIDE
FIRE WAS WET LINED AND WE WERE WETTING 3 FEET
IN FROM EDGE. RED WARNINGS WERE ISSUED OVER RADIO
FOR THUNDERSTORMS AND WINDS. WHEN MORNING UP
WINDS BEGAN TO INCREASE AND FIRE ACTIVITY ON THE
LINE STARTED TO BLOW OUT ON OUR SIDE. WE WORKED
TO CONTROL BLOW OUTS BUT SAGE/GRASS FUELS WERE
TO CONTINUOUS WITH WIND BLOWING AT EXTREAM SPEED. WE
THEN HAD KUNA FIRE ENGINES PASS US ON THE GREEN
SIDE, THEN HEADED FOR THE BLACK. WINDS PICKED
UP TO THE POINT WE MADE A DESITION TO BACK INTO
THE BLACK AND WAIT. VISABILITY WAS ZERO AND HEAT
IN THE BLACK WAS EXTREAM. NO RADIO CONTACT OF KUNA
ENGINES WAS CALLED TO US FOR THEIR PASSING US SO QUICKLY.
I KNEW CONDITIONS WERE TO HOT FOR US TO PROCEED, SO
HAVING THE KUNA ENGINES PASS BY WAS WEIRD IN MY MIND.

R. Miller

FOSe
7-28-95

After hearing the weather report that we were going to receive 40-50 MPH wind gusts, Linda Hunt & I began watching the north east corner of the fire line closely. We were positioned on Swan Falls Rd. At the time the wind was blowing to the south east. It was, I believe, around 8:00-8:30 pm when the wind began to shift. Linda called Dave Kirby fire boss, to inform him that there were some hot spots along the fire line we were watching ~~and that~~ (there were no trucks positioned on that end). He said he was sending a Cat and a fire truck our way and that it would be around 5-10 minutes before they got there. We kept watching the line, the wind began to pick up. The wind was blowing black dust off the fire. I remember seeing one kuna engine come off the line we were watching and head south down Swan Falls Rd. As the wind picked up the dust & smoke made it hard to see. I noticed one break out about 20 ft on the other side of the fence off the road. About that time I heard someone on the radio talking about a break out on the south end of the fire. The north east line started to explode with another break out to the west of the first one I noticed. I heard someone saying the north side was breaking. I couldn't see anyone on the line through the smoke & dust. We started down the road heading south and noticed a cat heading north through the black toward the fire line. I never saw the other kuna truck that was following the one I saw come off the line.

We picked up the kuna Fire Capt. on the road.

He told us he had an engine down on the fire and needed to find it. We headed back north. He was calling to the engine that was down on his radio. The last thing we heard from the people in the engine is that they were surrounded by fire and that the engine was on fire. We tried to locate the engine from the road, but couldn't see through the thick smoke and dust. We picked up Bob Stroud. The Kuna Capt. was trying to reach his dispatch on our cellular phone. He thought he spotted the engine, so we let him out on the road. We met up with Blas Telleria and told him that we'd head into the back side of the fire to try and locate the downed engine. We were driving through the black, the dust & smoke was too heavy to see. The black burnt area was still very hot. Bob stopped to let Linda and I out. We headed for the road when the 50 MPH wind hit and we were overcome by dust and smoke. We huddled down on the ground. Bob came back and found us. It was too windy, hot and dusty to search further. Also, our vehicle began to over heat, so we had to give up the search. We went back to the road. We saw the engine burning after the fire had passed and the wind had died down.

Carrie Landmeier

Linda Hunt - BLM Fire Investigation & Prevention

FOS6 July 28, 95

The intial fire had been knocked down. Fire crews were cleaning up the line. Carrie Sandner and I were watching the north east side of the fire from Swan Falls road. The line was still very hot. We called Dave Kirby (IC) to let him know. He replied that two engines and a cat were on there way to the north side. We noticed the winds were increasing and the fire line broke out in two spots. With the high winds the fire moved quickly. I again called Kirby to inform him of the flare up. I remember seeing a Kuna rural fire truck come off of the fire line before the

break outs occurred, on the north side. I never did see a second Kuna fire truck leave the fire line.

Carrie and I drove to the south end where we picked up the Kuna chief, I assumed, he was saying he had a truck at the north end. The fire by now was riping to the north. As we drove to the north the Kuna chief received a call on his radio that was something like "our truck is engulfed in flames." We reached the north side and stopped. The Kuna chief got out of our vehicle trying to make contact with his truck over the radio. Bob Stroud and Blas Telleria drove up and Bob got in

our vehicle to drive.
Bob had spotted the truck and wanted to go look for it to see if we could get the people. The Kuna chief was using our cellular phone to call for help. The fire was approaching Swan Falls road quickly so the chief got in with us and we drove south out of the flames. The chief spotted his missing truck in the fire. We stopped, the chief got out and joined his other engine on Swan Falls road. Bob, Carrie, & I drove into the black from the south looking for the fire truck. the winds were blowing extremely hard, 50-60 mph, and we couldn't see a thing. It was extremely hot so we returned to the road. Linda Hunt

on Friday July 28, 1995 Tim Vertrees A Volunteer Came by my Home And Ask if I have seen The fire out in The Desert, I Told Him it Looked To be Close To The NEW AREA That We WERE in The process of ANNEXing into our fire District. He said He Would go with ME And we left KUNA going south on SWAN FALLS ROAD. On The WAY out I switche My Radio To SCAN And About POEN ROAD I STARTED To HEAR BLM on CHANNEL 16. By The TIME WE got To Nicholson ROAD The South End of our District, I HEARD SOMEONE on BLM RADio ASK IF KUNA WAS THERE — ANSWER I Think so SOME WHERE in The SMOKE. AT This TIME I CALLED on The RAdio on B.L.M. freq. BLM KUNA 650 I HAVE No TRUCKS out HERE AS WE HAVE Not BEEN Dispatched, Do you REQUIRE TRUCKS AS MUTUAL AID from us. ANSWER YES! I THEN CALLED My Dispatch on my CHANNEL And Told them To Dispatch 620 - 622 and 625. They Did With TRUCKS RESPONDING I HEARD Captain Doyle McPHERSON on The RADio. I Told Him HE WAS Commnd AND To [redacted]e Contact BLM And BE SURE our TRUCKS WORKED in TANDAM. He Confirmed And I started BACK To The STATION

ARRIVING BACK AT THE STATION CHUCK JOHNSON, KENNETH DURRANT WERE WAITING. WE WATCHED THE FIRE AND AFTER A WHILE WE HEARED ON THE RADIO THE FIRE WAS UNDER CONTROL AND THEY WERE MOPING UP. I TOLD MY FIREMEN WITH ME TO SET UP THE HYDRANT AS THEY WOULD BE BACK SHORTLY AND NEED WATER. SHORTLY AFTER THEY HAD IT SET UP A HELLISH WIND CAME UP AND BLEW SO MUCH DIRT WE COULD NOT SEE THE INDIAN CREEK STORE ACROSS THE STREET FROM US. WE WENT INSIDE AND CLOSED ALL THE DOORS FOR ABOUT 5 MINUTES AND THE WIND SLOWED DOWN I WENT OUT SIDE AND LOOKED SOUTH AND THE SKY WAS BLACK WITH SMOKE AS BEFORE THE WIND YOU COULD NOT SEE ANY SMOKE AT ALL. I TOLD MY FIREMEN WE WOULD TAKE 650 AND 641 AS THE FIRE WAS PROBABLY IN OUR DISTRICT BY NOW, AS WE LEFT THE STATION AND TURNED ON TO 2ND ST I SAW ASSISTANT CHIEF DARWIN TAYLOR COMING HOME IN HIS PICKUP AND TRAILER I STOPED TO TALK TO HIM AND AT THAT TIME I HEARD BILL BUTTRAM SAY WE ARE IN TROUBLE - SURROUNDED BY FIRE AND THE ENGINE HAS QUIT. THIS IS THE LAST TRANSMISSION I REMEMBER HEARING FROM 620 TIM VERTREES WAS ON THE RADIO ASKING

WHERE ARE THEY OVER AND OVER SOMEONE ANSWERED THY ARE in it VERY ANGRY And SHAKED I TOOK THE RADIO And SAID CALM DOWN I Now its BAD But WE HAVE To go on. This WAS The LAST Contact I HAD With This AREA AS The fire BLEW ACROSS SWAN Falls Road And ~~[illegible]~~ TIM And I WENT TO EVACUATE People Along POOR Road.

Richard W Cromwell

Fire Chief

August 3, 1995

AUG 3 1995

STATEMENT OF EVENTS

PG. #1 OF 8 INTIAL POINT FIRE JULY 28 1995

AT APROX 1900 HRS KUNA FIRE UNITS were dispatched to ASSIST BLM ON A GRASS FIRE NEAR INTIAL POINT ON SWAN FALLS RD aprox. 6-8 MILES SOUTH OF KUNA IDAHO.

FIRE CHIEF RICH CROMWELL ASSIGNED ME to RESPOND WITH OUR UNITS AND BE THE KUNA INCIDENT COMMANDER.

I RESPONDED TO THE SCENE IN OUR TANKER/BRUSH TRUCK #(620). TANKER/BRUSH TRUCK #622 AND WATER TANKER #625 were ALSO RESPONDING TO THIS SAME LOCATION.

UPON ARRIVAL TO THE AREA OF SWANFALLS ROAD APROX ½ MILE SOUTH OF NICHOLSON RD I MADE A VISUAL SIZE UP OF THE VISIBLE FIRE SCENE INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SIZE OF AREA INVOLVED FUEL LOAD, DIRECTION OF WIND TRAVEL, LOCATION OF OTHER UNITS ON SCENE, [redacted] RATE OF TRAVEL OF THE FIRE.

AFTER ALL KUNA UNITS were ON LOCATION, a BRIEF DEPLOYMENT meeting WAS held BETWEEN myself, MIKE LAN AND BILL BUTRAM, Drivers of #622 + #620 respectively. DURING THAT meeting STRICT ORDERS FOR SCENE deployment were ISSUED. THOSE orders were THAT BOTH UNITS were to be IN CLOSE proximity OF EACH OTHER, work IN CONJUNCTION WITH BLM UNITS AS ASSIGNED by THEIR INCIDENT COMMANDER, TO MAINTAIN radio CONTACT WITH BLM INCIDENT COMMAND [redacted] AND TO OPERATE SAFELY DURING FIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN THEMSELVES IN A SAFE ZONE WITH AN ESCAPE ROUTE.

VEHICLES #620 + #622 WERE THEN deployed TO A LOCATION ON SWAN FALLS RD Aprox ½ mile SOUTH OF OUR INTIAL STAGING area TO [redacted] meet up WITH BLM UNITS ON SCENE AT that LOCATION for ASSIGNMENT.

It SHOULD Be noted THAT several Attempts were made en route from KUNA By myself VIA radio TO BLM personel for ASSIGNMENT to this FIRE SCENE but THOSE ATTEMPTS were UN successful.

An Attempt was also MADE following my BRIEFING WITH #620 + #622 drivers By BILL BUTTRAM to be And prior to them departing THE STAGING area But THIS also proved to be UNSUCCESSFUL. I Advised my UNITS to proceed on to the area SOUTH AND make personal CONTACT WITH BLM UNITS.

I REMAINED AT THE STAGING area WITH #625 operated by CAPT JOE STEAR (6804) AND F/F JENNY TAYLOR (6813). FROM THIS LOCATION IT WAS possible for me to OBSERVE THE NORTH EAST FLANK OF THE FIRE LINE, MY UNITS #620 + #622 AND BLM UNITS. AT THIS time I [redacted] NO LONGER HAD RADIO CAPABILITIES WITH my UNITS AS these CHANNELS were not AVAILABLE to me AT my LOCATION, AND I HAD ordered #620 + #622 TO operate ON BLM frequency.

UPON JOINING BLM UNITS, #620 + 622 moved TO THE front OF THE ATTACK TEAM + were FOLLOWED By 2 BLM pumpers INITIATING AN ATTACK ON THE fire. AT THIS TIME A WHITE BLM COMMAN VEHICLE PASSED THE entire ATTACK CREW IN UN BURNED territory AND proceded over A HILL IN A SOUTH westerly direction out OF my SIGHT.

#620, #622 And 2 BLM pumpers followed in the same direction extinguishing the fire as they went. From my postion, I could see no remaining flame as the last BLM [redacted] UNIT passed over the hill. I continued to observe the area both behind and what I perceived as where the attack team was now located and was very confident that no fire or imminant danger existed. Within a few minutes it was apparent that this attack team had knocked this flank of the fire completly out. The only smoke remaing in this area, was from sage brush stems at ground level and should not be An immediate problem.

Winds At this time were calm & no noticeable problems seemed to exist.

A few minutes passed by before 2 BLM pumpers from the fire line (presumed thought) Arrived At tanker # 625 requesting to be refilled. This was done in a very timely manner and they returned to the fire scene. AT this time the supply line from #625 was disconnected An left at the side of the road. TANKER #625 with CAPT JOE STEAR and F/F JENNY TAYLOR returned to the KUNA city limits (SWAN FALLS RD And STAGE COACH) to refill.

I Remained at the Staging area to observe the the area of the NORTH EAST FLANK And to Command #620 & #622 on South County Fire Channel Yellow if needed. No problems were observed or discussed with my units.

TANKER #625 with CAPT JOE STEAR And F/F Jenny TAYLOR returned to the STAGING area After refilling with WATER IN RUNN. UPON their return THE FILL hose WHICH had been left AT THE STAGING area earlier WAS PLACED BACK ON THE APPARATUS.

AT THIS time I felt it WAS SAFE AS WELL AS prudent TO LOCATE CHOSER TO THE fire line. TANKER #625 AND myself THEN relocated to AN AREA ON SWAN FALLS Rd APROX due east OF THE FIRE AREA. THIS NEW LOCATION GAVE better choices OF observation OF FIRE LINE ACTIVITIES.

AT this time I LEFT #625 AND WALKED APROX 200'-300' west TO AN existing fence TO OBSERVE. HERE I OBSERVED a BLM DOZER working THE AREA. WINDS were STILL calm, and NO problems were apparent. I ALSO observed THAT #622 WAS approaching TANKER #625 VIA SWAN FALLS from THE North. I THEN returned to TANKER #625.

During my return TO #625 I noticed THAT winds were increasing slightly but not strong enough TO IN my opinion be an immediate problem UPON my return TO #625 I observed refill operations IN progress. I then decided TO WALK ON SWAN FALLS Rd TO THE North TO get ANOTHER VIEW OF THE fire area. SHORTLY AFTER my Leaving #625 I observed #620 IN THE BURNED Area OF the scene proceding IN A NORTH EAST direction. THIS was ACCEPTABLE to me AS I KNEW At THIS time they were [redacted] IN very CHOSE [redacted] proximity OF their point OF entry TO the fire scene.

It was my assumption that #620 was low on water supply and that they were enroute to refill from #625.

At this time the winds erupted to what I felt were probably in excess 50 mph. The [redacted] wind now seemed to be blowing in a straight north direction from out of the south. I felt this was highly unusual as predominate winds in this area generally move from [redacted] NW to SE or SE to NW. [redacted]

Knowing that high winds could be a problem I continued to walk along Swan Falls Rd north bound. Due to the winds [redacted] SUDDEN increase in speed which made for difficult walking the entire area [redacted] became very dark due to blowing dust, smoke & ash from the burn area. Visibility at this time was aprox 100' to the west, and 300'-500' to the north.

I felt #620 at this time should be on Swan Falls Rd in a safe zone because of my last visual contact with them.

My feelings at this time were to return to #625 but felt I should remain where I was to try and observe any change in the fire line perimeter.

Visibilty remained very poor.

#620 then came on channel Yellow and advised that they were in trouble due to being surrounded by fire. I immediatly requested their location. They did not answer. I asked their location again and to confirm their problem. Still no answer.

At this time I detected noise to the west of my location that sounded like #620 moving at a higher than normal rate of speed. I again

STILL NO reply.

AT THIS Time I FELT IT WAS Necessary to Begin running of SWAN FALLS RD NORTHBOUND to try And Determine their LOCATIONS as their sounds were strongest IN that direction. I CONTINUED to CONTACT them as well #625, AS I KNEW that this was a very serious problem At the point due to the heavy fuel LOAD in the area, THAT I believed them to be in at this time. I NOW ATTEMPTED to CONTACT ADA COUNTY DISPATCH, NO REPLY, then KUNA BASE (STATION #1), NO Reply, then 625 or 622, NO reply. All the while I CONTINUED to RUN North ON SWAN FALLS RD. to try And KEEP WITHIN car shot OF my UNIT that was in trouble. AT THIS Time I OBSERVED HEAVY FIRE West OF my LOCATION MOVING very rapidly North And EAST at how to moderate rate. ALSO I DID not hear anything that sounded like #620 moving thru the area. I RAN APROX ANOTHER 10-20 yards North when I heard the SIREN OF 620 START then Suddenly stop. It FELT this sound came Aprox NW OF my LOCATION Aprox 50 yds. I CONTINUED ON SWAN FALLS RUNNING AND ALSO ATTEMPTING to CONTACT 625 OR 622 by RADIO.

BECOMING CONCERNED for my OWN SAFETY I took REFUGE in the BARROW PIT on the east SIDE OF SWAN FALLS RD. VISIBILITY NOW WAS 400' west 600' NORTH. WINDS very High with A lot OF DEBRIS in the AIR.

I DETECTED an APPROACHING vehicle and returned to the road to make CONTACT with them. THIS TURNED OUT to be a BLM vehicle which I had observed earlier in the area.

CONTACT WAS made with these personel. I ADVISED them that I had a unit IN trouble somewhere west OF OUR LOCATION and did they have any contact with them or knowledge of their location OR problem. THEY DENIED HAVING any INFORMATION. I then told them that I needed to use their CELLULAR PHONE (I had observed their possession of this equipment earlier) to call for help as I KNEW my WAIKIE WAS USELESS AT this POINT because of LOCATION & DISTANCE to transmitter sites. I DIALED 911 (ADA county DISPATCH) AND MADE CONTACT WITH DISPATCHER BRENDA HINSHAW. I IDENTIFIED myself AND OF the NATURE OF my problem requesting ADDITIONAL FIRE UNITS from KUNA AND requested mutal AID OF VARIOUS FIRE DEPTS as well as medical UNITS and LIFE FLIGHT. DURING this time I traveled north on SWAN FALLS RD with the 2 BLM personal Attempting to LOCATE OUR UNIT AND/OR people. Nothing WAS found SO we turned around at a LOCATION JUST SOUTH OF NICHOLSON RD AND proceded back South ON SWAN FALLS RD CONTINUING TO SCAN the area west. IT WAS then that I SAW thru the SMOKE DUST AND DEBRIS OUR UNIT totally INVOLVED IN FIRE APROX 250 yds west OF SWAN FALLS Rd. I ADVISED the DRIVER that I COULD See OUR UNIT AND to STOP the VEHICLE which she did. I then exited the VEHICLE, they drove AWAY not to be seen AGAIN NOR OFFERING ANY further ASSISTANCE.

SHORTLY there after #622 arrived at my LOCATION and I ADVISED of the location OF OUR UNIT in trouble (#620).

I felt it was imperative to attempt a rescue. MIKE LAW DRIVER OF #622 passed my Bolt cutters. I THEN RAN OUT TO the FENCE AND CUT AN Opening AND ORDERED #622 As they PROVE thru to get WATER ON ~~it~~ (UNIT) AS SOON AS possible AND Keep me advised OF their findings ie (~~foot~~ tracks heading Away or IF PERSONEL STILL IN UNIT ASAP) But ABOVE ALL to INSURE their own SAFETY.

BY THIS Time I WAS made AWARE OF [redacted] UNITS responding from KUNA FIRE TO ASSIST. CONTACT VIA RADIO WAS made AND ~~ASS~~ assignments made. #622 made And intial RESCUE ATTEMPT. #625 ARRIVED ON scene with me and I advised Capt STEAR OF OUR Distressed UNITS LOCATION AND ASSIGNMENTS made. SO FAR #622 returned Advising they could not SAFELY get to them at this time.

Submitted Aug 4 1995

BY

CAPTAIN DOYLE MCPHERSON

KUNA RURAL FIRE DEPT

TO

DAN FRIEND EAGLE FIRE CO

BLM INVESTIGATION TEAM MEM

#1 87

Joe Stear
6804 Capt
Kuna Fire

We were paged to assist BLM with a brush fire South of Nicholson rd. requested was 625, 620, 622. Myself and Jennifer taylor took 625. We were 1st on scene. I began looking for a BLM representative, observed a slow moveing brush fire and staged approx 1000' North of the fire on Swan falls rd. Doyle McPherson radioed me and asked if I had seen anyone from BLM, I said no, and he said he see a suburban comeing up to the road. 620 stopped ahead of 625 and 622 stopped beside 625. Doyle had a briefing with each of 620 and 622 sent them on their way. He came back across to 625 and said he would stay with us because there wasn't room in 620 and we could see most of the North side of the fire from our

#8

position. We watched them go down and into the area of the north perimiter with 2 BLM tks. At one point shortly in 600 was in the lead 622 then 2 BLM campers. There was a Suburban in with them that passed all 4 trucks and went one ahead out of our sight. After a while a BLM tk came up to us for water. Before we had the first one full the second came in for water both tks came up to us from the rear of our tk we were still head to the south. After we filled both BLM tks we went back to Stage coach rd and Swan falls for water. Leaving Doyle at our original staging pt.

(3)

We filled came back and picked up Doyle and stages behind a 3 PM Water tender near but north of a Cat working the South East corner of the fire line. I got out and talked to the driver of the water tender for for 3 minutes then stated that I wanted to go further down turn around and get out of the smoke we did so with all 3 of us in the truck and stage I put 20' south of the Cat and We saw 622 out and they came up to us for water - I got them hooked up and filling with Doyles help and asked Bob Black where 620 was. He said right behind us.

#4

I noticed Doyle walking to the North on the road. As I was filling 625 I heard a radio transmission that sounded frantic. I listened to the radio by leaning more to the opened door of 625. I heard, "where are you I can't see you", at this point the wind came to a very strong northerly wind. I told Bob Black and Mike Law to get down to Doyle to see what was happening. I unhooked them and sent them on their way as I quickly put up our fuel hose the wind came up also to a very seriously strong wind. I couldn't breath easily like the wind was blowing but there was very -

#5

little oxygen so I heard Doyle say something like "a fire and you" one more time, then "60". I started up the road and stopped at a BLM truck and said do you know anything about out the out there one guy said I hope it wasn't that ball of fire that came up over there. Most of the BLM crew was sitting around upon the truck like they were watching a show with no intension of doing any more. I proceeded up the road to the north watching where Doyle pointed and looking for Doyle in the rear. As I got to Doyle I looked to the west and saw [illegible] fully involved in flame.

BLM Library
Denver Federal Center
Bldg. 85, OC-521
P.O. Box 25047
Denver, CO 80225

#6

Doyle got in 625 and began radio traffic as command. I saw 622 coming South to us. I told Doyle I was going to get in 622 and go into 620. Doyle said go ahead. I swung the mower and got in. I said there is the tk lets go. We rolled up to the fence I hopped out cut the fence Hopped back in and said go. I told them I want to knock down the fire confirm that they were not in there and do a search as we got closer I saw 2 people on foot and one yelled you can't go in there I asked are they in there. He replied we can't get close enough to tell. I told Mike lets get over there and

#7 of 7

Do a knock down. We pulled up on the right rear of 620 [illegible] pulled a hand line and put out fire on the right side and cab. I saw that we had one inside and stepped up to confirm that they were both inside they were. I called command and said "We've got them" Doyle "Fires Status?" Me "In it". We extinguished the truck.

Joe H Stear
6804 Capt.
Kuna Fire
8-3-95

INITIAL POINT RANGE FIRE

I RESPONDED TO STATION 1 AND WAS ASSIGNED TO STANDBY TILL 622 FROM STATION 2 STOPPED BY TO PICK ME UP. I RESPONDED IN 622 WITH MIKE LAW. UPON ARRIVAL WE ENTERED THE BURNED AREA OF THE NORTHEAST PERIMETER AND PROCEEDED TO ASSIST B.L.M. TO SUPPRESS THE FIRE. WE WORKED OUR WAY AROUND COUNTER-CLOCKWISE APPLYING WATER FROM THE FRONT MOUNT BUMPER NOZZLES TO THE FIRE PERIMETER. WE MADE IT AROUND TO THE SOUTHERN PERIMETER AND MADE CONTACT WITH A B.L.M. DOZER AND TWO B.L.M. ENGINE COMPANIES. WE THEN TURNED AROUND TO THE WEST AND PROCEEDED TO EXTINGUISH FIRE UNTIL WE RAN OUT OF WATER IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN PERIMETER. I CONTACTED THE B.L.M. INCIDENT COMMANDER FOR UPDATED ASSIGNMENT AND WAS ADVISED TO REFILL AND MAKE ANOTHER PASS. WE PROCEEDED TO SWAN FALLS RD. TOWARDS THE TANKER WHEN 620 CALLED ON CHANNEL 16 (B.L.M.) AND STATED THAT THEY WERE OVERHEATING. I ADVISED 620 TO CHECK THE SCREEN ON THE RADIATOR AND WAS ACKNOWLEDGED. AS WE WERE PREPARING TO LEAVE THE FOREGROUND I NOTICED THAT THE WIND HAD CHANGED DIRECTION TO THE NORTHEAST FROM THE SOUTHWEST. I TRIED TO ADVISE B.L.M.I.C. OF THE POSSIBLE DANGER TO 620 BECAUSE THEY WERE LAST SEEN BY MYSELF ON THE NORTHWEST FLANK OF THE FIRE, LOW ON WATER OR COMPLETELY OUT, AND PROCEEDING IN A EASTERLY DIRECTION TOWARDS TANKER 625, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE I RECEIVED AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. WE THEN LEFT THE FIRE GROUND AND PROCEEDED TO RENDEZVOUS WITH TANKER 625 WHICH WAS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE SOUTHEAST PERIMETER ON SWAN FALLS RD. AS WE WERE REFILLING, THE NORTHEASTERLY WINDS PICKED UP TO THE POINT WHERE VISIBILITY WAS GREATLY REDUCED AND THE CONCERN OF A MAJOR RANGE FIRE BECAME AN ISSUE. WE WERE NOT COMPLETELY FULL OF WATER WHEN WE WERE ORDERED BY CAPT. STEAR TO GO SEARCH FOR 620 AND CREW. WE DROVE NORTH ON SWAN FALLS RD. WHEN WE CONTACTED CAPT. MCPHERSON WHO WAS ON FOOT. I HANDED MCPHERSON OUR BOLT CUTTERS TO CUT THE BARBWIRE FENCE, AND WE

PROCEEDED IN A NORTHWEST DIRECTION THROUGH THE DESERT TO START A SEARCH. WE WERE IN AN APPARENT FIRESTORM AND VISIBILITY WAS REDUCED GREATLY. I MADE OUT A COLUMN OF SMOKE WHICH WAS DARKER THAN THE SURROUNDING SMOKE AND ASKED MY PARTNER TO PROCEED IN THAT DIRECTION. WE LOCATED 620 WHICH WAS FULLY INVOLVED IN FIRE, BUT IN SPITE OF OUR BUMPER NOZZLES BEING DEPLOYED WE COULD NOT SAFELY CONDUCT A CIRCLE SEARCH IN THE INTENSE HEAT AND SMOKE. MY PARTNER STATED THAT OUR TRUCK ENGINE WAS TRYING TO STALL OR SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT SO WE AGREED TO EXIT THE AREA IN A SOUTHEAST DIRECTION. WE THEN DROVE BACK TO SWAN FALLS ROAD, WHERE WE ELECTED TO DRIVE NORTH IN HOPES OF FINDING OUR FELLOW FIREFIGHTERS. THE INTENSE STORM ONCE AGAIN ENVELOPED OUT TRUCK SO WE COVERED UP WITH NOMEX HOODS AND WAITED THE STORM OUT. AFTER THE SMOKE CLEARED, WE BACKED UP, PICKED UP CAPT. STEAR AND WENT BACK TO WHERE 620 WAS. I STRETCHED A 1 1/2 " COTTON JACKET HOSE OFF 622 AND ATTACKED THE FIRE IN 620. AS i EXTINGUISHED THE FIRE IN THE CAB OF THE TRUCK I OBSERVED WHAT APPEARED TO BE BLACKENED HUMAN REMAINS IN THE PASSENGER SEAT OF THE VEHICLE. I THEN CONTINUED TO FIGHT THE VEHICLE FIRE AS I YELLED BACK TO CAPT. STEAR THAT WE HAD A FATALITY. I MOMENTARILY DISCONTINUED FIREFIGHTING TO GRIEVE, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO EXTINGUISH MORE VEHICLE FIRE. I CANNOT REMEMBER THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS DIRECTLY AFTER THIS INCIDENT BUT WE EVENTUALLY HAD TO REPORT BACK TO STATION 1 WITH DEFECTIVE HEADLIGHTS————————END OF REPORT————————

Robert S Black

KUNA VOLUNTEER
FIRE DEPARTMENT
8-3-93

622

AUG. 3. 1995

ON JULY 28. 1995 AT ABOUT 7:15 PM. I HEARD THE FIRE CHIEF. RICH. REQUEST THE TANKERS TO RESPOND TO THE FIRE OUT BY INITIAL POINT. DISPATCH SET OFF THE PAGERS AND I RESPONDED TO STATION #3. I RESPONDED IN 622.

AS I WAS ON THE WAY TO THE FIRE. I WAS ASKED HOW MANY PERSONNEL WERE ON BOARD. I RESPONDED WITH ONE. I WAS TOLD TO STOP AT STATION #1 AND PICK UP ANOTHER FIRE FIGHTER. I THEN SAID I COPIED AND WENT TO STATION #1. I PICKED UP ROBERT BLACK AND RESPONDED TO THE FIRE. FORM THIS TIME ON HE RAN THE RADIO.

WHEN WE GOT ON LOCATION. DOYLE MCPHERSON WAS COMMAND. THE TWO OTHER TRUCKS. 625 AND 620. WERE ALREADY ON LOCATION. DOYLE TOLD US TO GET IN LINE WITH BLM TRUCKS WITH ONE BLM TRUCK IN FRONT AND EACH OF US TO FOLLOW AFTER IT WITH A BLM TRUCK BEHIND. THE FOUR TRUCKS GOT IN LINE AS PLANED.

WE STARTED ON THE NORTH PERIMETER OF THE FIRE JUST ALONG SWANFALLS ROAD. WE FOUND THAT BLM WAS USING OUR CHANNEL #16 ON THE RADIO. BOB SWITCHED THE RADIO TO #16 AND MADE CONTACT. WE WERE ON THAT CHANNEL MOST OF THE TIME. WE WENT TOWARD THE WEST ALONG THE NORTH PERIMETER. THERE WAS A LITTLE BREEZE THAT WAS COMING FROM THE NORTHWEST. THIS WAS AN EASY FIRE BECAUSE THERE WAS LITTLE BREEZE. WE WENT WEST AS FAR AS IT WENT AND CONTINUED ON AROUND TO THE SOUTH PERIMETER UNTIL WE CAME BACK TO THE FENCE ON THE SOUTH. 620 HAD FOLLOWED BLM'S TRUCK AND WE IN 622 FOLLOWED 620 UNTIL WE GOT TO THE FENCE ON THE SOUTH. WE WERE TOLD TO TURN AROUND AND GO AROUND THE PERIMETER AGAIN TO SOAK IT DOWN AGAIN. AFTER WE TURNED AROUND. WE FOLLOWED THE BLM TRUCK AND 620 FOLLOWED US WITH A BLM TRUCK BEHIND.

ALL WAS GOING WELL AND I NOTICED THAT THE FIRE WAS OUT ALL ALONG THE PERIMETER AS WE MADE OUR RETURN TRIP. WE ROUNDED THE WEST SIDE AND WAS GOING UP THE NORTH PERIMETER. WE RAN OUT OF WATER IN 622 AND LET 620 THEN PULL AROUND US. WE FOLLOWED THEM FOR A WAYS AS BOB CALLED ON CHANNEL #16 TO LET THEM KNOW THAT WE WERE OUT OF WATER AND WANTED TO KNOW IF WE SHOULD REFILL AND RETURN TO THE STATION. THEIR REPLY WAS TO FILL UP AND STAND BY AS A WIND STORM WAS TO PASS THROUGH. WE THEN PULLED OFF THE LINE AND WENT THROUGH THE BLACK TOWARD SWANFALLS ROAD.

AS WE WERE PULLING ON THE ROAD. 620 CAME ON THE RADIO AND SAID THEIR TRUCK WAS OVER HEATING. BOB SAID THEY SHOULD CHECK TO SEE IF THE SCREEN ON THE FRONT OF THE TRUCK WAS PLUGGED UP. THEY SAID "COPY". WE NEVER HEARD FROM THEM FOR A WHILE. WE THEN DROVE UP THE ROAD TO WHERE 625 WAS AND STARTED TO REFILL. AS WE WERE REFILLING I LOOKED BACK AS THE WIND HAD CHANGED AND PICKED UP VERY FAST. THE BLACK SMOKE WAS QUICKLY ALL ALONG THE NORTH END. IT WAS VERY THICK AND GREW VERY FAST. THE WIND APPEARED TO BE FROM THE SOUTHWEST AND BLOWING HARD. JOE MADE THE COMMENT THAT BY THE LOOKS OF IT THAT IT WAS BURNING HOT AND FAST. WE

WERE ABOUT HALF FULL WHEN WE HEARD 620 SAY ON THE RADIO THAT THEIR TRUCK HAD DIED. THEY THEN SAID THEY WERE SURROUNDED BY FIRE. WE THEN TRIED TO REACH THEM TO FIND OUT WHERE THEY WERE AND COULD GET NO REPLY. WE KNEW THEY WERE IN TROUBLE AND JOE YELLED "THEY ARE IN TROUBLE! UNHOOK AND GET OUT OF HERE."

WE QUICKLY UNHOOKED AND I TURNED THE TRUCK AROUND AND HEADED NORTH LOOKING FOR THEM. BOB TURNED TO CHANNEL #1 TO LET DOYLE KNOW THAT WE HAD AN EMERGENCY SITUATION. THERE WAS SO MUCH SMOKE AND DIRT THAT WE COULD NOT SEE VERY FAR. WE DROVE DOWN THE ROAD LOOKING FOR THEM. WE DROVE FOR A WAYS AND CAME TO DOYLE. HE WAS YELLING THEY WERE OUT THERE AND I LOOKED THERE AND SAW THE TRUCK FULLY ENGULFED IN FLAMES. DOYLE ASKED IF WE HAD WIRE CUTTERS AND I SAID YES. WE FOUND THEM AND PASSED THEM TO HIM. HE RAN OUT AND CUT THE FENCE. WE DROVE THROUGH THE FENCE AND WITH BOTH NOZZLES SPRAYING WE WENT TO THE TRUCK. WE WERE SPRAYING HOT EMBERS AS WE WENT. WHEN WE GOT TO THE TRUCK I DROVE UP TO THE CAB AND SPRAYED ON THE PASSENGER SIDE. MOST OF THE WATER WAS SPRAYED TO THE BOTTOM OF THE TRUCK BECAUSE THE NOZZLES ARE AIMED DOWN FOR BRUSH FIGHTING. I DID NOT WANT TO GO PASSED THE FRONT OF THE TRUCK BECAUSE THAT WAS THE DOWN WIND SIDE AND ALL THE FLAMES WERE IN THAT DIRECTION. WE BACKED UP AND MADE A PASS BY THE BACK OF THE TRUCK AND WAS GOING TO MAKE A CIRCLE AND PASS ALONG THE DRIVER SIDE OF THE TRUCK. AS WE STARTED TO COME IN AT THE REAR OF THE TRUCK, 622 LOST POWER IN THE ENGINE. I THOUGHT IT WAS FROM THE HEAT AND DECIDED TO GET OUT OF THERE. I HAD MY FOOT TO THE FLOOR TO KEEP THE ENGINE RUNNING AND SLAMMED IT INTO REVERSE. WE BACKED UP ENOUGH TO CLEAR THE TRUCK AND STARTED OUT OF THERE. AS WE GOT AWAY FROM THE TRUCK. 622 REGAINED ITS POWER AND WE HEADED FOR THE ROAD.

WHEN WE GOT TO THE ROAD WE TOLD DOYLE WHAT HAPPENED. HE SENT US DOWN THE ROAD TO SEE IF WE COULD FIND ANOTHER ACCESS TO THE TRUCK, AS WE WENT DOWN THE ROAD. THICK SMOKE ENGULFED US AND IT WENT BLACK ALL AROUND AND WE COULD NOT SEE THE ROAD. WE STOPPED AND COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING, NOT EVEN THE ROAD BESIDE US. I KNEW THAT WE WERE WHERE THE FIRE HAD ALREADY WENT THROUGH SO WE STAYED THERE. SOON IT CLEARED ENOUGH SO WE COULD SEE THE ROAD BEHIND US. I STARTED TO BACK UP AND SAW A BLM TRUCK BEHIND US. I STOPPED AND THEY STARTED TO BACK UP. IT GOT SMOKEY AGAIN AND WE HAD TO STOP AGAIN. IN A LITTLE WHILE WE COULD SEE THE ROAD AGAIN AND WE HEARD DOYLE ASK US TO RETURN TO MAKE ANOTHER ATTACK ON THE FIRE. WE WENT BACK AND PICKED UP JOE. WE THEN WENT BACK TO THE TRUCK. WE HOOKED UP A HOSE TO THE FRONT OF 622 AND BOB STARTED TO SPRAY THE CAB OF 620. AS HE SPRAYED THE CAB, WE DID LOCATE THE VICTIMS. THEY WERE IN THE CAB OF THE TRUCK. BOB STEPPED ASIDE AND JOE FINISHED PUTTING THE FIRE OUT. AFTER THE FIRE WAS OUT, JOE NOTIFIED COMMAND THAT WE HAD FOUND THE VICTIMS AND THEY WERE IN THE TRUCK. WE THEN RETURNED TO COMMAND FOR OUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

Michael J. Law

ON FRIDAY, July 28th I arrived at the Initial Point Fire South of Kuna at approximately 1830. The Fire seemed to be a routine Type incident, burning in heavy sage and grass and not moving very Fast.

I proceeded to the south west corner of the Fire and unloaded my "cat". I then started cutting line, working From The West To The East along the south side of the Fire. There were several engines working on that side of The Fire including The Two Kuna engines. I had heard on the Radio That there were storm cells in the area and To expect winds up To 50 m.P.h. When I Reached the Swan Falls Road on The East side of The Fire Dave Kirby the I.C. Told me To proceed To the North To The north side of The Fire and start cutting line back To The west, at That Time he cautioned me To watch For strong winds. Before I Reached The North side of The Fire The winds hit and visibility quickly becam Zero so That I stopped, stick in the black and waited For The wind To let up some. As soon as I could see I proceeded To The western Flank of The Fire ~~and~~ Through The black and Proceeded around The west and north side of The Fire, cutting Line. One of The Engine crews Told me That a Engine had been burned up but I did

not learn that there had been fatalities until later.

Dick Watts

Dick Watts

Incident Report for the Point Fire
Terry Roedel, 8/4/95

Boise District Bureau of Land Management dispatch office is open seven days a week from 0700 to 2100 unless there are fires burning in the District or severe weather conditions exist. There are four full-time dispatchers who work five eight hour days a week with two days off.

On July 28, 1995, my shift was from 0700 to 1530. The weather forecast for the day was for possible thunderstorms after sunset. Before I left for the day I called Danskin Lookout to get an updated weather report. I was told there were clouds in the southern part of the District, but it didn't appear that there would be any lightning that evening.

I went off duty leaving a relief dispatcher in charge. At about 1735 I was called back to work as there had been reports of new fires burning on Boise District BLM land. When I got into the office at 1810 I was told there were fires burning at Twin Buttes, along Interstate 84 at milepost 82, and there were reports of several other fires. These fires were apparently lightning caused.

Bonnie Barcus, one of our regular dispatchers, was on duty for the night. With all of the fire traffic we divided the dispatch consoles into two groupings, with Bonnie taking one group and I the other group.

The Point Fire was to use TAC 2 frequency 163.1756 for communication. We found that this frequency was not working on the main dispatch consoles, but the control head for the Boise front frequency would work on TAC 2 so we did have some communication with personnel on the Point Fire. Bonnie Barcus was handling the communication.

A severe weather warning was given to us by Jerry Worden, chief dispatcher, and it was relayed to the incident commanders on the Point Fire.

Shortly after the warning was given, Blas Telleria, one of the incident commanders on the Point Fire, called for an ambulance. He said there were possible injuries that had occurred on the fire. Jerry Worden dispatched an ambulance to the scene.

We were later told that there possibly had been three firefighters injured. Several other dispatchers later came in to take over for the rest of the evening shift.



BOB STROUD

7-28-95

22:30

F056

SWAN FALLS ROAD

18:30 (APPROXIMATELY) ARRIVED FIRE

DISPATCH HAD REPORTED THE FIRE TO BE CAUSED BY LIGHTNING, WE (LINDA HUNT, CARRIE SANDNER AND I) WENT TO FIRE TO CONFIRM THE CAUSE. UPON ARRIVING THE FIRE, WE TALKED TO A LOCAL COUPLE WHO HAD SEEN TWO LIGHTNING STRIKES IN THE AREA AND FIRES START. WE ASSISTED IN BURNING OUT THE ROAD AND THEN DROVE TO THE FIRE ORIGIN AREA. IT APPEARED TO BE AWAY FROM THE ROAD ON A LITTLE HILL. WE DID NOT INVESTIGATE FURTHER BECAUSE OF THE REPORTS AND LIGHTNING OCCURING IN THE AREA. WE DROVE BACK TO THE SWAN FALLS ROAD TO HELP CONTROL THE FIRE. I ASSISTED BLAS IN BURNING THE ROAD SOUTH AS THE TRUCKS AND CAT WORKED THE SOUTH SIDE EAST; THIS WAS THE LAST ACTIVE FLAME ON THE FIRE. ONCE THAT SIDE WAS DOWN, I GOT IN BLAS'S CARRYALL AND WE DROVE THE FIRE LINE STARTING ON THE NORTH SIDE CHECKING THE LINE AS WE DROVE. WE MET CREWS AS WE DROVE INCLUDING THE KUNA TRUCKS. THE KUNA TRUCKS WERE WORKING IN TANDEM DRIVING THE FIRE LINE AND SPRAYING BACK TO THE NORTH EAST SIDE OF THE FIRE. BLAS AND DAVE WERE TRYING TO ADJUST THE CREWS AND THE CAT TO GO BACK TO THE NORTH SIDE AND CONTINUE REINFORCING THE LINE. THEY WERE CONCERNED WITH THE NORTH SIDE AND SENT CREWS BACK TO THE NORTH FROM THE SOUTH AND WEST SIDES. THE CAT WAS TO GO TO THE NORTH EAST SIDE AND WORK WEST. BLAS AND I CONTINUED TO DRIVE AROUND TO THE FIRE. WE WERE NOW ON THE SOUTH SIDE TO THE EAST. THE WIND STARTED TO PICKUP. WE HEARD LINDA SAY THERE WAS A BREAKOUT, SHE WAS ON THE NORTH EAST

SIDE OF THE FIRE. THEN, I BELIEVE LANCE SAID HE HAD A BREAKOUT. HE WAS ON THE NORTH WEST SIDE. WE SOON REACHED THE PAVEMENT AND DROVE TO THE NORTH SIDE. BLAS ASKED ME TO GET HIS CAMERA OUT. WE SAW THE BREAKOUTS AND HURRIED TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE HEADS. ONCE OUT IN FRONT, WE NOTICE THE RED KUNA FIRE TRUCK OUT IN FRONT OF THE BREAK OUTS, ABOUT 300 YARDS FROM THE ROAD AND OFF THE FIRE LINE QUITE SOME DISTANCE. IT WAS POINTED NORTH AND NOT MOVING. THE TWO FINGERS OF THE FIRE WERE NOW GROWING VERY FAST. IT WAS VERY OBVIOUS THAT THE KUNA FIRE TRUCK WAS IN TROUBLE. BLAS TRIED TO CONTACT THEM AND KUNA COMMAND WITH NO RESPONSE. WE WERE NOW STOPPED DIRECTLY ACROSS FROM THEM. BLAS CALLED FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. I TOOK PICTURES OF THE TRUCK AND THE BREAKOUT WITH BLAS'S CAMERA. THE FIRE QUICKLY CIRCLED AND ENGULFED THE TRUCK. I TOLD BLAS THAT I WOULD GET IN WITH LINDA AND CARRIE AND TRY TO DRIVE THE BACK SIDE OF THE BREAK OUT, THINKING THIS WOULD BE THE SAFEST AND QUICKEST ROUTE TO THE TRUCK. I DROVE TO THE ORIGINAL FIRE LINE, WENT THROUGH THE FENCE AND THEN CUT OUT THROUGH THE CANDLES TO WHERE I THOUGHT THE TRUCK MIGHT BE. THE WINDS PICKED UP AGAIN AND VISIBILITY BECAME LESS THAN 10 FEET. THE HEAT BECAME WHAT WE FELT WAS UNSAFE SO, WE TURNED AROUND AND HEADED BACK OUT. ONCE OUT OF THE FIRE, THE WIND SEEMED TO LET UP SOME AND I THOUGHT I WOULD TRY ONCE MORE. LINDA AND CARRIE DID NOT FEEL SAFE DOING THIS SO, I LET THEM OUT IN THE BLACK WHERE THEY WOULD BE SAFE. I DROVE ONCE MORE INTO THE FIRE BUT THE WIND AGAIN PICKED UP AND VISIBILITY AND THE HEAT WERE TOO MUCH. I TURNED AROUND AND WENT TO GET LINDA AND CARRIE. ONCE LINDA AND CARRIE WERE FOUND, I HAD TO LET THE TRUCK COOL DOWN FOR IT WAS OVER HEATING. I RADIOED BLAS

AND TOLD HIM I COULD NOT GET IN. AFTER A SHORT TIME, WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST TO DRIVE BACK TO SWAN FALLS ROAD. ONCE ON THE PAVEMENT, WE DROVE TO WHERE BLAS WAS LOCATED. WE COULD SEE THE TRUCK FULLY ENGULFED IN FLAMES. THE WINDS, HEAT, DUST AND ASH MADE IT A MISERABLE PLACE TO BE. ONCE THE AREA COOLED ENOUGH, ONE OF THE KUNA TRUCKS WENT OUT TO THE BURNING TRUCK. IT CAME BACK FAIRLY QUICKLY ONLY TO RETURN AGAIN WITH ANOTHER TRUCK. THEY PUT THE TRUCK FIRE OUT AND RETURNED TO THE ROAD. I CALLED DENNIS TO INFORM HIM THAT AT LEAST ONE PERSON WAS IN THE TRUCK. SHORTLY THERE AFTER, I LEARNED THAT TWO PEOPLE WERE IN AND I CALLED DENNIS AGAIN. WE WERE ASKED TO SECURE THE AREA AND I CALLED TO INFORM LYNN MIRACLE. ONCE THE ROAD CLEARED OF VEHICLES, WE DROVE TO THE TOP OF A HILL, OUT OF THE SMOKE AND DUST, AND SET UP A ROAD BLOCK. I ASKED LINDA AND CARRIE TO WRITE STATEMENTS OF WHAT HAPPENED. WE REMAINED AT THE ROAD BLOCK, UNTIL WE WERE ASKED TO LOCATE THE TRUCK FOR THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. WHICH WE DID. WE STAYED UNTIL THE CORONER HAD REMOVED THE BODIES. WE THEN RETURNED TO OUR FIRE DUTIES.

Bob Stroud

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
IDAHO STATE OFFICE

REPORT OF

INCIDENT ☒ ACCIDENT ☐ CRIMINAL COMPLAINT ☐

1. Subject: Initial Point Fire F-056	4.File No.
2. Address:	5.Date Reported:7/30/95
3. Telephone:	6.Time: 7 PM
	7.Date Occurred: 7/28/95

8. Details: At 6:30 PM on July 28, 1995, I was returning from a fire on I-84 mile post 88. A fire was reported near Initial Point in the Birds of Prey area. I called Boise District Fire Dispatch (Dick Mendiola) and told them that I was going over to the fire to see if any traffic control was needed.

I arrived at the fire at 7:21 PM. The fire was burning on the west side of the road. Smoke was going over the road and the firefighters were using the road to fill the trucks with water. BLM Fire Investigator Bob Stroud and I blocked off Swan Falls road. Kuna Rural Fire Dept. and the BLM crews seemed to have the fire controlled - no flames were visible.

At approximately 8:50 PM, a front hit the area with strong winds coming from the Southwest. The fire blew up. I was talking to an adjacent landowner (John). He said that he had a hay stack and a diesel tank that was in danger. He drove over to his place to save the tank and stack. My truck was engulfed in smoke. I had my overhead lights on. I drove forward and used my truck PA system to turn cars around in front of the fire. I drove past "John's" land. I could see he was using a frontend loader to try to save his diesel tank. It seemed that the fire was going to engulf the loader. I called Fire Dispatch and reported that there may be a person in trouble. I heard on the BLM radio that a Kuna Fire Dept. truck was burned and it was unknown if there was people in the truck. Blas Telleria, BLM Unit C Crew Chief, called for an ambulance to come to the fire.

A brown Ford pickup drove towards my truck. He ignored my instructions to turn around. He pulled almost up to my front bumper and stuck his head out the window and said, "Does that mean I can't go fishing?" I yelled at him to turn his truck around. As he turned around, he jackknifed the trailer and completely blocked the road. Driver (sole occupant) froze when the trailer jackknifed. The fire had burned up to my back bumper. I jumped out of my truck, unhooked the trailer, and pushed it off the side of the road. I yelled at the driver to "Get out of here." The driver sped south past me through the fire. By then the fire had surrounded my truck. I attempted to get back into the truck on the driver's side, but it was too hot to approach the door. I ran around to the driver's side and used my spare keys to enter the truck. I drove north out in front of the fire.

The fire was heading in a northwestern direction towards houses on Poen and Kuna Cave road. I called Ada County Sheriff's Dispatch and told them that the fire was out of control. I said that I needed Swan Falls road blocked off to traffic and the houses on Kuna Cave and Poen road should be evacuated. I called BLM Fire Dispatch and told them to activate Kliman's pager and call Monte White. At the intersection of Kuna Cave and Swan Falls road, one of the residents of the farm off Kuna Cave road drove up. I sent him up Kuna Cave road to alert his neighbors. A fire crew tried ~~to~~ back burn from Kuna Cave

road but the wind whipped the fire across the road. It seemed like the wind direction was changing. The fire burned towards Kuna Butte. I notified Ada County Sheriff's Dispatch that the fire may be burning towards Kuna Butte and there was houses on the other side of the Butte.

The brown Ford pickup drove past my vehicle. The driver got out and said, "You owe me a boat." I yelled at him to get out of here. He said,"Not until I get some information from you." I walked towards the driver and said "Either you leave now, or I am going to arrest you." I got out a pair of handcuffs. The man got back into the pickup and drove towards Kuna.

A Ada County Deputy drove up to me. He said they were evacuating people off Poen, Barker, and Cloverdale Road. He asked if there were two fire fighters that died in the fire. I told him that wasn't confirmed. Fire Dispatch informed me that another front was due in two hours with high winds. I passed that along to the Ada County Deputy.

News people were coming up Swan Falls road and I was turning them around. I called Fires Dispatch about a Public Information Officer. Soon afterwards, a blue Dodge pickup that was being chased by a Ada County Sheriff sped up to my truck. The driver was Jerry Rohnert, ISO Public Affairs. I told him that the dead fire fighters were unconfirmed and I didn't know where the location of the Fire Boss. He said he would set up his operation in Kuna.

I heard on the Sheriff's radio that they had set up a command post. Boise Police and Ada Sheriff's Dept. were blocking roads and evacuating people in front of the fire. The fire was on the other side of Cloverdale road and it was threatening Desert View subdivision.

Ranger Jim Hart called me on my cell telephone. He said that he couldn't come tonight, but might tomorrow. Soon afterwards, Ranger Kliman called me. He said that he would come in the morning so he would be fresh. I told him that the Sheriff has this situation under control, but there was a fire on the foothills off Cartwright road. I "suggested" he go check and see if they need help. He called back approximately two hours later and said that they didn't need any help.

A white van drove up to my location. The driver said that he was the Ada County Corner. His passenger was the Kuna Fire Chief. The Chief said that he knew the location of the firefighters. I called (3C36) Ada Sheriff's command post on my cell telephone. He told me to hold the van until he could get a Deputy to my location. Deputy Alan Cavener drove up soon afterwards. He asked me to keep people out of the area while they searched for the bodies. Approximately one hour later, two trucks of Ada County Paramedics went by my location. At approximately, 3:30 AM the Corner and the bodies came out of the area. Deputy CAVENER returned and suggested that Swan Falls road be opened up. He said there was no need to protect the burned fire truck. His investigation of the deaths was complete. The DR number is: 70250.

I left the area and drove over to Desert View Subdivision. Fire Dispatch wanted me to check on the situation and to see if any houses had burned on Madera road. The subdivision was filled with smoke and fire trucks. I could not find Madera road.

I drove down Cloverdale, 10 Mile, Pleasant Valley, Kuna Mora, and S. Cole Roads and assessed the fire situation. There was a lot of burning fence posts and hay stacks. I saw a fire backing into the Iowa Beef Packer plant off S. Cole road. There was five people from the plant watching the fire burn. A person in charge said the fire was not a threat to the plant. Boise Police had all the roads into the fire blocked. The situation seemed under control. I drove back to Fire Dispatch. I arrived at 4:36 AM.

Press ALT and Y to continue

9. Action/Recommendation: If the identity of the man in the brown pickup can be determined, charges should be filed against him - Copy to Fire, Bruneau RA Mgr. and ISO Law Enforcement.	
10. Date: July 30, 1995	11. Officer: Lynn Miracle

August 3, 1995

The following is a summary statement to what was discussed during an interview with Stan Palmer, Hugh Thompson, and Mike Green. My present title is the Fire Control Officer for the Boise District, Bureau of Land Management with the responsibilities of hiring, training, and evaluating the fire crew each season. I, also, have the lead in coordinating the fire suppression efforts with the local and rural fire departments. I have 27 years of experience in fire suppression, starting as a firefighter, to a Chief Dispatcher and then to Fire Control Officer. My qualifications at one time were at the Class II level for Fire Boss, Plans Chief, Service Chief, and Finance Chief.

At the time of the incident that occurred on the Initial Point fire I was in Dispatch monitoring the radio conversations for this fire, Mile Post 83 fire, and the Twin Buttes fire. I participated in the decision to send the Wild West Guard Station from Boise, Unit C from the Mile Post 83 fire, and a dozer with Dick Watts, and a water tender with Terry Beck to the Initial Point fire. The helicopter was dispatched later and was released to the Jump Creek fire after consultation with Dave Kerby, IC, on the Initial Point fire when it determined their services were no longer needed on the Initial Point fire.

While in Dispatch I overheard the following communications between BLM and Kuna RFD. When Dave Kerby arrived on the fire he was asked by Dispatch if Kuna RFD was on the fire. Kerby's response was that he did not see any RFD's equipment or personnel. After Kerby's comments I heard Kuna 620?? offer assistance. Kerby asked for a brush truck and a water tender. Kuna 620 responded that the equipment would be available in about 30 minutes. The next communication I heard on the fire between Kuna and the BLM was that Kuna had arrived on the fire and asked for an assignment; they were told to bump in behind the crews already on the fire. The only other conversation that I recall is that prior to the accident/incident. Telleria's expressed his concern for a Kuna engine that was in front of the breakout and the alert for medical needs and an ambulance. This heightened my awareness and I did hear someone from Kuna say that one of their engines was missing and that they would go and look or warn them of the impending situation.

As the lead for the coordination with rural fire departments I have been working to formalize agreements with rural fire departments but need some legal reviews by the solicitor before I proceed. Until this is finalized we have an informal agreement to mutual aid with each other when forces are available and we are not jeporadizyng our own responsibilities. To that degree we meet prior to the fire season to discuss operational and communication procedures with those rural fire departments of which we have had a historical involvement.

Training opportunities were conducted this year with the Kuna RFD. On June 12?, 1995 Blas Telleria and I met with the Kuna RFD to discuss operational and communication procedures. In addition, Blas gave some insight to the volunteer group on Size Up and Initial Attack. I believe there were about 10 to 12 volunteers at the training session which included the Kuna Fire Chief, Rich Cromwell, and two of their Captains, Scott Koesing, and Doyle McPherson. In July date not verified ~~the~~ the Helitack Crew gave training to the Kuna RFD on the safety around a helicopter, and filling the "pumpkins" and/or folding tanks for bucket use.

These training opportunities have been offered to other rural fire departments thru the years. Our fire training effort this year was a Train the Trainers at the Payette Fire Department on the Standards for Survival, and the Use of Fire Shelters. At that training session a review of the videos with training techniques was discussed; workbooks and videos were distributed for inhouse training.

We continue to purchase fire equipment and supplies at a savings for the rural fire departments, in which we are reimbursed. And, we continue to issue radios when available to our neighboring rural fire departments that do not have BLM frequencies.

Boyd Yee
Fire Control Officer
Boise District
Bureau of Land Management

8/4/95

Between 1800-1830 hours during multiple fire starts, the dispatchers found out the tac 2 frequency on our consoles was not working. When I came in the dispatchers informed me of the problem. By this time the Paint fire had been switched to the Boise direct frequency.

At this time there were three fires going, two fires on Boise direct and one on tac 1 frequency.

I called our radio tech who was in Seattle wa, He gave me a list of four contract radio technicians who could remedy the problem. The last contract technician on the list was finally contacted. He came out to dispatch got the key to the communications building at Squaw Butte. At approximately 2330 hours the tech arrived at Squaw Butte and determined the radio problem was not at that location.

After some discussion with the radio tech on the tac 2 frequency on a separate septor radio located in the dispatch office, I asked him if he could come to the office and check out our consoles.

Sometime between 0300-0330 on 7/29/95 the radio tech arrived at the office, he checked out the radio cabinets located in the room behind the dispatch office. He found a switch had been turned off. Once he repositioned the switch the

tac 2 frequency became operational on both consoles.

On Tuesday 7/27/95 a core group designated to determine Communication needs for the new Consolidated dispatch met to discuss frequency needs. The forest Service radio tech was looking in the radio cabinets trying to determine how the BLM system operated in order to complete a contract specifications for the new radio consoles.

I suspect while the radio tech was investigating the radio cabinets, he may have accidently disabled the tac 2 switch.

I believe this unfortunate happening had no bearing on the incident at the Point fire. The dispatchers were always in contact with the fire

Jerry Warden
Logistics Coordinator
Boise District BLM.

Initial Point Fire
7-28-95
STATEMENT

I ARRIVED AT the FIRE on SWAN FALLS ROAD Approximately 6:00 pm. AT this time I pulled past the KUNA WATER TENDER AND SET-up to fill one BLM ENGINE. I then pulled up the ROAD A couple of Hundred YARDS TURNED AROUND AND SET-up AGAIN to fill REMAINING BLM ENGINES
I MOVED - the BLM TENDER BASICALLY BECAUSE the ELEVATION of the ROAD WAS higher SO I could SEE, AND it WAS the LOCATION where BLM ENGINES WERE COMING OUT TO the ROAD. IN ADDITION this SEEMED like a SAFER LOCATION BECAUSE of LOCATION of WHAT WAS LEFT of the ACTIVE FIRE.
Approximately 6:30 pm. the WINDS picked-up DRAMATICALLY AND CHANGING direction. A RED FLAG WARNING WAS ISSUED JUST BEFORE this ON the RADIO FROM DISPATCH. With INCREASED WINDS NOW FROM the SOUTHWEST, DUST, DEBRIS, SMOKE MADE VISIBILITY ALMOST NON EXISTENT. AT this TIME, the FIRE REGAINED INTENSITY MOVING NORTH INTO UNBURNED SAGE AND GRASS.

IT WAS during this TIME I HEARD A CALL to DISPATCH for A PARAMEDIC UNIT AS A KUNA RURAL TRUCK MAY OF BEEN ENGULFED

by the fire as it was supposedly in the path of the fire.

I only saw the Kuwa Truck two times during the fire. The first time it was heading south in some sage and grass just outside the black. The second time was when the dust, smoke & debris blowing let up a little and it was engulfed in flames pointed north.

I feel secure in the fact the the Boise district BLM does an excellent job in keeping crews safe, giving accurate and providing solid communication among the many different vehicles, and providing a service of getting fires out with very few if any accidents.

8-4-95

1995

Training Provided to Kuna RFD by BLM - 1995

Initial Attack

Assume

1. Dispatch has a check list to gather a reported fire
2. Initial Attack equipment has been identified and is "fire ready."
3. Route to fire — don't assume everyone knows the access
4. Personnel know how to use equipment
   - shovels - hose lays - line location - engines
5. Personnel have proper personal gear

Size Up

1. Identify what is At risk (- home - grass - bldgs - etc
   - A priorities
   - B Trade offs
   - C. Duties and Responsibilities of the Agency
2. Traffic Control

3. Scout, fire
   a) Who will ?
   b) How will it be done?
   c) Who do you report information to?
   d) Cause and origin point protection

4. FACTORS
   a) Wind
      1. direction
      2. Speed / Rate
         a) Weather in area
   B) Fuels — 1. Temp, Storms, RH, time of day
      1. broken vs continuous
      2. grass, sage etc

   C) Lay of The Land
      1. Aspect
      2. Slope
      3. Hazards — fences, gates, sand, barriers, bridges
      4. Access to — " " " " "
      *5. Anchor Point (s) And line location

5. Commitment of Forces
   - "Sometimes the best thing to do is wait"....
   - "bring the fire to you whereby you utilize your equipment, manpower, and natural factors best.
   - What if's
      * an engine become disfunctional
      * breakout — who'll pick them up
      * [illegible]

[5. cont]

* a new/unanticipated priority
* maintain the ability to quickly change plans or move assigned equipment
* continue scouting the fires progress
* Briefing of the game plan
* Communication channels / Command Post

6. Reinforcements
   1. Mutual Aid
   2. Private participation
   3. B.L.M (time lag) (time of day) (nearest forces) (Air
   4. Heavy equipment — cats; utilization of cats and limita

7. ON going FACTORS
   1. KEEP Abreast of Changing Conditions
   2. Methods to be utilized
      a) spray - straight stream
      b) shovels
      c) cold trail versus hand line
      d) gunny sacks
      e) burn out / back fires
      f) direct / indirect — flanking
   3. Adjustments
   4. Create a mental image or grid



   5. Extend Attack Organization

1. [illegible]

8. Transition
   A TO an extended attack
   B TO mop-up

9. Monitor

10. Demobilization

11. SAFETY ALWAYS

Records and Reports

Preplanned Dispatch

BLM Radio Transmission Log

Ada County Dispatch Log

Fire Incident Status Summary

Escaped Fire Situation Analysis

Wildland Fire Entrapment Report

Technical Analysis of Personal Protective Equipment

Vehicle Inspections

Weather Reports

Preplanned Dispatch

V. LIGHTNING OPERATIONS PLAN

When dry type lightning is forecasted, imminent, or lightning fires are occurring, the preplanned lightning plan will be implemented. This plan establishes parameters for management actions including automatic call up procedures, dispatching and prepositioning of both district and non-district resources. The lightning plan is divided into three sections which correspond with the response levels used in the first part of this plan.

RESPONSE LEVEL I BI 0-34

When lightning occurs in response level one, normal preplanned dispatching procedures will be followed.

RESPONSE LEVEL II BI 35-54

When dry lightning is forecasted to be at a Lightning Activity Level of three or higher, and a high probability of multiple lightning fires exists, or fires are already occurring and additional fires are a high probability the following actions will be taken.

All off-duty district fire personnel will be called back and placed in a duty status.

Resource area contacts will be notified of the current and expected situation.

Critical available non-fire personnel (heavy equipment operators, qualified fire fighters) will be contacted and placed in duty status.

The status and location and availability of all district heavy equipment (dozers, and transports) will be determined.

The status and location of southern Idaho retardant ships. Boise, Idaho Falls and Payette will be determined.

Four additional engines with a dozer and tender (contract resources could be used) will be ordered and prepositioned in a standby status at a predetermined location. Preferred locations are Boise, Wildwest, or Mountain Home. Expected lightning occurrence should dictate placement.

The FMO, FCO will coordinate with the designated Resource Area Contacts on setting individual priorities for suppression within the overall district priorities determined to be as follows:

1. Boise Front
2. Birds of Prey National Conservation Area
3. Danskin Range (Lucky Peak to E. of Danskin Mtn.)
4. Silver City

4. Squaw Butte, Willow Ridge Area
5. Bennett Mtn.
6. Payette River Corridor
7. Snake River Brownlee Resv. Area
8. Goodrich /Council Area
9. Salmon Falls Area of Critical Environmental Concern, (ACEC)
10. Hot Creek ACEC
11. Hickson Sharptail Grouse Management Area
12. Boulder Creek Habitat Management Plan, (HMP)
13. Jarbidge Greenstrip/Sagebrush Areas
14. De Lamar Mine/Cinnabar, War Eagle Mtns.

The following dispatch strategies will be followed in the event of multiple lightning fires.

If the lightning event occurs during daylight hours fires occurring in priority areas will be flown to determine their location and potential. Fires occurring in non priority areas will be flown and evaluated as time permits.

Fires will be initial attacked in accordance with the district fire suppression priorities list. Consideration will be given to the expected lightning track. If areas of higher priority are at risk, response to lower priority areas will be delayed until the lightning has cleared the higher priority area, or until the area is no longer at risk. It is extremely important that the available fire suppression forces are not used attacking fires in lower priority areas and leave adequate forces available for high priority area fires. Cooperating agencies and other available fire suppression forces will be asked to assist with lower priority fires near their geographical area.

The recommended dispatch procedures for the districts listed high priority areas is as follows:

AREA	RESOURCES	CLOSEST FORCES	CONSIDERATIONS
Boise Front	4 Engines Helicopter Dozer/Tender	See FMZ 1.4,2.5	See FMZ 1.4 2.5
BOP NCA	4 Engines Dozer/Tender	See FMZ 1.5	See FMZ 1.5
Danskin Range	4 Engines Helicpter/Tendr	See FMZ 2.5	See FMZ 2.5
Silver City	Helicopter 2 Engines	See FMZ 3.2	See FMZ 3.2
Squaw Butte/ Willow Ridge	4 Engines Helicopter	See FMZ 2.3	See FMZ 2.3
Bennett Mtn.	4 Engines Helicopter	See FMZ 2.5	See FMZ 2.5

DATE 7/28/95
CALL SIGN: KOD-426
DISPATCHER: BARCUS

Lucky Peak------T 63.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Rx. 163.9375
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375

Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 (Tone 1)
South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
1802	IEA	Boise errata FO54 Diggs/Rick/Baker	
	Knudson	2 fires requested 2 crews from Shoshone	
1804	Sunbird	off Boise	
1805	Cooke	Go to fires & Smokestack Farms FO52 & FO53	
1809	Shoshone	Have reports of fire at Lilly. Made from TWF co Rocky Many to other fires to N. but have sent Rodgerson Crews & Helicopter	
1812	Jordan Basin	T-12 off at 1807	
1813	IEA	2 units out from fire	
1815	IEA	on the fire	
1815	Unit C	on the fire	
1826	Squaw	On fire FO52 advised of	
1828	Cooke	@ SB at Bureau G.S.	
829	Dandin	Smoke Visible At 267° 20	
1831	~~Emigrant Co~~ Dept	has two cabins on fire at	
1832	Dandin	1N 1W Sec. 34 Blm visible Cedar wind SW	
1833	Idaho	Motor Home can Handle water lift on FO54	
		Requested to go to initial PT.	

FO56

DATE 7/28/95
CALL SIGN: KOD-426

DISPATCHER: DARCUS/LOEDEL/TOEW

Lucky Peak------T 63.1250
Rx. 163.9375
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250
Rx. 163.9375
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375

Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 ne 1)
South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 one 2)
Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
834	T-[illegible]	T-12? off at 1[illegible]	
1845	T123	~~ques~~ Dispatcher needs fire # and Lat/Long & what related Base would be ~~Base~~ TWF	
845	T-12	Crew fire FO52	
1847	Tolbert	Departed FO54 at 1838 enroute to FO56	
1847	Swenson	Head to FO56	
1849	Burks	Directed to Initial Pt. FO56	
1854	Brown	Confirmed 14J on at 1820	
1857	IEA	off Division to Initial Pt. Fire	
1916	T-12	From fire to Twf load & RTN	
1927	Tolbert	Just arrived on FO56	
1929	Miracle	Have a request from Elmore Co. about fire on Soreno Johnson Hill & Jump Cr.	FO57
1935	Vale	Requested they send 2 engines to FO57	
1936	Swain	Kennedy with Vale & the cat on the fire	
1937	Kenley	Send H IEA to Jump Cr FO57	
1938	MID Hom 651	Leaving FO54 enroute back to Mtn Home	
1928	TWF Base	T-12 off TWF To Fire	

DATE: 7/28
CALL SIGN: KOD-426
DISPATCHER: Barcus/Roedel

Lucky Peak------Tx. 163.1250 Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 (Tone 1)
Rx. 163.9375 South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Rx. 163.9375 Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375 AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
1932	TWF	T-123 on TWF	
943	IEA	enroute from F056 to F057	
952	Hum SHO	T-123 off TWF 1945	
2006	Vale	regarding smoke east of 10 will have Squaw Butte Check.	
2013	Squaw Butte	E. of Payette 9N 5W 36 Pair over fire area at this time looks like an ag burn can see one a little west 299°10' 9N 3W 26	
(See note at end of log)			
2022	420	Called & Ovie Waring on high winds up [redacted] 5V miles out of NE - from enroute	
2030	Squaw	Card on other fire E. of Payette or are in Ontario	
2033	Husband	T-123 should be almost to Boise Will probably be sending T-12 to Boise loaded	
2043	Denton	S. of Horn 276°20' Squaw Small white Smoke 2N 5W test. Small but picking up	
2054	Driggs	Requested a couple engines	
2055	Jellison	Swan Falls Rd to Inn Point	
057	911	Requested ambulance to Swan Falls & initial aid will send Paramedics	

BOISE DISP[illegible]

DATE: 7/28 LOG 1
CALL SIGN: KOD-426
DISPATCHER: BARNES/ROEDEL/[illegible]

Lucky Peak------Tx. 163.1250 Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 ne 1)
Rx. 163.9375 South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Rx. 163.9375 Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375 AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
1103	Miracle	Ambulance is on scene with Him	
1057	T-123	↓ at Boise	
2109	IEA	all flames knocked down	
111	Firebird	enroute to Boise T-12 doing last drop & will come in	
111	Helitac	Jim F056 blown out on two sides Real Problems	
113	Carroll	T-123 can't fly due to wind	
115	Helitac	Kuna engine on fire & Personnel now contain	
116	T-12	15' out of Boise	
127	Unit B	enroute to Quail Hollow Fire	
127	T-12	talking to approach Control for landing	
131	Danskin	125° 30 W side of [illegible]	
132	IEA	off fire to Jordan Valley 30 Ac — Knocked down	
		crew will stay till then — looks good.	
135	Danskin	125° 30 is 7E of [illegible] on h.t. [illegible] river	
136	Firebird	on ground Boise	
Title	Casey	Notified mgt team to gather here.	
140	Johnson	gone as far as railroad tracks and continuing further south.	
142	Cav. Cuda	Quail Fire [illegible], right around [illegible] of [illegible] River	

DATE. 7/29 LOG 1
CALL SIGN: KOD-426
DISPATCHER: JEE

Lucky Peak------Tx. 63.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 (Tone 1)
South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375 AIR NET------167.950

IME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
50		CNN called for info - told him to call 384-3444.	Jen
54		Caller reported hearing the fire had jumped 5-Mile @ Columbia.	
58		Fuel truck to HQ (Lew Spain) later this am. (Kelly Call)	
214		Blas called to / time they called 911 for ambulance. Time was logged @ 2057 hrs! Related to Blas.	
29		Cada - his crew almost done, instructed to call in when done.	
21		Gem County Sheriff called to say that BNF reported fire at 1mi W - 9mi S of powerhouse, SO side of river @ Horse Bend. Boyd told her we had no one to send right now, try + get local crews to handle.	
24		Army called to tell us Gem County had called to report fire @ Montour, Boyd will call Gem County. Area being reported is private.	
~~16~~		Rich called in - they'll try to hold on until	
117		Army - lightning 8N 4W Sec 21 Ontario - told her to call Payette + N. Plymouth rurals.	

BOISE DISP... "A" Unit

DATE: 7/28 LOG1
CALL SIGN: KOD-426
DISPATCHER: YEE

Lucky Peak------Tx. 163.1250 Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 ne 1)
Rx. 163.9375 South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Rx. 163.9375 Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375 AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
142	IEA.	landing Jordan Valley.	
		fire by golf course that in with Boise fire dept	
146	Cada	will ...	
147	Cunckin	little ... at IDES.	
150	Jdaho	... for ...	
151	Cada	or fire - ...	
155	K...	...	
		...	
		needs 4 heavy ...	
		... + ...	
		RESL and one more ...	
		Helicopter ... at 2000, 1200 Sunday.	
200	Nicole	... help Clinens & monty white from ... 866-0168 (clients called at 7:20 at answering machine)	
204	Caraqee	wx obs.	
15	Twin falls	...	
215	191 Cada	Advise heavy wind and dust warning from Boise Cada copy	
215	TO Squaw	advise of heavy winds ...	
215	TO Curley	advise of heavy winds -	

DATE: 7/28 LOG 1

CALL SIGN: KOD-426

DISPATCHER: YEE

Lucky Peak------Tx .63.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Rx. 163.9375
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375

Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 ne 1)
South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
220	Telleria	Heavy winds heading their way from west - he copied.	
221	Casa	[illegible]	
221	Cada	[illegible] - all the rec [illegible]	
228	Jerome	will a [illegible]	
230	Kimmett	Cast [illegible]	
233	To Pigg-	Notified Jim [illegible] of high winds coming tonight	
241	Shuttleworth	or Jerpchefie	
304	Spain	reports major Problems with fire - Heavy to Agreeman - could be Homes involved by Am - need to consider plans for structure notified Bill Casey of Problem -	
05	Boyd	Sheriff in TWF wants permission Buhl fire dept for structure protection in Twin Rapids area - we warned them about wind problems ; they passed it to Buhl who will respond.	
330		Notified Kerby : Telleria about change in Command- with Roger Cada -	

BOISE DIS[illegible]

DATE: 11/28 & 7/29 LOG / CALL SIGN: KOD-426

DISPATCHER: JEE

Lucky Peak------Tx. 163.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100.1 ne 1)
South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
TAC 1------163.175 TAC 2------163.8375 AIR NET------167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
3 54	426	KERRY CROW CALLED - SW SIDE OF FIRE CLIMBED TO SUBDIVISION INFORMED CREW ANOTHER FRONT WILL MOVE IN 2-3 HOURS FIRE DOWN BUT NEEDS MOP-UP	DG
2001		Mullins & Shipton to Quail Hollow	
		2 Shoshone Supers + 21 FS. to Point fire -	
2042	1126	Called William Trailsford about fire - Cattle near -	
246		Scott Lewby contacted re: allotment. 543-6628	Sm
247		Blue T. notified of storm front heading north cross the Snake River.	
054		Boyd warned all personnel of approaching storm.	Sm
1105		Call re: power poles burning on 8-Mile (Roger)	"
1108		Jerry in comm w/Squaw Butte re: Console Problems (?)	
1120		Lee's going home, doing mop-up now, no need to stay. Will come back @ 10 am unless needed sooner.	

DATE: 7/29 LOG 1

CALL SIGN: KOD-426

DISPATCHER: LJEE

Lucky Peak------ .63.1250 Rx. 163.9375
Squaw Butte-----Tx. 163.1250 Rx. 163.9375
TAC 1------163.175

Juniper Mtn.----Tx. tone 100. ne 1)
South Mtn.------Tx. tone 107.2 (Tone 2)
Bennett Mtn.----Tx. tone 114.8 (Tone 3)
Snow Bank-------Tx. tone 123.0 (Tone 4)
TAC 2------163.8375 AIR NET-----167.950

TIME	STATION	INFORMATION	INIT.
1123		Called in Joan Howard + Shelley Cooper.	
1123		Knudson reporting fire burning down, low on fuel, requesting diesel fuel + gas. Boyd will call Shoshone to see if they can re-fuel, if not will have to go w/contract services.	
1127		Shelley Cooper on the way.	
1127		Blas T called in on fire F056, fire into 2 divisions, #1 Telleria + Kerby orig part of fire, #2 Roger Cada working w/add'l equip.	
1129		No answer for Joan Howard, will CB.	
"		Any threats to Blacks Cr Gun Club call 888-7531 + re: Gun powder stored @ facility.	
1130		Desert View Sub fire took few structures.	
1135		Phoned Joan Howard, left msg.	
1136		Cary called in, says 1 crew can go, will shift his crew in about 1 hour.	
1137		No fuel truck available from Shoshone.	
141		Boyd contacted ~~Evan~~ Calvin Wild (Kelly Oil) to transport- Crow's Nest Rd @ HQ - 7/8 am	

8/1/95

Note: star in dispatch log between 2013 and 2022.
At 2020 Paul Werth National Weather Service called me. He stated he was going to upgrade the red flag watch to a red flag warning for dry lightning and high winds up to 50 MPH. As soon as we hung up the telephone the dispatchers were instructed to notify all personnel of the warning. As the log indicates 2022 hrs personnel were notified. Dispatchers indicated to me that all fire personnel acknowledged the warning.

Larry Worden
Logistics Coordinator
Boise District BLM.

TAPE 1 BEGINS

DISPATCH: This is the Fire Department.

JOHN AT J&W DAIRY: Yeah, this is John at J&W Dairy in Kuna.

DISPATCH: Um-hum.

JOHN: And on Swan Falls Road, about six miles south of Kuna, there was a lightning strike that just started a range fire.

DISPATCH: Okay. At Swan Falls Road, approximately six miles south?

JOHN: Yeah, six or seven miles, it's hard to tell from where I'm at. But it's really taking off.

DISPATCH: Okay. Do you know if --

JOHN: It's south -- it's south of Nicholson Road.

DISPATCH: South of Nicholson Road?

JOHN: Yes.

DISPATCH: How far from Nicholson Road?

JOHN: It's hard to tell from here, maybe a mile or two. It's probably just west of Initial Point, across Swan Falls Road from Initial Point.

DISPATCH: Okay. How far from Initial Point?

JOHN: Oh, it's probably a mile across Swan Falls Road from Initial Point.

DISPATCH: Okay. And your name again?

JOHN: John.

DISPATCH: Okay. And your phone number, John?

JOHN: 922-4072.

DISPATCH: Okay, thanks.

JOHN: All right.

DISPATCH: Um-hum, bye.

JOHN: Bye.

DISPATCH: Fire Dispatch.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Hi, I need to get ahold of somebody in regards to BLM land, there's a fire started out here by our house.

DISPATCH: Okay. Are there any structures threatened?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: No, it's just desert land out here.

DISPATCH: Okay. We've got another call out there, but how big of an area is it covering?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: Oh, geez, I don't know, we can't probably tell from here.

DISPATCH: Okay. All right.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: It's just -- we had a great big lightning strike out here a couple of minutes ago, and it started it right up, it's --

DISPATCH: All right, we'll get ahold of BLM.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN: All right, thanks.

DISPATCH: Thanks, bye.

(Dispatch Dialing Phone, Gets Answering Machine)

DISPATCH: Hi, this is Boise Fire Dispatch, we need somebody from BLM to call us ASAP. Thanks, bye.

(Dispatch Dialing Phone, Gets Busy Signal, Dials Again)

BLM DISPATCH: Dispatch.

DISPATCH: Hi, this is Ada County.

BLM DISPATCH: Hey, how are you?

DISPATCH: Just fine, I just called and left word on that 867 number, and then it dawned on me, you know I bet you guys are even still there.

BLM DISPATCH: Oh.

DISPATCH: We're getting calls from a couple people out one to two miles from the Nicholson Road, the area of Initial Point and Swan Falls --

BLM DISPATCH: Yeah, we just got that turned into us.

DISPATCH: Yeah, we did too, just now, got -- we got two different calls.

BLM DISPATCH: Okay.

DISPATCH: It was activated by a lightning strike.

BLM DISPATCH: Is that what it was?

DISPATCH: Yeah, and they said it is really going up out there.

BLM DISPATCH: Okay. Yeah, our lookouts have called it in, and so we're getting ready to go after it.

DISPATCH: Okay. Thanks.

BLM DISPATCH: Thank you.

DISPATCH: Um-hum. Bye.

UNIT 650: Dispatch, 650.

DISPATCH: 650.

UNIT 650: Will you set off our pagers? I want 622, 620, and 625 to respond approximately six and a half miles south of Swan Falls Road to assist BLM.

DISPATCH: Copy. Is this on the grass fire?

UNIT 650: That's affirmative.

DISPATCH: Copy. Kuna Fire, 650 is requesting 622, 620, and 625 to assist BLM, approximately six and a half miles south on Swan Falls.

Kuna Fire, 650 is requesting 622, 620, 625, to respond approximately six and a half miles south on Swan Falls Road to assist BLM with a grass fire. 1908.

UNIT 622: Dispatch, 622 responding.

DISPATCH: 622 responding. 1910.

UNIT 620: 620 responding.

DISPATCH: 620 responding. 1910.

UNIT 625: 625.

DISPATCH: 625.

UNIT 650: 60-650. 620, 650.

UNIT 620: 620, go ahead.

UNIT 650: Do you have two men?

UNIT 620: Affirmative.

UNIT 650: Copy. 625, do you have two men?

UNIT 625: Affirmative.

UNIT 650: 622, do you have two men?

UNIT 622: One.

UNIT 650: Copy. Stop in Kuna and they'll get you another man.

UNIT 622: Okay.

19:11 UNIT 650: 622 and 620, when you get on location, I want you two to stay together.

UNIT 622: Copy.

UNIT 625: Copy. Dispatch, we'll be delayed by train.

DISPATCH: Have a delayed by a train. 1912.

UNIT 625: Negative. It's clear. 625 back en route.

DISPATCH: 625 back en route. 1911.

UNIT 650: Dispatch, 650.

DISPATCH: 650.

UNIT 650: You might notify Union Pacific that the cross arms on the Swan Falls crossing are malfunctioning, there is no train in sight, and they are coming down and staying and then going back up.

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNIT 6803: 650, 6803.

UNIT 650: Go ahead.

UNIT 6803: Do you want to respond the squad also on this?

UNIT 650: Negative, they just say two brush trucks and a tanker. The squads, we're going to keep them in town.

UNIT 6803: Do you want me to stay in town and command town?

UNIT 650: No, why don't you go with those and command them. I'm on my way back now. Also, 6803, when you get out there, you'll switch to channel 16, and talk to BLM and find out where they want you.

19:12

UNIT 6803: 6803, copy.

UNIT 61: 650, 61.

UNIT 650: Go ahead.

UNIT 61: Do you want me to respond to the fire or to the station?

UNIT 650: Why don't you respond to the station.

UNIT 61: Copy, dispatch, 61 is en route to Kuna Station 1.

UNIT 622: 622, Kuna Base.

UNKNOWN: 622, go.

UNIT 622: Yeah, were you going to come out and pick up me?

UNKNOWN: Where are you at?

UNIT 622: Station 1.

UNKNOWN: Station 1, we'll be dropping by that way, unless somebody wants to meet me there at the corner.

UNIT 622: Just swing by and pick me up.

DISPATCH: 650, dispatch.

UNIT 650: Go ahead.

DISPATCH: We just received a call from a John Lightenburg at 8902 South Swan Falls Road. He states that the fire is getting pretty close to his residence, he has a large haystack and a large diesel tank that he believes are being threatened.

UNIT 650: Copy. 6803, 650.

UNIT 6803: 3, go ahead.

UNIT 650: You might look at that situation as you go by, but when we were coming from there, it was probably three-quarters of a mile from that area anyway.

UNIT 6803: Copy. I'll check it out.

UNIT 61: Dispatch, Kuna Base is covering fire and medical.

DISPATCH: Copy, covered for fire and medical both?

UNIT 61: Affirmative, available for automatic aid.

DISPATCH: Copy at 1915.

(Pause)

UNIT 625: Dispatch, 625 is on location.

DISPATCH: 625 on location. 1919.

UNIT 6803: 625, 6803.

UNIT 625: Go ahead.

UNIT 6803: Where are you staging?

UNIT 625: We're about 500 feet from the fire line right now.

UNIT 6803: Are you on Nicholson Road, or on farther south on Swan Falls?

UNIT 625: We're on Swan Falls.

UNIT 6803: 625, do we have BLM here on location?

UNIT 625: I'm trying to locate -- we have I believe it's a police car up here, I haven't seen any BLM personnel yet.

UNIT 6803: Okay, we've got a helicopter on the west side, that's all I can see so far.

19:21 UNIT 625: Yeah, that's the only thing I can see too.

UNIT 6083: Okay, we've got BLM guys coming in now off of Poen Road right now, we're just across from Poen on Swan Falls.

UNIT 625: Copy. I'll just stop here on Swan Falls and wait.

UNIT 620: Dispatch, 620 is on location Swan Falls and Nicholson Road, 6803 will be Kuna Fire Command.

19:22 DISPATCH: 620 on location, 6803 fire command.

KUNA STATION 2: 6803, Kuna Station 2.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

KUNA STATION 2: Do you want me to roll 601? I'm by myself, or do you want me to just stay here?

UNIT 6803: Negative, stand by the station at this time, also you can contact station 1 by land line.

KUNA STATION 2: Copy, we have no way of doing that.

UNIT 6803: Copy, just stand by the station then, we'll update you in a little while.

KUNA STATION 2: Station 2 copy.

(Pause)

19:29 UNIT 622: Dispatch, 622 on location.

DISPATCH: 622 on location.

UNIT 6803: 622, 6803.

UNIT 622: 22.

19:30 UNIT 6803: 20 is going to pull in behind these two BLM engines, and you pull in right in behind them. Have your pump running and ready to go.

UNIT 622: Roger.

UNIT 625: 620, you have loose gear on the back of

19:31 your truck. 620, 625. 620, 625. 620, do you have your radio on?

(Pause)

19:40 UNIT 625: 620, go to tac.

DISPATCH: Unit calling.

(Pause)

20:24 UNIT 620: 6803, 620. Well, Doyle we're basically just

doing mop-up. Is it okay for Josh to get some drive time just doing mop-up?

UNIT 6803: (Inaudible).

UNIT 620: That's affirmative, we're tucked in behind 622.

(Pause)

COUNTY STATION 4: County Station 4. County Station 4, I have a young female juvenile on the land line, she's at 5340 Willow Creek Road at a house on top of the hill. She's extremely hysterical, she's home by herself, she's advising that flames are very close to her house and she does not know what to do. She's on a dirt road. Can you advise on what I might instruct her to do?

(Pause)

DISPATCH: County Station 3 stand by for request from Eagle for an engine, grass fire with structures threatened, 4674 Willow Creek Road.

DISPATCH: County Station 3 requests an engine, grass fire with structures threatened, 4674 Willow Creek Road, map section Edward One Six crosses Stillwell.

DISPATCH: County Station 3 requests for an engine to respond, grass fire, structures threatened, 4674 Willow Creek Road, map section Edward One Six, crosses Stillwell, County Station 3 confirmed.

UNIT 304: Dispatch, 304 responding to Willow Creek

Road.

DISPATCH: 304 responding, request you respond on North County Eagle, 461 in command.

UNIT 304: Copy, Eagle 461 in command.

(Pause)

COUNTY STATION 3: Dispatch, County Station 3 is covered.

DISPATCH: County Station 3 covered.

20:49 (Pause)

BUTTRAM: Doyle, Buttram.

20:49 UNIT 6803: 6803.

BUTTRAM: We're on the north line, Doyle, we got fire coming hard, this thing has died.

20:50 UNIT 6803: Is it on the [transmission cutting out]?

BUTTRAM: Affirm. 6803, 6809. ~~Bill~~ -- it's not going to let us out of here.

UNIT 650: 6803, 650.

UNIT 650: 620, 650.

20:51 BUTTRAM: Go ahead.

UNIT 650: What kind of problem do you have?

BUTTRAM: We're surrounded by fire.

UNIT 650: Repeat?

20:51 BUTTRAM: The truck has been overtaken by fire.

UNIT 6803: Copy, we're en route.

DISPATCH: Unit on south county that needs an assist,

advice.

UNIT 650: Dispatch, 650. Ring out our station, I want the other squad responding and a pumper.

DISPATCH: I can just barely copy. Request another squad and repeat.

UNIT 650: We need our other squad, 641, and a pumper truck.

DISPATCH: Copy, request 641 and a pumper. Advise exact location. 650, request location.

UNIT 650: The grass fire on Swan Falls Road.

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNIT 641: Dispatch, 641 is responding.

DISPATCH: 641 responding.

UNIT 605: Dispatch, 605 responding.

DISPATCH: 605 responding.

(Pause)

KUNA BASE: Dispatch, Kuna Base.

DISPATCH: Kuna base.

KUNA BASE: Covered by one fire fighter, 62 is available to transport.

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNIT 650: 620, 650. 620, 650. 625, 650.

UNIT 625: 25, go.

UNIT 650: Give us approximate location of 620, where they're in trouble at?

UNIT 625: I don't know, they couldn't advise.

UNIT 650: Copy. What side of the flank were they on?

UNIT 625: Did you get in to -- get in contact with 622, they were with them last.

UNIT 650: Copy. 622, 650.

DISPATCH: Kuna 62, dispatch. Kuna 62, dispatch.

UNIT 62: 62.

20:55 DISPATCH: Request you respond to the fire.

UNIT 62: Copy, 62 responding.

(Pause)

UNIT 650: 622, 650.

UNIT 641: 650, 641. I think Buttram said he was on 20:55 the north flank.

UNIT 650: Copy. 622, 650. Where's your location at?

UNIT 650 ~~622~~: We're west of Watt [phonetic].

DISPATCH: Dispatch, 62 responding.

UNIT 650: Calm down and talk slower so we can hear you. Repeat it. 622, repeat, but talk slower.

UNIT 650 ~~622~~: Copy.

UNIT 650: 641, did you copy that?

UNIT 641: Copy.

UNKNOWN: 62, 6819.

KUNA DISPATCH: 62, go ahead.

KUNA STATION 2: You by yourself?

KUNA DISPATCH: I have a full crew rendezvousing at the LDS Church.

KUNA STATION 2: Okay, because I've got 6830 here if you need her.

20:57

UNIT 625: 650, 625. One of the BLM trucks down here said that they saw one of our trucks, just before the big wind, on the southwest corner of the fire.

UNIT 650: Copy, we're headed to the northwest corner of the fire at this point.

UNIT 625: Copy.

UNIT 6803: 650, 6803. Our ambulance is en route.

DISPATCH: 650, Dispatch.

UNIT 650: Go ahead.

DISPATCH: We've also made contact with Melba, they'll be en route.

UNIT 650: Copy, thanks.

UNKNOWN: Joe, repeat, you were breaking up.

UNIT 650: Dispatch, 650.

DISPATCH: 650.

20:58

UNIT 650: We need Life Flight on standby, also Ada County Paramedics en route.

DISPATCH: Dispatch copy. EM --

UNIT 605: 650, 605, do you want us to protect this new structure?

UNIT 650: Yeah, go ahead.

UNIT 641: 50, 641, we're going to work with you, we'll cover each other.

UNIT 61: Dispatch, Kuna 61 available as a transport.

DISPATCH: Confirmation, 61 available, returning.

UNIT 61: Negative. 61 available as a transport.

DISPATCH: Dispatch copy.

UNIT 641: 6803, 641, repeat your -- you were overrun by traffic?

UNIT ~~6803~~ 641: 6803, we're on Nicholson Road, we're heading into the head of the fire now. BLM is down on Nicholson Road and Swan Falls starting a backfire at this time.

DISPATCH: 650, dispatch.

UNIT ~~6803~~ 641: Working together. 650, be advised BLM is starting a backfire right behind us.

UNIT 650: Copy. We'll be alright.

DISPATCH: 650, dispatch.

UNIT 650: Go ahead.

DISPATCH: I have Medic 51 and Medic 49 en route, Kuna 2, (inaudible) 61 is available for transport.

UNIT 650: Copy, how about 49 -- I mean, Life Flight?

DISPATCH: Advise 49, stand by, I'll confirm with

him again.

UNIT 650: Dispatch, 650.

DISPATCH: 650.

21:01 UNIT 650: Unknown at this time until we get to our trucks, we are not sure if we have personnel that are burnt or not, if that's your reasoning for Life Flight.

DISPATCH: Affirmative, 49 is putting them on stand by.

UNIT 650: 622, 650.

UNIT 622: (inaudible).

UNIT 650: Northbound on Swan Falls Road? How about 620? Where are they at? Copy?

UNKNOWN: (Inaudible).

UNIT ~~622~~ 650: At this point we are on the northwest 21:02 section of the fire, heading towards it. We'll see if we cannot get through and get in to them.

UNIT 650: Copy.

UNIT ~~622~~ 650: Copy. We're going to have troubles getting through this down here so just stand by.

DISPATCH: Go ahead.

KUNA COMMAND: We've got huge demands (inaudible).

DISPATCH: Kuna command, I cannot copy, try again. Kuna command, try again.

KUNA COMMAND: (Inaudible)

21:03 DISPATCH: Units are covering, 650, dispatch.

UNIT 650: We need PD for traffic control ASAP.

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNKNOWN: 625, go ahead.

UNIT 625: 6803, 625, we're kind of still where we were.

KUNA COMMAND: (Inaudible) down here, the (inaudible) ~~is closed, he's~~ (inaudible).

UNKNOWN: Zero.

UNIT 650: Where are you at?

UNKNOWN: (Inaudible).

UNIT 650: Are you on foot?

UNKNOWN: (inaudible).

UNIT 650: We'll head that way.

UNIT 6803: 50, it's building pretty fast behind us, you might want to hit the road and get out.

UNIT 650: We're heading. ~~Unit~~ Kuna Command, 650.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

21:04 UNIT 650: We cannot get through to the northwest section of this thing, it's moving this way at about 20, 25 mile an hour at this point.

21:05 UNIT ~~6803:~~ 641: We're already gone, we're almost to the road. When this dies down, we'll go back in if we can. It hasn't crossed Nicholson yet. I take that back, it has, it's jumped Nicholson Road, it's about halfway to Kuna Cave Road.

~~UNKNOWN~~ 641: Go ahead, command.

UNKNOWN: (inaudible).

UNIT 641: We are right behind 650, we're cut off from Swan Falls by the head.

21:05 UNIT 6803: (inaudible).

UNIT 641: 6803, 641, and I recommend maybe contacting mutual aid with Whitney and Meridian.

UNIT 622: Doyle, this is 622. We cleared -- we ran into a desperate situation here where we tried to get through the northern eastern flank and we were held up by fire, and so far, we haven't located those guys. Over.

Hey, also, Doyle, advise our incoming (~~inaudible~~ units) that this is a very dangerous situation on the highway, to maybe back off. Because otherwise they're going to get enveloped.

DISPATCH: 650, dispatch.

UNIT 650: Go ahead.

21:07 DISPATCH: PD is en route, code 3, ETA 20.

UNIT 650: Copy. We want mutual aid from Meridian and Whitney, ASAP.

DISPATCH: ~~That's~~ Dispatch copy. Boise 21, County Station 3, stand by, requesting mutual aid from Kuna Fire, grass fire, Initial Point and Swan Falls.

County Station 3, Boise 21, Kuna Fire is requesting mutual aid, grass fire, Initial Point and Swan Falls, map section --

COUNTY STATION 3: Dispatch, County Station 3.

DISPATCH: County Station 3.

COUNTY STATION 3: What equipment do they need?

DISPATCH: 650, dispatch. Kuna command, dispatch.

UNIT 650: ~~Yeah,~~ Go Ahead send me two squads and an engine, and a tanker.

DISPATCH: ~~I'm~~ Copy requesting two squads, one engine, one tanker.

COUNTY STATION 3: 3, will be responding into Kuna.

DISPATCH: Unit responding, I covered.

UNIT 143: 143 responding.

DISPATCH: Copy Whitney 143 responding?

UNIT 143: Affirmative.

DISPATCH: County Station 3, did you copy?

UNKNOWN: Go ahead.

21:09 ~~UNKNOWN:~~ 622 Now, if the wind has calmed down enough, we're going to try a few wide sweeps. Have you by chance had any contact with those guys?

[redacted]

UNIT ~~6803~~: Negative. I want you to go up Swan Falls and make a sweep off of the east side of Swan Falls, and give me an update of what we've got going there, we've got something heavy happening.

21:09 UNKNOWN: 622 Did you say to make a sweep on the east side?

UNIT 6803: Affirm, we have fire on the east side of

the road, with structures and whatnot threatened.

UNKNOWN: Copy, we have the fire side we're going to attack.

UNIT 341: Dispatch, 341 responding to mutual aid to Kuna.

DISPATCH: Approximately one mile south of -- correction north of the fire on Swan Falls.

UNIT 341: Affirm. Can you advise visibility there?

DISPATCH: It's approaching north quickly.

UNIT 605: Command, 605.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

UNIT 605: Yeah, we've got a fire that has jumped Swan Falls Road. We're trying to back up and protect these structures now.

UNIT 6803: Okay, I'm trying to get you another engine and a tanker to support.

UNIT 605: Copy. The way the fire --

UNKNOWN: Copy, 344.

UNIT 605: -- jumped Kuna Cave Road by now.

UNIT 6803: 641, Command.

DISPATCH: Unit on South County.

UNIT 6803: Melba 205, go ahead.

UNIT 341: 341 responding --

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNIT 304: 304 responding, Swan Falls.

DISPATCH: 304 responding.

21:11 UNIT 6803: Melba 205, request you meet up with my crew at the northwest corner of the fire and stage.

UNIT 62: Unit Command, this is Kuna 62.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

21:11 UNIT 62: Fire at this time is about a half a mile north of Kuna Cave Road.

UNIT 6803: Copy. Thanks. Break 605, Command.

UNIT 605: Go ahead.

UNIT 6803: How are you doing for manpower there?

UNIT 605: 605 has two personnel.

UNIT 6803: Copy. 622, can you give me an update of what you've got there?

UNIT 622: We're about to make a fire attack on the 21:11 northeast side of Swan Falls Road. And the fire is running about 200 yards due north and east off of Swan Falls Road.

UNIT 126: Dispatch, 126 responding.

UNIT 6803: ~~62,~~ Station 2 go ahead.

UNIT 62: Well, we're covered by two, do you want us to respond?

UNIT 6803: Affirm. Respond to pumper and meet up with 605 on Nicholson and Swan Falls.

UNIT 320: Dispatch, 320 responding to Swan Falls fire.

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNIT 6803: 650, Command.

UNIT 62: Kuna, 62.

UNIT 6803: 650, go. Your status there too.

UNIT 650: We're at the northwest end of the fire with the BLM crew. We are backfiring this as quick as we can.

21.12

UNIT 6803: Okay, do you have an injured subject somewhere. Medic 51 is here on location.

UNIT 650: That's unknown at this time, 51, we have two guys who are missing. We are unable to locate at this time. Have them standby.

UNIT 6819: Copy. The fire is rapidly approaching Kuna Cave, we're staged here. 6819 is location, do you need extra manpower anywhere?

UNIT 6803: Affirmative. I want you to go to 605 and give them a hand.

UNIT 6819: Where is there location?

UNIT 6803: They are on Nicholson and Swan Falls. Do use due caution because the smoke is real thick across Swan Falls Road.

UNIT 6819: ~~Unit 5,~~ 30 advised the fire has jumped Swan Falls Road, there is no way I can get through.

21.13

UNIT 602: Command, 602 is responding with two personnel.

UNIT 6803: Pick up with 602.

UNKNOWN: Affirm.

UNIT 6803: 622, Command.

UNIT 602: Command, 602, where would you like us to go?

UNIT 6803: 622, Command.

UNIT 622: This is 622.

UNIT 6803: I want you to pull off and come back and go to our truck out in the brush.

21:13

UNIT 622: (~~inaudible~~ come back to you?).

UNIT 6803: Affirmative.

UNIT 622: Coming back.

UNIT 320: Dispatch, 320 responding to Swan Falls fire.

DISPATCH: 320.

UNIT 601: Dispatch, 601 is responding to Swan Falls and Nicholson Road.

DISPATCH: 601.

21.14

UNIT 650: That's affirmative, Scott, it has jumped Swan Falls Road.

UNIT 6803: Whitney 143, Command. Your location?

UNIT 143: (inaudible) south.

UNIT 6803: What route of travel are you taking?

UNIT 143: Meridian Road, we're on Victory at the present time.

BOISE 21: Dispatch, Boise 21 is covered by 1.

DISPATCH: 21 covered by 1.

UNIT 602: Command, 602, where would you like us to go?

UNIT 6803: 602, advise when you get to where 62 and 51 are staged. Depending on visibility I'd like to put you in near this new dairy under construction out here, but due to visibility we may not be able to get you there.

UNIT 602: Copy.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead. Copy, can you give me a report of the fire from that position.

UNKNOWN: (Inaudible) county.

UNIT 650: Kuna Base, 650.

DISPATCH: 650, I can relay.

UNIT 650: Kuna Base, 650.

KUNA BASE: Kuna Base.

UNIT 650: This road that runs from the trailer houses back over to Kuna Cave Road is it accessible only by squads or can we get a pather [sic] truck through there?

KUNA BASE: Thems the one down by Nicholson?

UNIT 650: It's the one that goes in to the -- from the south -- or north into Kuna Caves.

KUNA BASE: Affirmative. You should be able to get a truck through there.

UNIT 650: (Inaudible).

KUNA BASE: Take it kinda easy.

UNIT ~~650:~~ ~~Clear~~ 605, ~~go ahead.~~

Unit 650 - go ahead

UNIT 605: Yeah, when we -- ~~do~~ you have somebody to get down to Swan Falls and Nicholson, we're in to the east approximately a quarter mile protecting a large haystack.

UNIT 6803: Affirm. Dispatch, Command. Dispatch, Swan Falls, Command.

DISPATCH: Go ahead.

UNIT 6803: Would you advise what tankers we have en route?

DISPATCH: You were covered by other traffic, repeat.

UNIT 6803: Would you advise what tanker, mutual-aid you have en route?

DISPATCH: A tanker from Meridian and Whitney.

UNIT 602: Command, 602, do you want us to go down Kuna Cave Road from Swan Falls, east of Swan Falls?

UNIT 6803: 605, Command. 602, standby.

(Pause)

UNIT 6803: 605, Command, ~~go ahead.~~

UNIT 605: Yeah, we're down here trying to protect these haystacks.

UNIT 6803: Okay, I'll get you a tanker. Melba 205, can you proceed on Swan Falls to the south with your tanker?

UNIT 205: Yes, sir.

UNIT 601: Kuna Command, 601.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

UNIT 601: We're at Kuna Road and Stroble, where do you want us?

UNIT 6803: Request you stand by at the station.

UNIT 641: 6803, 641.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

UNIT 641: We're on the east flank -- or on the west flank, we've got a road and we got the wind working for us. We're going to go up and try and hit the hill and go inside the black and look for those guys.

21:19

UNIT 6803: Okay, be careful and keep an escape route.

UNIT 641: Okay, I have 650 with us also.

BOISE 21: Dispatch, Boise 21 is covered by two.

UNIT 6803: Unit calling, Command, repeat.

BOISE 21: Dispatch, Boise 21, is covered by two available auto aid.

DISPATCH: Dispatch, Boise 21, covered by two available automatic aid. Canyon Station 3, dispatch.

COUNTY STATION 3: County Station 3, covered by 3.

DISPATCH: Copy.

UNIT 6803: Their status?

21:20

UNIT 341: Unit, Command, 341.

UNIT 601: 50-601.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

UNIT 641: We've got a BLM engine up here, we're

going to go ahead, as soon as we can, we're going to take off and go behind them and see if we can get in the black and go look for those guys.

21:21 UNIT 650: Okay, we're right behind you.

UNIT 641: We've located our men.

UNIT 6803: Copy. Where they at?

UNIT 641: Still in the truck.

UNIT 6803: Exactly, what is the truck due? Does anybody know yet?

UNIT 650: The truck is south of Nicholson Road on Swan Falls about a half a mile.

UNIT 6803: Repeat that again.

UNIT 641: Swan Falls Road, a half a mile south of Swan -- of Nicholson and to the west about 100 yards.

UNIT 6803: They are on the road then or they're

21:21 still in the burn?

UNIT 641: In the burn, in the truck.

UNIT 650: Thank you kindly, and just calm down a little bit, even though it's bad.

DISPATCH: Kuna Command, Dispatch.

UNIT 6803: Go ahead.

DISPATCH: The information, citizen reporting another fire starting one mile east of the large fire between Locust Grove and Cloverdale.

~~UNIT 143:~~ Command Whitney 143 to Command.

INCIDENT STATUS SUMMARY

(See reverse for general instructions)

Date 7/29/95	Time 2000	2. INITIAL ☐ UPDATE ☐ FINAL ☒	3. Incident Name POINT (12)	4. Incident Number BOD F056 (8)	
Incident Commander KIRBY (12)	6. Jurisdictions BOD KUNA FD (5)	7. County ADA (14)	8. Type Incident Fire (20)	9. Location T1N R1W S.34 (64)	10. Started Date 7/28 Time 1829 (6/4)
11. Cause Lightning (28)	12. Area Involved 10,000 (28)	13. % Contained 100% (4)	14. Expected Containment Date 7/29/95 Time 1900 (6/4)	15. Est. Control Date 7/29/95 Time ~~2200~~ (6/4)	16. Declared Controlled Date 7/29/95 Time 1910 (6/4)
Current Threat NONE (66)			18. Control Problems NONE (64)		
19. Est. Loss 500,000 (12)	20. Est. Savings 3,000,000 (12)	21. Injuries 0 (4)	Deaths 0 (4)	22. Line Built 18 miles (6)	23. Line to Build 0 (6)
Current Weather 15-20 West Temp 80 RH 35% (14)		25. Predicted Weather WS 15 WD W NW Temp 85 RH 35% (14)		26. Costs to Date 80,000 (12)	27. Est. Total Cost 90,000 (12)

28. AGENCIES (5)

29. RESOURCES (4)	BLM	Other FD																			TOTALS	
KIND OF RESOURCE	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST
ENGINES	9		11																		20	
DOZERS	3																				3	
CREWS																						
HELICOPTERS	1T3 1T2																				1T3 1T2	
AIRTANKERS																						
TRUCK COS.																						
RESCUE/MED.																						
WATER TENDERS	2																				2	
OVERHEAD PERSONNEL	5		4																		9	
TOTAL PERSONNEL	50		37																		87	

Cooperating Agencies: Boise City, KUNA FD, Whitney FD (52)

Remarks: Fire is being demobed at present all resources are being returned to base.

INCIDENT STATUS SUMMARY

(See reverse for general instructions)

ID-BOD-

Date	Time	2.	3. Incident Name	4. Incident Number
7/28/95	2400	INITIAL ☒ UPDATE ☐ FINAL ☐	Point (12)	FO56 (8)

Sent Commander	6. Jurisdictions	7. County	8. Type Incident	9. Location	10. Started
Kirby (12)	BOD City of Kuna	AdA (14)	Fire (20)	1N 1W 34 (64)	Date 7/28 Time 1829 (6/4)

11. Cause	12. Area Involved	13. % Contained	14. Expected Containment	15. Est. Control	16. Declared Controlled
Lightning (28)	10,000 (28)	20 (4)	Date No est of Time contain (6/4)	Date NO EST Time (6/4)	Date N/A Time (6/4)

17. Current Threat	18. Control Problems
Private lands, Structures (66)	High winds lightning (64)

19. Est. Loss	20. Est. Savings	21. Injuries	Deaths	22. Line Built	23. Line to Build
700,000 (12)	n/a (12)	0 (4)	2 (4)	No estimate (6)	No estimate (6)

24. Current Weather	25. Predicted Weather	26. Costs to Date	27. Est. Total Cost
WS 15 Temp 80 WD E RH 18 (14)	WS 25 Temp 90 WD S to W RH 30 (14)	50,000 (12)	200,000 (12)

28. AGENCIES (5)

29. RESOURCES (4)	BLM		Other FD																		TOTALS	
KIND OF RESOURCE	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST	SR	ST
ENGINES	9		21																		30	
DOZERS	3																				3	
CREWS																						
HELICOPTERS	1T3																				1	
AIRTANKERS																						
TRUCK COS.																						
RESCUE/MED.																						
WATER TENDERS	1		1																		2	
OVERHEAD PERSONNEL	5		4																		9	
TOTAL PERSONNEL	50		65																		115	

30. Cooperating Agencies: Boise City FD, Kuna FD, Mountain Home FD, Whitney FD, Numerous other departments (also shown in other above) (52)

31. Remarks

See attached narrative.

(8 Lines/20)

32. Prepared By	33. Approved By	34 Sent To
Linda Bass (12)	Wm T. Cook (12)	Date Time By

Great Basin
Incident Status Summary (ICS-209) Continuation Sheet

Incident Name: Point Incident Number: F056
Priority: 1 (to be assigned at local unit/dispatch center)

Incident Narrative Summary

The following information (items 1 through 11) is mandatory, and must be submitted to the local dispatch center along with the ICS-209 form by 2100 hrs. on a daily basis, until the incident is controlled. (See Great Basin Mobilization Guide Section 26.1). There are two options for submitting this information: (1) include items 1-11 in a narrative summary, then complete the approval block, or (2) skip the narrative summary and fill in items 1-11 and the approval block.

Analysis

1. **Significant events** - highlight events such as hazardous materials spills, evacuations, closures, accidents/injuries, significant progress made on containing/controlling the incident, etc.

At approx. 2030 hrs. frontal passage occurred on fire. Kuna F.D. engine was overrun, resulting in two fatalities. Control efforts continue to be hampered by high winds and dry fuel conditions.

2. **Structures destroyed** - describe the type of structure(s) (commercial/business, primary residence, outbuilding, summer cabin, etc.). Include dollar values, if known.

Four confirmed residences destroyed with assorted outbuildings. Structure protection and evacuations continuing.

3. **Today's fire behavior** - describe fire behavior observed on the incident during the reporting period. Leave blank for non-fire incidents.

Extreme – near fire storm conditions @ 2400 hrs. Little temperature recovery.

Prognosis

4. **Tomorrow's predicted fire behavior** - describe the fire behavior expected during the next operational period. Leave blank for non-fire incidents.

Temps in 90's and high winds w/ frontal passage will continue to produce extreme fire behavior.

5. **Structures threatened** - categorize according to type of use (commercial/business, year-round residence, summer residence, outbuilding, etc.) and include the time that the fire is anticipated to reach the structure(s).

Residences, year round, is currently burning in a subdivision near town

6. **Resources threatened** - describe significant threats to watershed, timber, wildlife habitat and/or other valuable resources.

Structures, critial wildlife habitat

7. **Major problems and concerns** - list expected control problems/threats for the next operational period, social/political/economic concerns and impacts, etc. This section may also be used to explain critical resource needs by relating them to tomorrow's action plan.

Extreme fuel loading
Fire weather windy temps in 90's Thunder storms

8. **Projected incident size** - estimate the total size of the incident at control (acres for fire incidents, square miles/counties/municipalities affected for other types of natural disasters). Estimate 20,000

9. **Outlook** - Analyze the probability of meeting the suppression objectives within the specified timeframe documented in the Escaped Fire Situation Analysis (EFSA).

Good

10. **Critical resource needs** (list in priority order). Relate to operations planned for the next 1-2 days, if possible. Use additional lines, if needed.

(1) Resource type: A/T
(2) Resource type: Dozers
(3) Resource type: Engines

11. **Projected demob start** (date and time): 7/31 1800

Submitted by:	Approved by:	Date:	Time:
	[illegible]	7/28	2400

Critical incident stress team is currently on scene.

ESCAPED FIRE SITUATION ANALYSIS (EFSA) WORKSHEET

Date: July 29, 1995 **Time**: 1200 **Location**: BLM Boise District (BOD) **Name**: Point

I. SITUATION

A. FIRE: Current Size (acres)10,000 acres Date StartedJuly 28, 1995 Time:1829MDT

B. FIRE WEATHER AND BEHAVIOR

1. Current: High pressure ridge being overridden by moisture streaming up from California coast. Widespread cloud development triggering frequent lightning with gusty winds.

2. Outlook: RED FLAG WARNING below 5500 ft for low RH, dry lighting, and erratic thunderstorms.

C. FUELS:

1. Type: Sagebrush-steppe. Unusually heavy fine fuel loadings (cheatgrass in the "Birds of Prey" Area measured in excess of 3,000 lbs/acre.
2. Extent: Widespread, covering all of the affected area.

D. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY: Competition exists at the local level and within the geographic area for Federal resources. Adequate support from local cooperators.

Source: ICS 209 dated 7/28/95, 2400

E. FIRE SIZE POTENTIAL: 30,000 acres

F. CONSTRAINTS ON SUPPRESSION ACTIVITIES (Administrative, Legal): None

G. AREA MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES: FMAP objective 50 acres or less. Objective was exceeded shortly after ignition. Current objectives are to minimize resource and property damage.

H. SOCIAL OR EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS: Internationally recognized habitat for birds of prey. Also, the Peregrine Fund facility is located nearby. Also, Initial Point and surrounding area is within the Birds Of Prey NCA.

EFSA WORKSHEET

II. ALTERNATIVES			
	Alternative A	Alternative B	Alternative C
A. Strategy	Aggressive initial/extended attack with engines, dozers, and airtankers to minimize habitat loss, protect improvements, and protect lives and private property.	Indirect attack by burning out and backfiring along existing roads and ways.	
B. Strategy			
C. Estimated Date Contained:	2400, July 29, 1995	2400, July 31, 1995	
D. Estimated Size @ Containment	10,000 acres	20,000 acres	
E. Estimated Suppression Cost	$100,000	$200,000	
F. Estimated Rehabilitation Cost	$175,000	$350,000	
G. Estimated Probability of Success	80%	80%	

EFSA Worksheet

III. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS	Alternative A		Alternative B		Alternative C	
CONSIDERATIONS	Critical	Not Critical	Critical	Not Critical	Critical	Not Critical
A. Social	X		X			
1. Safety						
a. Firefighter	X		X			
b. Public	X		X			
2. Economic						
a. Long Term	X		X			
b. Short Term	X		X			
B. Resource and Environmental	X		X			
1. Visual		X		X		
2. Water/Watershed		X		X		
3. Soils	X		X			
4. Vegetation	X		X			
a. Economic		X		X		
b. Non Economic	X		X			
5. Recreation		X		X		
6. Wildlife	X		X			
7. Fish		X		X		
8. Rec. Opportunity		X		X		
9. Air Quality	X		X			
C. Other Considerations						
Improvements	x		x			
Private property	x		x			

Comments: About 300 residents evacuated. 1 primary residence and several additional structures destroyed. 2 fatalities.

EFSA Worksheet

IV. DECISION: Alternative A is selected because:

7/29/95	1200	John C Sullivan
Date	Time	Line Officer(s) (Acting)

DAILY REVIEW:

		By
		By
		By
		By
Date	Time	

V. EXPANSION OF ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS (Any further explanations as necessary.)
Attach additional sheets as needed.

NWCG

WILDLAND FIRE ENTRAPMENT/FATALITY

INITIAL REPORT

Timely reporting of entrapments or fatalities is necessary for the rapid dissemination of accurate information to the fire management community. It will also allow fire safety and equipment specialists to quickly respond to these events as appropriate. This initial report does not replace agency reporting or investigative responsibilities, policies or procedures. Complete this report for fire-related entrapment and/or fatalities. Immediately notify the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) attn: Intelligence Section. Submit this written report to the address given below within 24 hours. Submit even if some data are missing.

NICC-National Interagency Fire Center
3833 S. Development Avenue
Boise, Idaho 83705-5354

Phone-(208) 387-5400
FAX-(208) 387-5414

NICC Intelligence Section
DG-A.INT: W02A
IAMS- FCNICCOR

I. General Information

A. Date 7/28/95
B. Fire name and location Point 5W IN S28
C. Number of personnel involved 55+
D. Number of injuries 0
E. Number of fatalities 2

II. Fire Related Information

A. Fuel Model A-T
B. Temperature 101 R.H. 12% Wind 45 (mph)
C. Topography FLAT Slope 0-10 %
D. Fire size at time of incident/accident 200+ Acres
E. Urban/wildland intermix [X] Yes [ ] No
F. Cause of Fire [X] Natural [ ] Incendiary [ ] Accidental [ ] Unknown

III. Entrapment

A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire-behavior related, life threatening position where escape routes or safety zones are absent, inadequate or have been compromised. An entrapment may or may not include deployment of a fire shelter.

A. Entrapment information

1. Firefighter trapped	[ ] with fire shelter	[X] without fire shelter
2. Burns/smoke injuries incurred while in fire shelter	[ ] Yes	[X] No
3. Burns/smoke injuries incurred while escaping entrapment	[X] Yes	[ ] No
4. Burns/smoke injuries incurred while fighting fire	[X] Yes	[ ] No
5. Fire shelter performed satisfactorily	[ ] Yes	[ ] No N/A
6. Fire shelter was available, but not used	[ ] Yes	[ ] No N/A

B. Personal Protective Equipment Used

1. Fire Shelter	☐ Yes	☒ No		5. Protective Shirt	☒ Yes	☐ No	
2. Protective Pants	☒ Yes	☐ No		6. Hardhat	☒ Yes	☐ No	
3. Gloves	☒ Yes	☐ No		7. Boots	☒ Yes	☐ No	
4. Face/Neck Protection	☒ Yes	☐ No		8. Goggles	☐ Yes	☐ No	

IV. Fatalities

A. Type of accident

- ☐ 1. Aircraft
- ☐ 2. Natural (lightning, drowning, etc.)
- ☐ 3. Medical (heart, stroke, heat, etc.)
- ☐ 4. Struck by Falling Object
- ☐ 5. Vehicle
- ☐ 6. Smoke
- ☑ 7. Entrapment
- ☐ 8. Other

B. Where fatality(s) occurred

- ☑ 1. Fire site
- ☐ 2. Incident Base
- ☐ 3. In transit
- ☐ 4. Other

C. Fatalities

1. Name Bill Buttram D.O.B. 31 years of age
   Employment status ☐ Career ☐ Seasonal ☑ Casual ☐ Other
2. Name Josh Oliver D.O.B. 18 years of age
   Employment status ☐ Career ☐ Seasonal ☑ Casual ☐ Other
3. Name _____ D.O.B. _____
   Employment status ☐ Career ☐ Seasonal ☐ Casual ☐ Other
4. Name _____ D.O.B. _____
   Employment status ☐ Career ☐ Seasonal ☐ Casual ☐ Other

Note: In the event of fatality(s), do not release name(s) until next of kin are notified.

D. Employing agency Kuna Rural Fire District
E. Unit name and address PO Box 57 Kuna 83634
F. Firefighting part of employee's job description ☐ Yes ☒ No

G. Person to contact for additional information _____ Phone _____
   Home unit address _____

H. Brief description of accident Two volunteer fire fighters were caught in their vehicle during a frontal passage.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)
from the

"POINT FIRE", IDAHO
July 28, 1995

On August 14, 1995, Fire Equipment Specialists George Jackson and Dick Mangan from the USDA Forest Service, Missoula Technology & Development Center inspected and analyzed the personal protective clothing and equipment recovered from the two fatalities, (William Buttram and Josh Oliver - Kuna Volunteer Fire Department) that were entrapped on the Bureau of Land Management's "Point Fire" on July 28, 1995.

This review was requested by Stan Palmer, Investigation Team member and Safety & Health Group Leader @ NIFC-BLM. Mr. Palmer forwarded three boxes to MTDC, which contained the following items. Bag #1: remains of structural turnout coat, retrieved from area next to gear shift housing. Bag #2: structural turnout coat and structural helmet, retrieved from the seat area of the vehicle. Bag #3: Josh Oliver's clothing received from the coroner. Bag #4: one glove retrieved from passenger side of the vehicle. Bag #5: steel boot shank, retrieved from the passenger side of the vehicle. Bag #6: EMT scissors enclosed in a pocket, retrieved from area of the gear shift housing. Bag #7: William Buttram's clothing received from the coroner. Bag #8: remains of a pair of structural turnout pants, retrieved from the passenger side of the vehicle.

INSPECTION AND ANALYSIS

Contents of bag #1 were retrieved from the center console of the vehicle from the area of the gear shift housing. Contents consisted of the remains of a structural turnout coat. (we were unable to determine the manufacturer) Zipper parts, coaxial cable, small metal speaker (possible PASS device), and snap fasteners with the name "Body Guard" printed on the snaps. It is probable that the manufacturer of the turn out coat was Body Guard, a division of Lion Uniform. No labels were found due to the extent of thermal damage.

Contents of bag #2 were retrieved from the area between the two victims. Contents consisted of a red structural fire helmet that was melted to a structural turnout coat manufactured by "Globe". The turnout coat had circular impressions possibly from the seat springs, from either the bottom or the back of the seat. There were no indications that the liner was attached to the turnout coat. A waterproof flashlight was found in a pocket of the turnout coat.

Contents of bag #3 were Josh Oliver's clothing received from the coroner. Contents consisted of: blue cotton sweat pants, (size large), cotton tee shirt, a protective baklava style knit hood, an orange colored, flame resistant (FR) cotton fire shirt, estimated weight in ounces per square yard is 9 to 11 o.s.y. and snap fasteners with the name "Body Guard"

printed on the snaps. Also included was a length of coaxial cable and a rectangular metal tray measuring 1.5" x 9".

Contents of bag #4 were retrieved from the passenger side of the vehicle and consisted of a right hand glove with a knit gauntlet and leather palm and fingers. Thermal damage had shrunk the glove to approximately 40% of its original size. No labels were evident.

Contents of bag #5 were retrieved from the passenger side and consisted of a steel boot shank for a left boot. In conversations with the investigation team three other steel boot shanks were located in the vehicle at a later date.

Contents of bag #6 were retrieved from the area of the gear shift housing and consisted of a pair of EMT scissors in a pocket that was probably attached to the structural turnout coat that was found in the same area.

Contents of bag #7 were William Buttram's clothing received from the coroner. Contents consisted of, cotton underwear, cotton tee shirt, blue colored uniform pants, with a black belt attached, pants appear to be a cotton, polyester blend, William Buttram's wallet, Motorola pager in case, (Model #J602/605, ID # 6809 etched into the case). Structural turnout pants, manufactured by Globe, and an orange flame resistant (FR) cotton fire shirt, estimated weight in ounces per square yard is 9 to 11 o.s.y..

Contents of bag #8 were retrieved from the passenger side of the vehicle and consisted of the remains of a pair of turnout pants manufactured by "Body Guard".

DISCUSSION

Information and articles of clothing that MTDC received from Stan Palmer suggest that William Buttram was driving the converted 2 & 1/2 ton military water tender and Josh Oliver was sitting in the passenger seat. When the victims were discovered in the vehicle, Josh Oliver was sitting in the passenger side of the vehicle and William Buttram was leaning against Josh Oliver in a sitting position.

William Buttram was wearing a FR cotton fire shirt with a cotton tee shirt on his upper torso. He was wearing cotton underwear with his uniform pants and turnout pants manufactured by "Globe" on his lower torso. With the location of four steel boot shanks from the interior of the vehicle we can surmise that William Buttram was wearing structural bunker boots. We can surmise that the structural turnout coat and helmet retrieved from between the victims belonged to William Buttram because the turnout coat was manufactured by "Globe" the same manufacturer as the turnout pants that he was wearing.

Josh Oliver was wearing a FR cotton fire shirt with a cotton tee shirt on his upper torso. He was wearing cotton sweat pants and structural turnout pants manufactured by "Body Guard" on his lower torso. The protective hood was probably tucked into the waist of his turnout pants. Evidence suggests that Josh Oliver was wearing structural bunker boots. Evidence also suggests that the structural turnout coat retrieved from the area of the gear shift housing belonged to Josh Oliver, buttons stamped "Body Guard" were retrieved from the same area matching the turnout pants that he was wearing.

CONCLUSIONS

While the analysis of the (PPE) personal protective equipment from the "Point Fire" was not conducted on-scene, and the thermal damage destroyed much of the revelant information from the clothing and equipment, conclusions can be drawn, both from actual observation as well as knowledge gained from previous investigations.

1. The protective clothing and equipment worn by the victims was intended for structural fire fighting.

2. There was no physical evidence found that would suggest that the clothing the victims were wearing was compliant with NFPA 1977.

3. There was no physical evidence found that would suggest that the victims were carrying fire shelters.

4. Staying in the vehicle caused more severe thermal damage to the PPE than would have occurred if the victims had been away from the vehicle laying on the ground.

5. Combustible materials in and on the vehicle continued to burn after the flame front and residual fire from the natural fuels had passed.

6. The PPE worn by the fatally injured firefighters was subjected to long-duration high-intensity direct flame contact.

George M. Jackson
Equipment Specialist
MTDC

Dick Mangan
F & AM Program Leader
MTDC

TransCorp
NationaLease

4450 Enterprise St.
Boise, Idaho 83705
Tel. (208) 336-7220
Fax (208) 385-0477

BRANCHES:
Twin Falls, Idaho
Salt Lake City, Utah

August 24, 1995

Stan Palmer
Safety and Health Manager
National Interagency Fire Center
3833 South Development
Boise, Idaho 83705

Dear Stan:

I inspected the fire vehicle with license plate #F528 at TNT Towing Storage Lot (3901 West Gowen Road, Boise, Idaho) on 8-24-95. I could not determine the exact cause of engine failure from the present condition of the vehicle. Any further analyses would involve the conditions at the time of failure and detailed vehicle service records.

If you have any further questions feel free to call met at 208-336-7220.

Sincerely,

Rick Milliron
General Manager - V.P.

RM/wb

15 AUG 95

MEMORANDUM FOR BLM FIRE INVESTIGATION TEAM

SUBJECT: Inspection of Fire Truck #620, VIN#33-3321954

1. Inspection was conducted 14 August 1995 of a 1955 cargo truck model M211, mounted with water tank and pump assembly. There were no obvious mechanical failures that would indicate a stalling condition of drive train as viewed from under vehicle.

2. For further assistance or questions contact the undersigned:

Terry K. Shepherd
888-1559
Meridian

Wade C. Nielsen
378-9681
Boise

ZCZC BOIFWFBOI
TTAA00 KBOI 281508

BOISE FIRE WEATHER OFFICE...MORNING FORECAST
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE BOISE, IDAHO
ISSUED 9 AM MDT FRIDAY JULY 28, 1995 GIBSON

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FIRE WEATHER WATCH FOR DRY LIGHTNING LATE THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT...LOWER ELEVATIONS OF ZONES 637...401...404...408-409 AND 412. DRY LIGHTNING WILL AFFECT ALL OF THE WESTERN FIRE WEATHER DISTRICT. WATCH IN EFFECT ONLY FOR AREAS WHERE FUELS ARE IN THE HIGH TO EXTREME CATEGORY....MAINLY BELOW 5000 FEET.
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DISCUSSION...
WARMEST DAY OF THE SUMMER..SO FAR..FRIDAY. COLD FRONT..INITIALLY DRY..SWEEPING THROUGH THE DISTRICT FRIDAY NIGHT AND SATURDAY.

A HOT AND DRY RIDGE OF HIGH PRESSURE ALOFT..OVER THE DISTRICT..IS SHIFTING EAST THIS MORNING. AN UPPER LEVEL TROUGH IS APPROACHING FROM THE GULF OF ALASKA. MOISTURE IS STREAMING NORTH ACROSS CENTRAL CALIFORNIA AHEAD OF THIS SYSTEM. AS THE COLD FRONT APPROACHES LATE TODAY AND TONIGHT SOUTHEAST TO SOUTHWEST WINDS WILL INCREASE AND DRY THUNDERSHOWERS WILL DEVELOP OVER THE WESTERN ZONES..SPREADING EAST BY DAWN. THE THUNDERSHOWERS WILL BECOME WET IN NATURE BY SATURDAY EXCEPT FOR CONTINUING DRY STRIKES OVER SOUTHWEST WYOMING INTO MIDDAY SATURDAY. A COOLER AND MORE HUMID AIRMASS WILL SPREAD ACROSS THE DISTRICT SATURDAY AND BEGIN TO MODERATE SUNDAY.

SOUTHEAST IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING (ZONES 411-417)

FRIDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...SUNNY, WARM AND DRY. WINDY DURING THE AFTERNOON. ISOLATED LATE DAY THUNDERSHOWERS YELLOWSTONE PLATEAU. SOME MAY BE DRY.
LAL.....1 EXCEPT 2 ZONE 411-412...415-416.
TEMPERATURE...UP 3-6. HIGHS 70S AND 80S EXCEPT LOW TO MID 90S LOWER ELEVATIONS ZONES 412 AND 413.
HUMIDITY.....LITTLE CHANGE TO DOWN 6 PCT. MINS 12-25 PCT LOCALLY NEAR 8 PCT ZONES 412/413 AND 417.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST INCREASING TO 15-25 MPH BY LATE MORNING. AFTERNOON GUSTS TO 35 MPH RIDGES AND USUAL WINDIER LOCATIONS WESTERN WYOMING. ERRATIC WINDS GUSTING TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE WITH ANY THUNDERSHOWERS.
HAINES INDEX..5..MODERATE NORTH TO 6..HIGH SOUTH.

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...INCREASING CLOUDS. SCATTERED DRY THUNDERSHOWERS ZONE 412. ISOLATED...MAINLY EVENING THUNDERSHOWERS ZONES 415-416.
LAL.....6 ZONE 412...2 ZONES 415-416 AND 1 ELSEWHERE.
TEMPERATURE...LOWS IN THE 40S AND 50S...EXCEPT MID TO UPPER 30S HIGHER ELEVATION BASINS OF WYOMING.
HUMIDITY.....MODERATE TO GOOD RECOVERY VALLEYS, POOR UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES. MAX 65-95 PCT VALLEYS AND

25-45 PCT UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 15-20 MPH THIS EVENING WITH GUSTS TO 30 MPH ON RIDGES. VALLEY WIND DIMINISHING TO 5-12 MPH AFTER DARK BUT RIDGES CONTINUING 10-25 MPH. WINDS GUSTING TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE WITH THUNDERSHOWERS.
HAINES INDEX..6..HIGH EARLY DECREASING TO 5..MODERATE

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...COOLER. PARTLY CLOUDY WITH A CHANCE OF MAINLY WET THUNDERSHOWERS. BREEZY.
LAL.....3-4.
TEMPERATURE....DOWN 4-10. HIGHS FROM THE 60S ZONE 416 TO NEAR 90 LOWER ELEVATIONS OF SOUTHEAST IDAHO.
HUMIDITY.....UP 5 TO 15 PCT. MINS 12-35 PCT..LOWEST ZONE 417.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST 15 TO 25 MPH WITH GUSTS TO 50 MPH OVER EXPOSED RIDGES.
HAINES INDEX..5..MODERATE DECREASING TO 3..LOW.

SMOKE DISPERSAL....EXCELLENT TODAY AND GOOD TONIGHT.

SNAKE RIVER VALLEY/SOUTHEAST OREGON (ZONES 408-410 AND 637)

FRIDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...SUNNY, HOT AND DRY. ISOLATED DRY THUNDERSTORMS VALE AND BOISE BLM DURING EVENING HOURS.
LAL.....1 EXCEPT 2 ZONES 637/408 DURING THE EVENING.
TEMPERATURE...UP ABOUT 5. HIGHS FROM 90 TO 103.
HUMIDITY.....NOT MUCH CHANGE. MINS 8-22 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..LIGHT MORNING HOURS BECOMING SOUTHEAST TO SOUTHWEST 10-20 MPH. GUSTY ERRATIC WINDS TO 55 MPH NEAR ANY THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..6 HIGH

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...PARTLY CLOUDY. BREEZY. SCATTERED...MAINLY DRY THUNDERSHOWERS ZONES 637..408-409. ISOLATED DRY THUNDERSHOWERS BY DAWN IN ZONE 410.
LAL.....3-4 EXCEPT 2 ZONE 410.
TEMPERATURE...LOWS MOSTLY IN THE 50S AND 60S.
HUMIDITY.....MODERATE RECOVERY. MAX 55-75 PCT VALLEYS AND 30-55 PCT SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTH TO WEST 10-25 MPH DECREASING TO 5-15 MPH AFTER DARK. WINDS GUSTING TO 55 MPH POSSIBLE WITH THUNDERSHOWERS.
HAINES INDEX..6..HIGH EARLY DECREASING TO 4..LOW LATE.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...PARTLY CLOUDY...BREEZY AND COOLER. ISOLATED MAINLY WET THUNDERSHOWERS WEST AND WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSHOWERS EAST..SOME DRY.
LAL.....2 WEST TO 3-4 EAST.
TEMPERATURE....DOWN 5-15. HIGHS FROM 75 TO 90.
HUMIDITY.....UP 5-20 PCT. MINS 15-35 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-25 MPH WITH GUSTS TO 40 MPH. WINDS GUSTING TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE WITH THUNDERSHOWERS.

HAINES INDEX..4..LOW DECREASING TO 3..LOW.

SMOKE DISPERSAL...EXCELLENT TODAY AND GOOD TONIGHT.

CENTRAL IDAHO MOUNTAINS (ZONES 401-407)

FRIDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...SUNNY, WARM AND DRY. ISOLATED LATE AFTERNOON DRY THUNDERSTORMS 401-404.
LAL.....2 WEST AND 1 EAST.
TEMPERATURE...UP 3-6. HIGHS UPPER 70S AND 80S EXCEPT LOW TO MID 90S LOWER ELEVATION CANYONS.
HUMIDITY.....LITTLE CHANGE TO DOWN 5 PCT. MINS 10-25 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..RIDGES..SOUTH TO WEST 10-20 MPH WITH A FEW GUSTS TO 30 MPH AFTERNOON HOURS. VALLEYS CALM IN THE MORNING BECOMING SOUTH TO WEST 10-20 MPH DURING THE AFTERNOON.
HAINES INDEX..6 HIGH.

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...PARTLY CLOUDY. BREEZY. SCATTERED..MAINLY DRY THUNDERSHOWERS ZONES 401-404 AND ISOLATED DRY THUNDERSHOWERS BY DAWN ZONES 405-407.
LAL.....3-4 EXCEPT 2 EASTERN 405-407.
TEMPERATURE...LOWS 40S TO LOWER 50S.
HUMIDITY.....GOOD TO MODERATE RECOVERY. MAX 75-95 PCT VALLEYS, 50-75 PCT UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST 10-20 MPH. DECREASING TO 3-8 MPH IN THE VALLEYS AFTER DARK. WINDS GUSTING TO 55 MPH NEAR THUNDERSHOWERS.
HAINES INDEX..6..HIGH EARLY DECREASING OVERNIGHT TO 4..LOW.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...PARTLY TO MOSTLY CLOUDY. BREEZY AND COOLER. SCATTERED TO WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSHOWERS. STORMS SHOULD BE WET EXCEPT SOME DRY STRIKES LOWER ELEVATIONS OF ZONE 406.
LAL.....3-4.
TEMPERATURE....DOWN 5-15. HIGHS IN THE 70S AND 80S.
HUMIDITY.....UP 10-25 PCT. MINS 20-50 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-20 MPH DURING THE LATE MORNING AND AFTERNOON. GUSTS TO 40 MPH OVER THE EXPOSED RIDGES. WIND GUSTS TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE WITH THUNDERSHOWERS.
HAINES INDEX..4..LOW DECREASING TO 3..LOW.

SMOKE DISPERSAL...EXCELLENT TODAY AND GOOD TONIGHT.

OUTLOOK FOR SUNDAY...
PARTLY CLOUDY AND BREEZY. WIDELY SCATTERED SHOWERS AND THUNDERSHOWERS NORTHERN AND EASTERN ZONES. HIGHS FROM THE UPPER 60S NORTHWEST WYOMING TO THE LOW 90S WESTERN SNAKE RIVER VALLEY.

EXTENDED FORECAST MONDAY AND TUESDAY...
MOSTLY SUNNY WITH A SLOW WARMING TREND. ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS OVER THE MOUNTAINS TUESDAY. HIGHS SUNDAY IN THE 70S MOUNTAINS AND

85-95 VALLEYS WARMING 3-6 DEGREES TUESDAY.
END..

NNNN

BOISE FIRE WEATHER OFFICE.....NOON UPDATE
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE BOISE, IDAHO
ISSUED 1200 MDT FRIDAY JULY 28, 1995 GIBSON

DISCUSSION: SOUTHEAST OREGON, IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING...

****
FIRE WEATHER WATCH FOR DRY LIGHTNING LATE THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT...LOWER ELEVATIONS OF ZONES 637...401...404...408-409 AND 412. DRY LIGHTNING WILL AFFECT ALL OF THE WESTERN FIRE WEATHER DISTRICT. WATCH IN EFFECT ONLY FOR AREAS WHERE FUELS ARE IN THE HIGH TO EXTREME CATEGORY....MAINLY BELOW 5000 FEET.
****

MOISTURE IS STREAMING NORTH ACROSS NEVADA. THIS MOISTURE WILL FIRE THUNDERSTORRMS LATE THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT OVER THE WESTERN ZONES. OTHER THUNDERSTORMS WILL DEVELOP OVER NORTHWEST WYOMING. WITH A VERY WARM AND DRY LOWER ATMOSPHERE THESE THUNDERSTORMS WILL BE MOSTLY DRY.

AT NOON...
TEMPERATURES ARE RUNNING 6-12 DEGREES ABOVE YESTERDAY AT NOON. TEMPERATURES RANGE FROM 68 AT YELLOWSTONE LAKE TO 91 AT BOISE. RELATIVE HUMIDITIES HAVE FALLEN INTO THE TEENS AT LOWER ELEVATIONS AND THE 20S IN THE MOUNTAINS. NO LIGHTNING HAS BEEN DETECTED AS OF YET.

END..

ZCZC BOIFWFBOI
TTAA00 KBOI 282230

BOISE FIRE WEATHER OFFICE...AFTERNOON FORECAST
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE BOISE, IDAHO
ISSUED 4 PM MDT FRIDAY JULY 28, 1995 WERTH

****
FIRE WEATHER WATCH FOR DRY LIGHTNING THIS EVENING AND TONIGHT
LOWER ELEVATIONS OF ZONES 637...401...404...408-409 AND 412. DRY
LIGHTNING WILL AFFECT ALL OF THE WESTERN FIRE WEATHER DISTRICT.
HOWEVER, WATCH IN EFFECT ONLY FOR AREAS WHERE GRASS HAS ALREADY
CURED...MAINLY BELOW 5000 FEET.
****
FIRE WEATHER WATCH ROCK SPRINGS BLM (ZONE 417) SATURDAY FOR
STRONG WINDS, LOW HUMIDITIES AND ISOLATED DRY LIGHTNING.
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DISCUSSION...
CHANCE OF DRY LIGHTNING TONIGHT EASTERN OREGON AND WESTERN IDAHO
MOVING INTO EASTERN IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING SATURDAY!! WILL
LEAVE FIRE WEATHER WATCH UP THROUGH TONIGHT..AND EXTEND INTO
SOUTHWEST WYOMING SATURDAY. COMBINATION OF DRY LIGHTNING AND
STRONG WINDS COULD RESULT IN FIRES WITH HIGH RATES OF SPREAD IN
CURED GRASSES. LATE AFTERNOON SATELLITE PICTURES SHOW AN UPPER
TROUGH APPROACHING THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST COAST..AND AN UPPER LOW
NEARING THE CALIFORNIA COAST. THESE TWO SYSTEMS WILL MERGE IN
EASTERN OREGON AND WESTERN IDAHO TONIGHT..AND THEN MOVE INTO
EASTERN IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING SATURDAY. A COLD FRONT WILL
DEVELOP IN WESTERN IDAHO AROUND SUNRISE SATURDAY..AND BY SATURDAY
EVENING SHOULD BE LOCATED IN SOUTHWEST WYOMING. COOLER AND MORE
STABLE AIR WILL MOVE INTO EASTERN OREGON AND WESTERN IDAHO LATER
SATURDAY MORNING ENDING THE THREAT OF THUNDERSTORMS THERE.
HOWEVER, STRONG GUSTY WINDS CAN BE EXPECTED ACROSS THE ENTIRE
FIRE WEATHER DISTRICT SATURDAY. SUNDAY SHOULD SEE A LITTLE MORE
COOLING, ESPECIALLY IN EASTERN IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING. HIGH
PRESSURE WILL REBUILD MONDAY AND TUESDAY WITH A RETURN OF HOT,
DRY WEATHER.

SOUTHEAST IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING (ZONES 411-417)

TONIGHT...
 SKY/WEATHER...SCATTERED CLOUDS. ISOLATED DRY THUNDERSTORMS
               ZONE 412.
 LAL.....1 EXCEPT 2 ZONE 412.
 TEMPERATURE...LOWS 40S TO MID 50S VALLEYS AND 50S TO MID 60S
               RIDGES.
 HUMIDITY.....MODERATE RECOVERY VALLEYS, POOR UPPER SLOPES AND
               RIDGES. MAX 55-85 PCT VALLEYS AND 20-45 PCT UPPER
               SLOPES AND RIDGES.
 WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-20 MPH THIS EVENING WITH
               GUSTS TO 30 MPH ON RIDGES. VALLEY WIND DIMINISHING
               TO 5-15 MPH AFTER DARK BUT RIDGES CONTINUING 10-25
               MPH. WINDS GUSTING TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE WITH
               THUNDERSTORMS ZONE 412.
 HAINES INDEX..5 MODERATE NORTH AND 6 HIGH SOUTH.

SATURDAY...

SKY/WEATHER...PARTLY CLOUDY AND WINDY. WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE AFTERNOON HOURS.
LAL.....2-3
TEMPERATURE...LITTLE CHANGE TO DOWN 5. HIGHS 70S AND 80S EXCEPT NEAR 90 LOWER ELEVATIONS ZONES 413 AND 417.
HUMIDITY.....UP 3-10 PCT. MINS 12-35 PCT..LOWEST ZONE 417.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST INCREASING TO 20-35 MPH BY LATE MORNING. GUSTS TO 55 MPH POSSIBLE RIDGES AND NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..5 MODERATE

SMOKE DISPERSAL....MARGINAL TONIGHT AND EXCELLENT SATURDAY.

SNAKE RIVER VALLEY/SOUTHEAST OREGON (ZONES 408-410 AND 637)

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...ZONES 637/408 AND 409..PARTLY CLOUDY AND BREEZY. WIDELY SCATTERED DRY THUNDERSTORMS DEVELOPING THIS EVENING AND CONTINUING THROUGH THE NIGHT. ZONE 410..SCATTERED CLOUDS AND BREEZY.
LAL.....2-3 EXCEPT 1 ZONE 410.
TEMPERATURE...A WARM NIGHT WITH LOWS MID 50S AND 60S.
HUMIDITY.....POOR RECOVERY. MAX 35-55 PCT VALLEYS AND 20-35 PCT SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTH TO WEST 10-25 MPH DECREASING TO 8-18 MPH AFTER DARK. GUSTY WINDS TO 55 MPH POSSIBLE NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..6 HIGH DECREASING TO 5 MODERATE.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...ZONES 637/408..PARTLY CLOUDY EARLY THEN MOSTLY SUNNY BY AFTERNOON. COOLER AND WINDY. ZONES 409/410..PARTLY CLOUDY WITH ISOLATED TO WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS. WINDY AND A LITTLE COOLER.
LAL.....2-3
TEMPERATURE...DOWN 10-15 ZONES 637/408..DOWN 6-12 ZONE 409.. AND DOWN 4-7 ZONE 410. HIGHS IN THE 80S.
HUMIDITY.....UP 5-15 PCT. MINS 15-30 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-25 MPH WITH GUSTS TO 40 MPH. GUSTY WINDS TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..4 LOW WEST AND 5 MODERATE EASTERN ZONES.

SMOKE DISPERSAL...MARGINAL TONIGHT AND EXCELLENT SATURDAY.

CENTRAL IDAHO MOUNTAINS (ZONES 401-407)

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...SCATTERED CLOUDS. WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS DEVELOPING ZONES 401-404 AROUND MIDNIGHT MOVING INTO EASTERN ZONES BY MORNING. LITTLE IF ANY RAIN WITH THUNDERSTORMS.
LAL.....2-3
TEMPERATURE...LOWS 40S TO MID 50S VALLEYS AND 50S TO LOWER 60S

UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
HUMIDITY.....MODERATE RECOVERY VALLEYS, POOR UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES. MAX 55-75 PCT VALLEYS AND 30-45 PCT UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST 10-20 MPH. WIND DECREASING TO 4-9 MPH VALLEYS AFTER DARK. WINDS GUSTING TO 50 MPH NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..5 MODERATE.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...ZONES 401-404..PARTLY CLOUDY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED MORNING THUNDERSTORMS. CLEARING DURING THE AFTERNOON. COOLER AND LOCALLY WINDY.
ZONES 405-407..PARTLY CLOUDY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS, MAINLY DURING THE AFTERNOON. WINDY AND A LITTLE COOLER.
LAL.....3
TEMPERATURE...DOWN 13 WEST TO 8 EAST. HIGHS 70S AND 80S.
HUMIDITY.....UP 5-10 PCT. MINS 18-35 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-20 MPH BY LATE MORNING. AFTERNOON GUSTS EASTERN ZONES TO 30 MPH. GUSTS TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..4 LOW

SMOKE DISPERSAL...MARGINAL TONIGHT AND EXCELLENT SATURDAY.

OUTLOOK FOR SUNDAY...
MOSTLY SUNNY, MILD AND BREEZY. ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS WESTERN WYOMING ZONES. HIGHS MID 60S AND 70S MOUNTAINS AND 70S TO MID 80S VALLEYS.

EXTENDED FORECAST MONDAY THROUGH WEDNESDAY...
MOSTLY SUNNY, WARMER AND DRIER. ISOLATED MOUNTAIN THUNDERSTORMS LATE TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY. HIGHS WARMING INTO THE 80S AND 90S WITH NEAR 100 LOWER ELEVATION VALLEYS.

THE 6-10 DAY EXTENDED OUTLOOK FOR THURSDAY AUGUST 3 THROUGH MONDAY AUGUST 7 CALLS FOR ABOVE NORMAL TEMPERATURES AND LITTLE OR NO RAIN.

END..

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ZCZC BOIFWFBOI
TTAA00 KBOI 290251

BOISE FIRE WEATHER OFFICE...UPDATED FORECAST
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE BOISE, IDAHO
ISSUED 830 PM MDT FRIDAY JULY 28, 1995 WERTH

****
RED FLAG WARNING VALE AND BOISE BLM DISTRICTS (ZONES 637 AND 408) TONIGHT FOR DRY LIGHTNING AND LOCALLY STRONG WINDS.
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****
RED FLAG WATCH REMAINS IN EFFECT TONIGHT FOR ZONES 409 AND ELEVATIONS BELOW 5000 FT ZONES 401 AND 404 FOR POSSIBLE DRY LIGHTNING AND STRONG WINDS.
****

****
FIRE WEATHER WATCH ROCK SPRINGS BLM (ZONE 417) SATURDAY FOR STRONG WINDS, LOW HUMIDITIES AND ISOLATED DRY LIGHTNING.
****

DISCUSSION...
DOPPLER RADAR AND LIGHTNING DETECTION SHOW A BAND OF LIGHTNING WITH VERY LIMITED RAINFALL FROM NEAR BOISE ACROSS THE VALE BLM DISTRICT INTO NORTHWEST NEVADA. THESE STORMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH AN UPPER TROUGH THAT IS MOVING ONTO THE COAST. EXPECT THESE THUNDERSTORMS WILL LAST PAST MIDNIGHT WITH GUSTS TO UP TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE. THESE STORMS ARE MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHEAST AT ABOUT 30 MPH.

SOUTHEAST IDAHO AND WESTERN WYOMING (ZONES 411-417)

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...SCATTERED CLOUDS. ISOLATED DRY THUNDERSTORMS ZONE 412.
LAL.....1 EXCEPT 2 ZONE 412.
TEMPERATURE...LOWS 40S TO MID 50S VALLEYS AND 50S TO MID 60S RIDGES.
HUMIDITY.....MODERATE RECOVERY VALLEYS, POOR UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES. MAX 55-85 PCT VALLEYS AND 20-45 PCT UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-20 MPH THIS EVENING WITH GUSTS TO 30 MPH ON RIDGES. VALLEY WIND DIMINISHING TO 5-15 MPH AFTER DARK BUT RIDGES CONTINUING 10-25 MPH. WINDS GUSTING TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE WITH THUNDERSTORMS ZONE 412.
HAINES INDEX..5 MODERATE NORTH AND 6 HIGH SOUTH.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...PARTLY CLOUDY AND WINDY. WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE AFTERNOON HOURS.
LAL.....2-3
TEMPERATURE...LITTLE CHANGE TO DOWN 5. HIGHS 70S AND 80S EXCEPT NEAR 90 LOWER ELEVATIONS ZONES 413 AND 417.

HUMIDITY.....UP 3-10 PCT. MINS 12-35 PCT..LOWEST ZONE 417.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST INCREASING TO 20-35 MPH BY LATE MORNING. GUSTS TO 55 MPH POSSIBLE RIDGES AND NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..5 MODERATE

SMOKE DISPERSAL....MARGINAL TONIGHT AND EXCELLENT SATURDAY.

SNAKE RIVER VALLEY/SOUTHEAST OREGON (ZONES 408-410 AND 637)

TONIGHT...RED FLAG WARNING FOR DRY LIGHTNING AND STRONG WINDS..
SKY/WEATHER...ZONES 637/408 AND 409..PARTLY CLOUDY AND BREEZY. WIDELY SCATTERED DRY THUNDERSTORMS DEVELOPING THIS EVENING AND CONTINUING THROUGH THE NIGHT. ZONE 410..SCATTERED CLOUDS AND BREEZY.
LAL.....6 ZONES 637/408..2 ZONE 409..1 ZONE 410.
TEMPERATURE...A WARM NIGHT WITH LOWS MID 50S AND 60S.
HUMIDITY.....POOR RECOVERY. MAX 35-55 PCT VALLEYS AND 20-35 PCT SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTH TO WEST 10-25 MPH DECREASING TO 8-18 MPH AFTER DARK. GUSTY WINDS TO 55 MPH POSSIBLE NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..6 HIGH DECREASING TO 5 MODERATE.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...ZONES 637/408..PARTLY CLOUDY EARLY THEN MOSTLY SUNNY BY AFTERNOON. COOLER AND WINDY. ZONES 409/410..PARTLY CLOUDY WITH ISOLATED TO WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS. WINDY AND A LITTLE COOLER.
LAL.....2-3
TEMPERATURE...DOWN 10-15 ZONES 637/408..DOWN 6-12 ZONE 409.. AND DOWN 4-7 ZONE 410. HIGHS IN THE 80S.
HUMIDITY.....UP 5-15 PCT. MINS 15-30 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-25 MPH WITH GUSTS TO 40 MPH. GUSTY WINDS TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..4 LOW WEST AND 5 MODERATE EASTERN ZONES.

SMOKE DISPERSAL...MARGINAL TONIGHT AND EXCELLENT SATURDAY.

CENTRAL IDAHO MOUNTAINS (ZONES 401-407)

TONIGHT...
SKY/WEATHER...SCATTERED CLOUDS. WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS DEVELOPING ZONES 401-404 AROUND MIDNIGHT MOVING INTO EASTERN ZONES BY MORNING. LITTLE IF ANY RAIN WITH THUNDERSTORMS.
LAL.....2-3
TEMPERATURE...LOWS 40S TO MID 50S VALLEYS AND 50S TO LOWER 60S UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
HUMIDITY.....MODERATE RECOVERY VALLEYS, POOR UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES. MAX 55-75 PCT VALLEYS AND 30-45 PCT UPPER SLOPES AND RIDGES.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO WEST 10-20 MPH. WIND DECREASING TO 4-9 MPH VALLEYS AFTER DARK. WINDS GUSTING TO 50

MPH NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..5 MODERATE.

SATURDAY...
SKY/WEATHER...ZONES 401-404..PARTLY CLOUDY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED MORNING THUNDERSTORMS. CLEARING DURING THE AFTERNOON. COOLER AND LOCALLY WINDY.
ZONES 405-407..PARTLY CLOUDY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS, MAINLY DURING THE AFTERNOON. WINDY AND A LITTLE COOLER.
LAL.....3
TEMPERATURE...DOWN 13 WEST TO 8 EAST. HIGHS 70S AND 80S.
HUMIDITY.....UP 5-10 PCT. MINS 18-35 PCT.
WIND - 20 FT..SOUTHWEST TO NORTHWEST 10-20 MPH BY LATE MORNING. AFTERNOON GUSTS EASTERN ZONES TO 30 MPH. GUSTS TO 50 MPH POSSIBLE NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
HAINES INDEX..4 LOW

SMOKE DISPERSAL...MARGINAL TONIGHT AND EXCELLENT SATURDAY.

OUTLOOK FOR SUNDAY...
MOSTLY SUNNY, MILD AND BREEZY. ISOLATED THUNDERSTORMS WESTERN WYOMING ZONES. HIGHS MID 60S AND 70S MOUNTAINS AND 70S TO MID 80S VALLEYS.

EXTENDED FORECAST MONDAY THROUGH WEDNESDAY...
MOSTLY SUNNY, WARMER AND DRIER. ISOLATED MOUNTAIN THUNDERSTORMS LATE TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY. HIGHS WARMING INTO THE 80S AND 90S WITH NEAR 100 LOWER ELEVATION VALLEYS.

THE 6-10 DAY EXTENDED OUTLOOK FOR THURSDAY AUGUST 3 THROUGH MONDAY AUGUST 7 CALLS FOR ABOVE NORMAL TEMPERATURES AND LITTLE OR NO RAIN.

END..

NNNN

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GLOSSARY

GLOSSARY OF WILDFIRE-FIGHTING TERMS

BLOWUP
Sudden increase in fireline intensity sufficient to preclude direct control or to upset existing suppression plans. Often accompanied by violent convection and may have other characteristics of a fire storm.

BREAKOVER OR BREAKOUT
A fire edge that crosses a control line intended to confine the fire and the resultant fire. Also called a slopover.

BURN OUT
Setting fire inside a control line to consume fuel between the edge of the fire and the control line.

CLEAR TEXT
The use of plain English in radio communications transmissions. No ten codes are used in clear text.

CONTAINMENT
Completion of a control line around a fire and any associated spot fires that can reasonably be expected to stop the fire's spread.

COORDINATION
The process of systematically analyzing a situation, developing relevant information, and informing appropriate command authority (for its decision) of viable alternatives for selection of the most effective combination of available resources to meet specific objectives.

DEAD FUELS
Fuels with no living tissue in which moisture content is governed almost entirely by atmospheric moisture (relative humidity and precipitation), dry-bulb temperature, and solar radiation.

DIRECT ATTACK
Any treatment of burning fuel, e.g. by wetting, smothering, or chemically quenching the fire or by physically separating the burning from unburned fuel.

DISPATCH
The implementation of a command decision to move a resource or resources from one place to another.

DISPATCHER
A person employed who receives reports of discovery and status of fires, confirms their locations, takes action promptly to provide people and equipment likely to be needed for control in first attack, and sends them to the proper place.

DISPATCH CENTER
A facility from which resources are directly assigned to an incident.

DOZER
Any tracked vehicle with a blade for exposing mineral soil, with transportation and personnel for its operation.

DOZER LINE
Fireline constructed by a dozer.

DRY LIGHTNING STORM
Thunderstorm in which negligible precipitation reaches the ground. Also called a dry storm.

ENGINE
Any ground vehicle providing specified levels of pumping, water, and hose capacity.

ENTRAPMENT
A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior-related, life-threatening position where planned escape routes or safety zones are absent. An entrapment may or may not include deployment of a fire shelter for its intended purpose. These situations may or may not result in injury.

ESCAPE ROUTE
The way out to safety, either to an already burned area, previously constructed safety area, a meadow that won't burn, natural rocky area that is large enough to take refuge without being burned. When escape routes deviate from a defined physical path, they should be clearly marked (flagged).

ESCAPED FIRE
Fire that has exceeded initial attack capabilities.

ESCAPED FIRE SITUATION ANALYSIS
A decision-making process that evaluates alternative suppression strategies against selected environmental, social, political, and economic criteria. Provides a record of decisions.

EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR
"Extreme" implies a level of fire behavior characteristics that ordinarily precludes methods of direct control action. One or more of the following is usually involved: high rate of spread, prolific crowning and/or spotting, presence of fire whirls, strong convection column. Predictability is difficult because such fires often exercise some degree of influence on their environment and behave erratically, sometimes dangerously.

FINGERS OF A FIRE
The long narrow extensions of a fire projecting from the main body.

FIRE BEHAVIOR
The manner in which a fire reacts to the influences of fuel, weather and topography.

FIRE BEHAVIOR FORECAST
Prediction of probably fire behavior, usually prepared by a Fire Behavior Officer, in support of fire suppression or prescribed burning operations.

FIRE CREW
General term for tow or more firefighters organized to work as a unit.

FIRE PERIMETER
The entire outer edge or boundary of a fire.

FIRE SHELTER
An aluminized tent offering protection by means of reflecting radiant heat and providing a volume of breathable air in a fire entrapment situation. Shelters may be used for protecting against falling embers or smoke inhalation in non life-threatening situations or as radiant heat shields during escape.

FIRE SHELTER DEPLOYMENT
The removing of a fire shelter from its case and using it properly for protection against fire.

FLAME HEIGHT
The average maximum vertical extension of flames at the leading edge of the fire front. Occasional flashes that rise above the general level of flames are not considered. This distance is less than the flame length if flames are tilted due to wind or slope.

FLAME LENGTH
The distance between the flame tip and the midpoint of the flame depth at the base of the flame (generally the ground surface), an indicator of fire intensity.

FLAMING FRONT
The zone of a moving fire where the combustion is primarily flaming. Behind this flaming zone combustion is primarily glowing. Light fuels typically have a shallow flaming front, whereas heavy fuels have a deeper front. Also called fire front.

FLANKS OF A FIRE
The parts of a fire's perimeter that are roughly parallel to the main direction of spread.

FLASH FUELS
Fuels such as grass, leaves, draped pine needles, fern, tree moss and some kinds of slash, that ignite readily and are consumed rapidly when dry. Also called fine fuels.

FUEL BED
An array of fuels usually constructed with specific loading, depth and particle size to meet experimental requirements; also, commonly used to describe the fuel composition in natural settings.

Fuel Loading
The amount of fuel present expressed quantitatively in terms of weight of fuel per unit area.

Fuel Model
Simulated fuel complex for which all fuel descriptors required for the solution of a mathematical rat of spread model have been specified.

Fuel Type
An identifiable association of fuel elements of distinctive species, form, size, arrangement, or other characteristics that will cause a predictable rate of spread or resistance to control under specified weather conditions.

Ground Fuel
All combustible materials below the surface litter, including duff, tree or shrub roots, punky wood, peat, and sawdust, that normally support a glowing combustion without flame.

Haines Index
A tool used to measure the contribution of atmospheric stability to the growth potential of existing fires.

Head of a Fire
The side of the fire having the fastest rate of spread.

Heavy Fuels
Fuels of large diameter such as snags, logs, large limbwood, that ignite and are consumed more slowly than flash fuels.

Incident Command System
The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedure and communications operating within a common organizational structure, with responsibility for the management of assigned resources to effectively accomplish stated objectives pertaining to an incident.

Incident Commander
Individual responsible for the management of all incident operations.

Incident Objectives
Statements of guidance and direction necessary for selection of appropriate strategy(s), and the tactical direction of resources. Incident objectives are based on realistic expectations of what can be accomplished when all allocated resources have been effectively deployed.

Initial Attack
The wildfire control efforts taken by resources that are first to arrive at a wildfire.

Initial Attack Incident Commander
The incident commander at the time the first attack forces commence suppression work on a fire

Knock Down
To reduce the flame or heat on the more vigorously burning parts of a fire edge.

Lightning Activity Level (LAL)
A number, on a scale of 1 to 6, that reflects frequency and character of cloud-to-ground lightning. The scale is exponential, based on powers of 2 (i.e., LAL 3 indicates twice the lightning of LAL 2).

Live Fuels
Living plants, such as trees, grasses, and shrubs, in which the seasonal moisture content cycle is controlled largely by internal physiological mechanisms, rather than by external weather influences.

National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)
A group formed under the direction of the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior and comprised of representatives of the U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Park Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Association of State Foresters. The group's purpose is to facilitate coordination and effectiveness of wildland fire activities and provide a forum to discuss, recommend action, or resolve issues and problems of substantive nature.NWCG is the certifying body for all courses in the National Fire Curriculum.

National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC)
A facility located at Boise, Idaho, jointly operated by several federal agencies, dedicated to coordination, logical support, and improved weather services in support of fire management operations throughout the United States.

Nomex
Fire-resistant synthetic material used in manufacturing of flight suits, pants and shirts used by firefighters.

Rate of Spread
The relative activity of a fire in extending its horizontal dimensions. Usually it is expressed in chains or acres per hour for a specified period in a fire's history.

Red Flag Warning
Term used by fire weather forecasters to alert forecast users to an ongoing or imminent critical fire weather pattern.

Reel
A frame on which hose is wound, now chiefly used for "booster" or small hose (3/4 or 1-inch hose), supplied by a water tank.

Remote Automatic Weather Stations (RAWS)
An apparatus that automatically acquires, processes, and stores local weather data for subsequent transmission to the GOES Satellite, from which they are retransmitted to an earth receiving station for use in the National Fire Danger Rating System.

Rural Fire Protection
Fire protection and firefighting problems that are outside of areas under municipal fire prevention and building regulations and that are usually remote from public water supplies.

Situation Analysis
Analysis of factors that influence suppression of an escaped fire from which a plan of attack will be developed; includes development of alternative strategies of fire suppression and net effect of each.

Spray
Water applied through an orifice in finely divided particles to absorb heat and smother fire, to protect exposures from radiated heat, and to carry water toward otherwise inaccessible fire.

Strike Team
Specified combinations of the same kind and type of resources, with common communications, and a leader.

Strike Team Leader
Person responsible to a division/group supervisor for performing tactical assignments given to the strike team.

Structure Fire
Fire originating in and burning any part or all of any building, shelter, or other structure.

Tactics
Deploying and directing resources on an incident to accomplish the objectives designated by strategy.

Turnout Coat
Waterproof, lined fire coat with snap fastenings that may be donned quickly when turning out on a fire alarm; generally used on structure fires and hazardous material fires, but not on wildfires.

Water Tender
Any ground vehicle capable of transporting specified quantities of water.

Wet Line
A line of water, or water and chemical retardant, sprayed along the ground, that serves as a temporary control line from which to ignite or stop a low-intensity fire.

Wildland/Urban Interface
The line, area or zone where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels.

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